The Eurozone Member States are not equivalent to currency-issuing governments in fiscal flexibility

I don’t have much time today for writing as I am travelling a lot on my way back from my short working trip to Europe. While I was away I had some excellent conversations with some senior European Commission economists who provided me with the latest Commission thinking on fiscal policy within the Eurozone and the attitude the Commission is taking to the macroeconomic surveillance and enforcement measures. It is a pity that some Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) colleagues didn’t have the same access. If they had they would not keep repeating the myth that for all intents and purposes the 20 Member States are no different to a currency issuing nation. Such a claim lacks an understanding of the institutional realities in Europe and unfortunately serves to give false hope to progressive forces who think that they can reform the dysfunctional architecture and the inbuilt neoliberalism to advance progressive ends. There is nearly zero possibility that such reform will be forthcoming and I despair that so much progressive energy is expended on such a lost cause.

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The US dollar is losing importance in the global economy – but there is really nothing to see in that fact

Since we began the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) project in the mid-1990s, many people have asserted (wrongly) that the analysis we developed only applies to the US because it is considered to be the reserve currency. That status, the story goes, means that it can run fiscal deficits with relative impunity because the rest of the world clamours for the currency, which means it can always, in the language of the story, ‘fund’ its deficits. The corollary is that other countries cannot enjoy this fiscal freedom because the bond markets will eventually stop funding the government deficits if they get ‘out of hand’. All of this is, of course, fiction. Recently, though, the US exchange rate has fallen to its lowest level in three years following the Trump chaos and there are various commentators predicting that the reserve status is under threat. Unlike previous periods of global uncertainty when investors increase their demand for US government debt instruments, the current period has been marked by a significant US Treasury bond liquidation (particularly longer-term assets) as the ‘Trump’ effect leads to irrational beliefs that the US government might default. This has also led to claims that the dominance of the US dollar in global trade and financial transactions is under threat. There are also claims the US government will find it increasingly difficult to ‘fund’ itself. The reality is different on all counts.

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The arms race again – Part 2

This is the second part of my thoughts on the current acceleration in military spending around the world. The first part – The arms race again – Part 1 (June 11, 2025) – focused on background and discussed the concept of ‘military Keynesianism’. In this Part 2, I am focusing more specifically on the recent proposals by the European Commission to increase military spending and compromise its social spending. The motivation came from an invitation I received from the Chair of the Finance Committee in the Irish Parliament to make a submission to inform a – Scrutiny process of EU legislative proposals – specifically to discuss proposals put forward by the European Council to increase spending on defence. The two-part blog post series will form the basis of my submission which will go to the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure, Public Service Reform and Digitalisation on Friday. In this Part, I focus specifically on the European dilemma.

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The arms race again – Part 1

The Chair of the Finance Committee in the Irish Parliament invited me to make a submission to inform a – Scrutiny process of EU legislative proposals – specifically to discuss proposals put forward by the European Council to increase spending on defence. This blog post and the next (tomorrow) will form the basis of my submission which will go to the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure, Public Service Reform and Digitalisation on Friday. The matter has relevance for all countries at the moment, given the increased appetite for ramping up military spending. Some have termed this a shift back to what has been called – Military Keynesianism – where governments respond to various perceived and perhaps imaginary new security threats by increasing defence spending. However, I caution against using that term in this context. During the immediate Post World War 2 period with the almost immediate onset of the – Cold War – nations used military spending as a growth strategy and the term military Keynesianism might have been apposite. These nation-building times also saw an expansion of the public sector, which supported expanding welfare states and an array of protections for workers (occupational safety, holiday and sick pay, etc). However, in the current neoliberal era, the increased appetite for extra military spending is being cast as a trade-off, where cuts to social and environmental protection spending and overseas aid are seen as the way to create fiscal space to allow the defence plans to be fulfilled. That trade-off is even more apparent in the context of the European Union, given that the vast majority of Member States no longer have their own currency and the funds available at the EU-level are limited. We will discuss that issue and more in this two-part series.

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The Far Right opposition to the euro in Germany has nothing to do with MMT

Edward Elgar, my sometime publisher, is interested in me updating my 2015 book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (published May 2015). I have held them off for a few years because there have been notable developments such as Brexit, COVID-19, and more since I finished that work, which are still playing out and difficult to disentangle in such a way that definitive analysis can be made. One of the striking things about Europe, from my perspective, is that voters appear to have separated the growing economic stagnation and the insecurity it brings from their view of the euro as a currency. The most recent – Standard Eurobarometer Survey 102 (conducted in November 2024) – conducted by the EU itself, “has registered the highest support ever for the common currency, both in the EU as a whole (74%) and in the euro area (81%)”. (85 per cent support in Germany and 76 per cent in France). Given the circumstances that is a pretty stunning result. And more respondents thought the EU economy was ‘good’ than those who thought it was ‘bad’, although in Germany and France, the outlook in that regard is highly pessimistic (40 per cent good Germany, 29 per cent France). Yet, the Far Right party in Germany – Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – which as a result of the national election on February 25, 2025 gained the second highest number of votes (20.8 per cent of total) and improved its voting outcome by a staggering 10.4 per cent. Interestingly, from my perspective, AfD is now the leading voice in Europe against the euro, while other Far Rights voices are no longer (Rassemblement National) or never have (Fratelli) advocated abandoning the euro in favour of a return to national currency sovereignty. So while most Germans like the euro, more are voting for AfD who want it scrapped. That tension is what I am researching at the moment among other things.

