This category focuses largely on matters pertaining to Japan

Inflation in Japan – invariant to monetary policy and be careful what you wish for (tourism)

I have been thinking about the recent inflation trajectory in Japan in the light of constant calls from mainstream economists (including a bevy of private bank economists who work for institutions that benefit from interest rate hikes) for the Bank of Japan to hike rates. What is driving CPI movements? What has been the impact of the yen depreciation? How responsive is the yen to interest rate changes anyway? Are the increasing yen-denominated import prices being passed on to Japanese consumers? Why doesn’t the Takaichi Administration realise that in the face of supply-side inflation the remedy is not to expand fiscal policy? How responsive are exports to the yen depreciation? All these questions are popping up continually in the financial media at the moment. I haven’t time today to answer all these questions in detail. But here is a start.

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Those who invoke the ‘Truss Moment’ should look at what is happening in Japan

In the annals of ruses used to provoke fear in the voting public about government deficits, central bank currency issuance, and fiscal activism, the experience of Germany in the 1920s was a long-standing favourite, that could be wheeled out on demand and have immediate effect. Wheelbarrows full of money being pushed to the local bakery to buy the daily bread, etc. It was a very effective vehicle for advancing the interests of the ruling class because it created a political brake on government action to reduce poverty and maintain full employment. More recently, Zimbabwe became the vehicle. It was equally effective even though it, like the Weimar ruse, was largely based on fiction. Even more recently, we have a new ‘ruse on the block’, the so-called ‘Truss Moment’, which is particularly effective in the UK. The current Labour government is petrified to do anything that might resemble a Labour government because they have a deep-seated paranoid ideation that the ‘City’ is out to get them, and the ‘Truss Moment’ is used as the summary event that apparently justify that delusion. They might have looked to the East, to Japan, to see why the ‘Truss Moment’ was about something quite different to the popular narrative that accompanies the mention of the ill-fated few months in British politics.

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Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund and the yen – mainstream macro myths driving bad policy

With a national election approaching in Japan (February 8, 2026), there has been a lot of discussion about the so-called ‘weak yen’ and whether the Bank of Japan should be intervening to manage the value of the currency on international markets. PM Takaichi has been quoted as saying that the weak yen is good for Japanese exports and has offset some of the negative impacts on key sectors in Japan, including the automobile industry. She also said that the government would aim to encourage an economic structure that could withstand shifts in the currency’s value, largely by encouraging domestic investment. The yen depreciation is another example of the way mainstream economists distort the debate. They argue that the Bank of Japan should be increasing interest rates further to shore up the yen. Previously, they pressured the government into creating a pension fund investment vehicle to speculate in financial markets to ensure the basic pension system doesn’t run out of money. These two things are linked but not in ways that the mainstream public debate construes. It turns out that pension myths, are directly responsible for the evolution of the yen. This blog post explains why.

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Japan goes to an election accompanied by a very confused economic debate

These notes will serve as part of a briefing document that I will send off to some interested parties in Japan. Japan is about to go to the poll for a snap national election on February 8. The recently installed Prime Minister, Ms Takaichi is betting that her recent solid showing in the polls will allow her to capture more seats in the Diet and reduce or even eliminate her dependency on the ‘uncomfortable’ coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) aka Ishin. That coalition was formed after Mr Ishiba, the previous PM, also bet on a snap election result, which saw the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) go backwards (losing 68 seats) and the coalition partner Komeito also lose seats. Together the ruling coalition lost its majority in the National Diet (for the first time since 2009) and Shigeru Ishiba’s popularity began to evaporate. The background to that loss was a major political funding scandal among the Cabinet ministers and the election result signalled that the Japanese people had seemingly had enough of the corruption at the top. Ms Takaichi took over after Mr Ishiba could no longer sustain his position as PM. The old coalition between the LDP and Komeito fell apart because the Buddhist Komeito could no longer stomach the new PMs imperialist ideology nor her unwillingness to deal with he insidious corruption in her party. This forced Ms Takaichi to forge a new coalition – hence the rather unlikely pairing with Ishin, which is a right wing populist party espousing neoliberal economic policies. The government is proposing a major fiscal expansion but the debate during the campaign that is now underway is very confused. The confusion arises because all the main players keep wheeling out mainstream economic arguments that tie them up into nonsensical policy proposals.

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When contraction is called expansion – Japanese government style

Well my holiday is over. Not that I had one! This morning we submitted the manuscript to the publisher for the Second Edition of our Macroeconomics text, which will come out later this year. Finishing a massive project like that is always non-linear – the last few months are hideous – checking everything and filling gaps. Anyway, that was the Xmas break. And as the New Year starts, one always hopes that humanity learns from the mistakes of the previous year. In economics, though, that is the hope of the forlorn. I read this morning’s Japan Times newspaper and lo and behold there are predictions of dire consequences as a result of the current Cabinet decision to shift focus away from pursuing a primary fiscal surplus to massaging the public debt ratio. The mainstream economists are arguing about the relative virtues of each and forecasting gloom. The reality is that neither target is worth attention. Meanwhile, the privatised rail companies are negotiating with communities for the closure of certain rail segments because they are loss making. All that discussion is about costs per passenger km, rather than satisfaction gained from bringing people together. The priorities are all wrong.

