Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you work out why you missed a question or three! If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of modern monetary theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
I am now using Friday’s blog space to provide draft versions of the Modern Monetary Theory textbook that I am writing with my colleague and friend Randy Wray. We expect to publish the text sometime around mid-2014. Our (very incomplete) textbook homepage – Modern Monetary Theory and Practice – has draft chapters and contents etc in varying states of completion. Comments are always welcome. Note also that the text I post here is not intended to be a blog-style narrative but constitutes the drafting work I am doing – that is, the material posted will not represent the complete text. Further it will change as the drafting process evolves.
The Financial Times article (December 19, 2013) – The long farewell to quantitative easing – concluded such: “Quantitative easing has demonstrated to politicians everywhere that it is possible to finance government deficits simply by printing money, a fact which had become obscure in the developed economies in previous decades. The umbilical link, previously unchallenged, between running a budget deficit and the requirement to sell bonds has been broken in the mind of the political system. Who knows what the long-term effects might be”. While mistakenly thinking crediting reserve accounts is activating any printing press it is true that there is no requirement to sell bonds to run government deficits. Today I am updating my analysis of the latest flow of funds data in the US. The US Federal Reserve recently put out the latest – Z.1 Financial Accounts of the United States – aka the Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts. If the FT author had have been studying this and related data he would have known years ago that there was no functional relationship between government net spending and its habit of issuing debt to the private sector. The former is financially unconstrained while the latter is just a system of corporate welfare. But recently, the government has given the game way by being the dominant purchaser of its own debt. Hysterical (as in comical) when you think about it!
The Governor of the RBA appeared before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics yesterday (December 18, 2013). He told the Committee that the economic growth that we experienced leading up to the crisis in 2008 was unlikely to be repeated but his assessment was largely ideological in nature – in the sense that he implicitly eschewed a fundamental re-appraisal of the policy structures in the economy and the way in which national income is distributed. He thus rejected (tacitly) a return to fiscal activism claiming the public “debt dynamic” militated against that. He admitted the limits of monetary policy as an expansionary force. And he implicitly ignored the fact that the on-going failure of real wages to keep track of productivity growth meant that if household consumption expenditure was to grow it would see a return to increasing private debt to unsustainable levels, as occurred in the decade leading up to the crisis. He acknowledged that households were much more cautious now given the heavy debt levels they were carrying but didn’t acknowledge that this meant that the fiscal surpluses of that era were also unsustainable and that deficits were needed to offset the drain from the external deficits and the cautiousness of the private domestic sector. The journalists thus published all the wrong headlines and stories and the public is none the wiser. We remain locked into a neo-liberal option set that will deliver sub-trend growth and rising unemployment. The Governor even had the audacity to say that the unemployment rate (at 5.8 per cent) was low by historical standards, which in itself is false (depending on where history starts) and ignores the fact that our broad labour wastage exceeds 15 per cent of the willing labour force at present.
I have been travelling today a lot and so haven’t had much time to write. I have been reading early (1970s and 1980s) documents in recent days relating to the debate that preceded the establishment of the Eurozone. I have read them before, at the time they were released in many cases, but they provide a salutary reminder of how the political and economic reality in Europe diverged with catastrophic consequences for millions of people that live there. There was ample analysis and supporting evidence in the late 1970s to tell us that the creation of a common monetary union in the form that was eventually agreed in the 1990s would fail. But even now, with that failure for all to see, the same dynamics that predicate against any reforms that might create a strong federal fiscal capacity, are present in the discussions surrounding the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism to regulate banks and protect their depositors. The Germans, exhibiting all their irrational paranoia about inflation, are using their political weight to influence the design of the banking policy and the likely outcomes are looking decidedly deficient. They are doomed to fail if subjected to a stern test.
Last week, the Holden Motor Car Company, a division of General Motors announced it was intending to close its Australian operations down in 2017 after having operated on a continuous basis in one form or another since 1856. The decision has led to outbreaks of nostalgia, worries about our national identity (since when has a national identity been tied up with a foreign-owned capitalist firm?), and calls for more government subsidies to the industry that has been in decline for years. The problem is that thousands of jobs are directly and indirectly impacted by the closure (although there are some years before the full brunt will be experienced) and that is an issue that the government has to manage through appropriate policy interventions. The real issue is that the current thrust of aggregate (macroeconomic) policy does not provide one with much confidence that the government will introduce appropriate responses to the closures. I offer some thoughts by way of an introduction in this blog.