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The Left has created the swing to the Right – some reflections

The last several decades of what is termed the neoliberal era has led to some fundamental changes in our social and economic institutions. It was led by the interests of capital reconfiguring what the polity should be doing, given that most of the significant shifts have come through the legislative or regulative capacity (power) of our governments. In turn, this reconfiguration then spawned shifts within the political parties themselves such that the traditional structures and voices have changed, in some cases, almost beyond recognition. The impacts of these shifts have undermined the security and prosperity of many citizens and redistributed massive wealth to a small minority. The anxiety created as the middle class has been hollowed out has been crying out for representation – for political support. Traditionally, support for the socio-economic underdogs came from the Left, the progressive polity, which, after all was the Left’s raison d’être. But that willingness by the Left politicians to give voice to the oppressed has significantly diminished as it surrendered the macroeconomic debate to the mainstream and got lost in post modernism. As a consequence, the ideological balance has demonstrably shifted to the Right, and the former progressive parties have been abandoned. My thesis is that the Left has created a burgeoning return of the Right with a daring and resolve that we haven’t seen for decades. The election and aftermath of Donald Trump’s elevation to presidency demonstrates the situation. Last weekend’s general election in Germany demonstrates the situation. And today a poll was released in Australia that suggests the current Labor government, which slaughtered the conservatives in the last election just 3 years ago are now facing a clear loss to the Opposition – that is advocating Trump-style radicalism. As the saying goes – you get what you deserve.

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ECB should take over and repay all the joint debt held by the European Commission after the pandemic

There are repeating episodes in world macroeconomics that demonstrate the absurdity of the mainstream way of thinking. One, obviously is the recurring debt ceiling charade in the US, where over a period of months, the various parties make threats and pretend they will close the government down by failing to pass the bill. Others think up what they think are ingenious solutions (like the so-called trillion dollar coin), which just gives the stupidity oxygen. Another example is the European Union ‘budget’ deliberations which involve excruciating, drawn out negotiations, which are now in train in Europe. One of the controversial bargaining aspects as the Member States negotiate a new 7-year deal is the rather significant quantity of joint EU debt that was issued during the pandemic to help nations through the crisis. How that is repaid is causing grief and leading to rather ridiculous suggestions of further austerity cuts and more. My suggestion to cut through all this nonsense is that the ECB takes over the debt and insulates the Member States from repayment. After all, the debt wasn’t issued because the Member States were pursuing irresponsible and profligate fiscal strategies.

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Germany’s sectoral decline and its obsession with fiscal austerity

I am currently researching statistical and textual material as part of my plan to produce an updated version of my 2015 book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (published May 2015) – to take into account the pandemic, Brexit and other major changes that impact on Europe’s position in the world economy and the internal shifts within Europe itself that will make it even more difficult for the Member State nations to maintain their material living standards. My publisher (Edward Elgar) is keen to push this project on. As part of this work I have been examining changes since 2015 across various European states. Today, I discuss the decline in Germany’s fortunes that has arisen as a result of a combination of circumstances: an obsession with fiscal austerity; the suppression of domestic spending capacity; the unrelenting promotion of the so-called ‘export-reliant, manufacturing-heavy economic model’; the election of Donald Trump; and the maturing of the Chinese economy. German politicians, particularly, have become so caught up in the ‘Schwarze Null’ ideology that they have failed to anticipate the medium- and longer-term consequences of their actions. These consequences were all laid out in my 2015 book but policy makers have generally ignored any criticisms of the ‘German model’. Now the chickens are coming home to roost. Fast. And it spells bad times for Europe.

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The assessment that Greece has been an ‘astonishing success’ beggars belief

Today, I consider the Greek situation, the decision by the UK Chancellor to further deregulate the financial services sector and then to calm everyone down or not, some music. The Financial Times published an article (December 12, 2024) – The astonishing success of Eurozone bailouts – which basically redefines the meaning of English words like ‘success’. Apparently, Greece is now a successful economy and that success is due to the Troika bailouts in 2015 and the imposition of harsh austerity. The data, unfortunately, doesn’t support that assessment. Yes, there is economic growth, albeit from a very low base. But other indicators reveal a parlous state of affairs. At least, this blog post finishes on a high note. Please note there will be no post tomorrow (Wednesday) as I am travelling all day. I will resume on Thursday.

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Austerity cultist Kenneth Rogoff continues to bore us with his broken record

One would reasonably think that if someone had been exposed in the past for pumping out a discredited academic paper after being at the forefront of the destructive austerity push during the Global Financial Crisis, then some circumspection might be in order. Apparently not. In 2010, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a paper in one of the leading mainstream academic journals – Growth in a Time of Debt – which became one of the most cited academic papers at the time. At the time, they even registered a WWW domain for themselves (now defunct) to promote the paper and tell us all how many journalists, media programs etc have been citing their work. While one can understand the self-promotion by Rogoff and Reinhart, it seems that none of these media outlets or journalists did much checking. It turned out that they had based their results on research that had grossly mishandled the data – deliberately or inadvertently – and that a correct use of the available data found that that nations who have public debt to GDP ratios that cross the alleged 90 per cent threshold experienced average real GDP growth of 2.2 per cent rather than -0.1 per cent as was published by Rogoff and Reinhart in their original paper. So all their boasting about finding robust “debt intolerance limits” arising from “sharply rising interest rates” – and then “painful fiscal adjustments” and “outright default” were not sustainable. Humility might have been the order of the day. But not for Rogoff. He regularly keeps popping up making predictions of doom based on faulty mainstream logic.

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