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Video – Japan at a Crossroads: Fiscal Policy, China, and the Growth

I have limited time today to write a blog post and last night I was sent a new video that I recently recorded with my research colleague at Kyoto University, Professor Fujii where we talk for some hours on the topic – Japan at a Crossroads: Fiscal Policy, China, and the Growth. It was a conversation we had via Zoom that was recorded on Friday, December 5, 2025. We reflect on recent developments in Japan and its relationship with other major countries (US, China, etc) and consider the policy challenges facing the new Takaichi Cabinet. It is a very long session. The transcript was generated by YouTube AI I believe and then edited and is not perfect. A lot of unnecessary aspects are edited out and the latter part of the transcript is really just an AI summary. But I think the record is acceptable. At times, the discussion changed from English to Japanese, where there was some ambiguity in terminology etc, and those segments have been cut from the transcript. I put in timestamps during the transcript to help you zoom into topics of interest. I hope you find something useful in our long discussion.

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A lower yen is not inflationary once the adjustments are absorbed

Last Friday (December 5, 2025), I filmed an extended discussion with my Kyoto University colleague, Professor Fujii about a range of issues concerning the Japanese and Global economy. Once it is edited, the video will be available on YouTube. Fujii-sensei is advising the new Japanese Prime Minister and is the author of the ‘Responsible proactive fiscal policy’ slogan that is summarising the shift within the Japanese government from the Ishiba Cabinet and their austerity mindset to the new Takaichi Cabinet and its desire to introduce renewed fiscal expansion. Among the topics discussed: (a) my conjecture that Japan is caught in a vicious cycle of secular stagnation and requires a large fiscal shock to alter the deflationary mindset that has crippled the economy over several decades; (b) the need for tariffs to protect Japanese industry to advance food security (in the face of major rice shortages during the last year or two); (c) whether Japan should participate in Plaza Accord 2.0 (aka Mar-a-Lago Accord) that Trump is demanding China accept; and (d) policy structures that are necessary to reallocate labour from areas of excess (gig economy) to sectors where shortages and bottlenecks are present (for example, Construction), The latter will be essential if the proposed fiscal expansion is to stimulate production rather than prices. For the purposes of this blog post though, we also discussed the validity of fiscal expansion within the context of the yen. Mainstream economists keep arguing that the expansion is not viable given the depreciation of the yen, which they claim has been inflationary. It is a standard argument and I mentioned it in this recent blog post – Panel of Japanese economists mired in erroneous mainstream constructions and logic (November 27, 2025). I consider that issue more today.

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Talk of a Plaza Accord 2.0 should heed the lessons of Plaza Accord 1.0

Pressure is building from the US for a Plaza Accord 2.0 as part of the US President’s attempts to ‘improve’ the US trade situation. I use the term ‘improve’ cautiously because the US President seems think that making it more difficult and expensive for US consumers and businesses to access imports from abroad is a benefit to the same. While Japan is being discussed in this frame, the real US target is China. However, it is unlikely that the US will be able to bully China into agreeing to a similar deal that the US effectively forced on to Japan and other nations under the Plaza Accord 1.0 in 1985. Further, the Plaza Accord 1.0 was extremely disruptive – some say it caused the asset price bubble in Japan, which led to the secular stagnation, after the bubble burst. And, there is little evidence that it led to any significant long-term benefits for the US anyway.

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Panel of Japanese economists mired in erroneous mainstream constructions and logic

Last Friday, I met a journalist in Tokyo and we discussed among other things, the results of the latest Nikkei/JCER ‘Economics Panel’, which was conducted between November 13 and November 18, 2025. The panel involves “questionnaires” being “sent to approximately 50 economists to gather their evaluations of various economic policies. The aim is to promote deeper and more active discussions on economic policy by clearly conveying the consensus and differences of opinion among experts, along with presenting individual comments from each economist.” The results are quite striking and demonstrate that the Japanese academic economics profession is mired in destructive Groupthink that means the profession is failing to contribute in any effective and functional way to advancing the well-being of the Japanese population or providing insights into how the nation can meet its considerable and immediate challenges.

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Kyoto Report 2025 – 9

This Tuesday report will provide some insights into life for a westerner (me) who is working for an extended period at Kyoto University in Japan but who over the years of working here has increasingly began to understand the language and local cultural traditions. Sadly, this is my last Kyoto Report for 2025. My time here has once again come to an end after 9 weeks and I am heading back home. I will return to my work here next September if all is well.

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