Posts about monetary policy

Imagine if the British government wrote off its holdings of its own debt

Last week, I considered recent research published by the BIS – Bank of International Settlements pushing the ‘growth friendly austerity’ myth – which was a classic example of how the sense of urgency and crisis is engendered by constructing the narrative in such a restricted manner that real world options are excluded which contradict the mission. If we assume that key features of any system are unable to be activated, then it is easy to speculate that the system will fail. This communication technique abounds in the financial and economic commentariat and leaves listeners and readers with a sense of anxiety and distort the political process. The commentaries that typify this approach all invoke a sense of urgency – ‘act now or else’ – and like to quote large dollar (pound, yen etc) sums because the commentator knows that our eyes glaze over with numbers that are beyond our own experience. Further, when the article parades as an Op Ed, the writer regularly just rehearses some press release or perhaps, less formal statement, that some organisation like the IMF has made. The other part of the scam is that these organisations are elevated into the sphere of sources that are to be believed without question. Two recent examples are the recent articles appearing in the UK Guardian – Burnham’s funding gap: what state are UK finances in for the PM-in-waiting? (published July 3, 2026) – and – Act soon to change ‘unsustainable’ direction of UK debt, OBR warns (published July 7, 2026).

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Bank of International Settlements pushing the ‘growth friendly austerity’ myth

I have been ‘at it’ for decades now but it never ceases to amaze me how mainstream macroeconomic analysis is carried out and the way the public just accepts the conclusions without understanding the basis on which the analysis generates those conclusions. Chapter II in the BIS Annual Economic Report (released June 28, 2026) – High public debt and shifting financial markets: challenges for central banks – exemplifies this point. The conclusions are rather stark but they all flow on some key assumptions that could be varied at any time by the government, which would nullify the conclusions. In other words, the projections of crises and monetary emergencies are all predicated on the assumption that the government would not step in with its unique capacities to prevent the catastrophe. In what world would we think that would happen? Not the real world, and the GFC and pandemic are recent examples where the alleged constraints are jettisoned by government in the blink of an eye.

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Depreciating yen – look beyond the obvious for the explanation

The editorial in The Japan Times (July 3, 2026) – Little hope for a declining yen amid structural pressures – is an example of how mainstream commentators seize on superficial facts, apply some ideology, and come up with the wrong conclusion. As I have noted many times, the challenges facing Japan are many, not the least being the high savings rate, which is dominated by corporations. After the asset collapse in 1991, Japanese corporations have become large-scale net savers, with strong profits and very weak investment. The corporations are sitting on massive stockpiles of cash and liquid assets, and use on-going financial surpluses (profits greater than costs) to reduce their debt exposure. The 1991 crash (and the massive debt buildup that preceded it) has left a psychological scar on the Japanese firms. The Takaichi strategy is to ‘shock’ the economy into increasing investment rates via a large fiscal injection. This has implications for the currency value, which I will explain.

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Apparently the UK government is about to do the impossible – run out of sterling

Go back to the headlines in 2010 – – “Countries with debt over 90 percent of GDP enter a danger zone”. The 90 per cent threshold entered the media coverage as a result of a paper released by Harvard economists Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart – Growth in a Time of Debt. That paper talked about “debt intolerance limits” arising from “sharply rising interest rates” – and then “painful fiscal adjustments” and “outright default”. It also talked about the “obvious connection” between inflation and high public debt ratios – which had me laughing at the time because no-one has really shown that to be a robust relationship at all. Everyone started quoting the paper, even though at the time it had obvious flaws. The predictions failed to materialise as did all the previous predictions that economists like them had failed. But the press keeps giving their views a public platform because the lurid predictions attract audiences. It is a pity because lame politicians seem to regard the predictions as being based in fact and change policies for the worse. Anyway, Rogoff is back in town predicting that the British government will run out of sterling and be forced to bring in the IMF to address the fiscal crisis. That is what the headlines say. But if you delve more deeply, his position is a little different and exposes the chicanery of mainstream economics which holds itself out as a consistent body of theory but regularly uses that pretence to bully governments into political shifts that help the elites and damage the rest of us.