Today’s Australian Bureau of Statistics – Australian National Accounts – for the September-quarter 2013, shows that real GDP growth was 0.6 per cent, down from the (revised) 0.7 per cent for the June-quarter. The annualised growth rate of 2.3 per cent is now well below the trend rate between 2000 and 2008 of 3.3 per cent. This poor growth relative to trend is the reason the unemployment rate is rising. The stunning result is that the public sector contributed 1.5 percentage points to growth this quarter (a reversal from the June-quarter). This contribution, while welcome, will not be sustained given the current political environment. Overall, the data paints a fairly gloomy overall picture for the Australian economy. It ia hard to discern what the new Federal government is up to given that in 2 months we have already had four discrete statements about education policy, for example! But if their overall macroeconomic rhetoric is maintained and they start hacking into public spending to flex their conservative muscles then the outlook will shift very quickly from gloomy to disastrous and we will follow Europe down the sink hole.
This is the first part in what might be several blogs. I will see where my curiosity takes me. Today I want to invoke that well-known piece of inductive reasoning the – Duck Test. We all should know how that goes. But consider this reasoning. We have an institution that is 100 per cent government owned. It borrows millions and its liabilities are 100 per cent guaranteed by the federal government. It spends, I mean lends millions each year at very low rates to all manner of firms, organisations and even builds infrastructure. It also takes equity positions (provides capital) to a range of enterprises. It pays no tax having the same status as the central bank. It is not a duck but looks very much like a government fiscal entity. Welcome to the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit Institute) or as it is now known the – KfW. This bank was created in 1948 as a German vehicle to faciliate the infrastructure rebuilding under the Marshall Plan. It has since grown (and diversified) into one of the largest banks in Germany (taken its main business units into account) and pumps millions of Euros in the domestic economy and the export sector (via IPEX, its 100 per cent owned subsidiary). It is a major reason why the public debt ratio in Germany is 80 per cent rather than close to 100 per cent. It is a major reason why the federal deficit has been reduced without scorching the German economy. It is a story about smoke-and-mirrors accounting, German-style.
In case you are wondering what is going on with my blog today – the answer is it is flying …
Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you work out why you missed a question or three! If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of modern monetary theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
When the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of European Parliament considered the 2012 Report from the European Central Bank, the Rapporteur of the Committee and Deputy President of the EP, Gianni Pittela tendered the – Draft Report – on June 11, 2013. The ECB presented its – Annual Report 2012 to the Committee on April 24, 2013. The ECB is accountable to the EP and this Committee was exercising its political functions under that relationship. Under the heading Monetary Policy, the draft report contained two interesting items (9 and 10). By the time the amendments were finalised you learned a lot about politics in Europe and why the current system is unworkable.
In case you are wondering what is going on with my blog today – the answer is nothing!
What is happening today? I am off to Europe next week for my annual inspection of how successful fiscal austerity has been (not!). I actually have some work to attend to. I will report on that in due course. I was due to fly to Sydney late Sunday but I changed my plans and decided to fly today, which also explains why my normal blog today is very short. What motivated that?
There are seven graphs in the paper. An Excel spreadsheet was involved. Shonky stuff alert! R&R are back with another attention-seeking effort after they were disgraced when their Excel manipulation that just happened to generate ideologically-convenient results was discovered to be shonky (in the extreme). This time is not different though. As in all their so-called historical insights the pair conflate monetary regimes across time and at points of time, which means most of their conclusions are erroneous. While their insolvency threshold has zero credibility now they also still hang on it, if only by implication. And they claim that repression is when residents of free nations enjoy parking their savings in risk-free, interest-bearing government bonds, instead of taking risks with commercial paper. Sounds like free choice to me. Is suggest R&R take some R&R and let governments get on with expanding their deficits and reducing unemployment. The public debt ratios will take care of themselves.
I have been looking at industry employment data today for Australia, in particular, the behaviour of the manufacturing industry, which has attracted considerable press attention in the recent period as a result of announcements of substantial job losses being linked to exchange rate movements and high interest rate spreads between Australia and the rest of the world. What follows is a discussion of various features of the change in manufacturing employment over the last few decades which is a precursor to some very detailed work I am doing on shifts in industry employment (reasons, implications etc). These shifts are not unrelated to the major macroeconomic policy settings (fiscal and monetary) which are currently stifling economic activity at present. These aggregate effects manifest in disaggregated ways through such things as the composition of employment by industry. That is what I am looking at today.
A regular occurrence is the prediction of doom for Japan. Some minor upturn in Japanese government bond yields or a movement in some other irrelevant financial statistic relating to the Japanese public sector sends the financial press into apoplexy. The latest signal of impending bankruptcy being bandied about relates to the rising trend in foreign holdings of short- and longer-term Japanese government debt. This trend is explained by financial markets moving into less risky assets (in this case, Japanese government bonds) as uncertainty in other markets, for example the Eurozone, remains. However, the narrative then goes that eventually these purchasers will refrain from buying Japanese government debt and with the funding from the savings of the ageing domestic population drying up, the Japanese government will run out of money. Policy response? Cut fiscal deficits immediately through a combination of tax rises and spending cuts. All of which is nonsense and if the Japanese government follows the advice – there will be a 1997-style recession and public debt ratios will just rise faster than they are at present. It is better that we now all turn to the sport’s section of whatever news you read and relax.
I am now using Friday’s blog space to provide draft versions of the Modern Monetary Theory textbook that I am writing with my colleague and friend Randy Wray. We expect to publish the text sometime in 2013. Our (very incomplete) textbook homepage – Modern Monetary Theory and Practice – has draft chapters and contents etc in varying states of completion. Comments are always welcome. Note also that the text I post here is not intended to be a blog-style narrative but constitutes the drafting work I am doing – that is, the material posted will not represent the complete text. Further it will change as the drafting process evolves.
I am now using Friday’s blog space to provide draft versions of the Modern Monetary Theory textbook that I am writing with my colleague and friend Randy Wray. We expect to publish the text sometime in 2013. Our (very incomplete) textbook homepage – Modern Monetary Theory and Practice – has draft chapters and contents etc in varying states of completion. Comments are always welcome. Note also that the text I post here is not intended to be a blog-style narrative but constitutes the drafting work I am doing – that is, the material posted will not represent the complete text. Further it will change as the drafting process evolves.
There was an article in the UK Guardian (October 29, 2013) – Mainstream economics is in denial: the world has changed, which reported that the economics profession had been “stupidly cocky before the crash” and “had learned no lesson since”. It followed a – report – last week (October 25, 2013) that students at Manchester University had proposed an overhaul of orthodox teachings and economics. The latest Guardian article concludes that the economics profession is in “denial”, that is, “the high priests of economics refuse to recognise the world has changed”. I will come back to that in a moment, but evidence of this denial is swamping the debate about the upcoming Scottish decision on whether to break from Britain. So-called informed policy briefing papers have started to emerge, which will distort the choice available to the Scottish people by perpetuating basic myths about the way monetary systems operate and the choices particular currency arrangements provide government. As I’ve said before, if the medical profession offered the sort of analysis and professional opinion that my own profession offers, then they would be very few practising medics because they would have all been sent broke through malpractice lawsuits.
There is a literature emerging that suggests that a Eurozone nation would be no better off with its own currency then and is within the monetary union. The claim is that these nations have not performed any worse than nations outside the Eurozone during the current crisis. A recent paper by an American economist (Andrew Rose) – Surprising Similarities: Recent Monetary Regimes of Small Economies – is being used as the authority to support this claim. The intent is clear – to deny that the Eurozone as a monetary system is inferior to systems where the nation issues its own currency and sets its own interest rates. However, these studies skate over the currency sovereignty issue and cast the differences between nations in terms of exchange rate arrangements or whether their central bank targets inflation or not. The real issue is whether the monetary system is characterised by the government facing a financial constraint or not in its spending – that is, whether it issues its own currency, sets its own interest rates and resists issuing debt in a foreign currency. Once you consider those basic aspects of the monetary system then it becomes obvious that the Eurozone nations as a whole have performed worse than other advanced Non-Eurozone nations which have enjoyed more fiscal flexibility.