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Monetary policy is not fit for purpose

I have said this many times – monetary policy is not fit for purpose and central banks should be prevented from having discretionary powers to alter rates at will. There are two levels of justification for that assertion. First, at the ideological level, a major (dominant under neoliberalism) arm of macroeconomic policy should not be outsourced to an unelected, unaccountable body of technocrats. This subverts the operation of democracies by allowing elected officials to depoliticise policy settings through their ‘pass the parcel’ approach – ‘oh the central bank is independent and we never interfere in their decisions’ type narrative. Second, on a technical level, the officials have little idea of when and what the impact will be of their policy changes. There are too many unknowns, mostly relating to the distributional consequences of interest rate changes (creditors win, debtors lose) which make it impossible to predict when the creditors will spend up their gains and debtors cut their spending. As a result, there are many examples in history of central banks moving too early (relative to their stated objective) or too late, with the outcome being that they make matters worse, particularly prolonging recessions. This situation is once again looming up in Japan at the moment.

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Another major disservice in the quest for an enlightened society

I read two articles at the airport early this morning, while I was waiting for a flight, which I wish I hadn’t read. The first was bemoaning the approaching “$A1 trillion problem” that apparently the Australian government and all of us are about to face. It was written by a journalist who is schooled in paraphrasing press releases from corporations and investment banks and holding out the results as somehow informed and independent commentary. The second was about the UK and how it faces a major issue with the ‘bond markets’ a la Liz Truss-style and how it should instead do something about the Bank of England. It was written by a progressive academic (sadly). Neither commentary captures the essence of the issue they seek to write about. But they do present enough reality to provide a pathway into something much better. Today, I will deal only with the alleged $A1 trillion problem.

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Article 4 of the Bank of Japan Act 1997 ensures fiscal and monetary policy must work together

Last week, the RBA increased interested rates claiming there was a growing capacity constraint (even though there is 10.2 per cent labour underutilisation) and inflationary expectations were increasing and in danger of propelling inflation even further. The RBA governor once again threatened the Treasurer along the lines of ‘unless you cut net spending we will continue to hike rates’ – which not only demonstrates that the central bank is not politically independent but also reveals how poor monetary policy then compromises fiscal policy. The double jeopardy of New Keynesian macroeconomics – pretend monetary policy is effective and then cripple fiscal policy (which is effective) by subjugating it to the central bank whims. If we look at what is going on in Japan at present, we get a different angle to this. The Bank of Japan is certainly worried about inflation but it is being tethered to some extent by the Prime Minister who is placing a specific emphasis on Article 4 of the Bank of Japan Act. The resulting policy dynamics stand in sharp contrast to the way the RBA acts and thinks it is appropriate to bully the government into pursuing austerity when there is massive wastage of available labour resources.

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RBA rate hikes – ideology triumphing over evidence and reason

In some respects, we are back to where we were in 2021 when the supply constraints that arose from the COVID lockdowns and widespread illnesses started to reveal themselves in escalating prices around the world. This time it is the US-Israel folly in the Middle East that is the culprit and the supply constraints are largely confined to energy, specifically oil (and its derivative products). And like the COVID inflation, the current inflationary pressures will prove to be transitory and will dissipate as soon as Trump gets bored and decrees his folly is over. It is irresponsible to adjust monetary policy, which will have long-term consequences, to deal with a short-term blip, especially when the causes of that blip are not sensitive to interest rate changes. When the RBA hiked interest rates again they knew they could not justify it based on the energy cost rises. Everyone knows these cost rises are temporary. So the RBA resorted to “capacity constraints” and ‘rising expectations’ to justify their action yet provided no robust evidence to support these assertions. It was ideology triumphing over reason. Just what we have come to expect from our central bank.

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US economy on an unstable knife edge at present

The income and wealth inequality that continues to grow in most advanced nations has led to some new terminology being introduced into the lexicon of economic terms, the – K-shaped economy: When growth moves in two different directions. When this pattern of growth is identified you know how far out of kilter the world has become. Essentially, for most people, times are so tough that even essential goods and services become so expensive that even non-discretionary spending starts to take a hit. Yet, for the top-end-of-town, with the high wealth and high incomes, who are boosted by rising central bank interest rates and rising asset prices (financial and real estate etc), their spending goes crazy as the Porsches roll out the showroom door at an increasing rate. The K-pattern relates to the less well-off heading south and the rich and high income cohorts heading north in terms of prosperity and capacity to consume. The latest data from the US, which exemplifies this trend more than most countries, given its massive inequality, clearly demonstrates this phenomenon.

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