Edward Elgar, my sometime publisher, is interested in me updating my 2015 book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (published May 2015). I have held them off for a few years because there have been notable developments such as Brexit, COVID-19, and more since I finished that work, which are still playing out and difficult to disentangle in such a way that definitive analysis can be made. One of the striking things about Europe, from my perspective, is that voters appear to have separated the growing economic stagnation and the insecurity it brings from their view of the euro as a currency. The most recent – Standard Eurobarometer Survey 102 (conducted in November 2024) – conducted by the EU itself, “has registered the highest support ever for the common currency, both in the EU as a whole (74%) and in the euro area (81%)”. (85 per cent support in Germany and 76 per cent in France). Given the circumstances that is a pretty stunning result. And more respondents thought the EU economy was ‘good’ than those who thought it was ‘bad’, although in Germany and France, the outlook in that regard is highly pessimistic (40 per cent good Germany, 29 per cent France). Yet, the Far Right party in Germany – Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – which as a result of the national election on February 25, 2025 gained the second highest number of votes (20.8 per cent of total) and improved its voting outcome by a staggering 10.4 per cent. Interestingly, from my perspective, AfD is now the leading voice in Europe against the euro, while other Far Rights voices are no longer (Rassemblement National) or never have (Fratelli) advocated abandoning the euro in favour of a return to national currency sovereignty. So while most Germans like the euro, more are voting for AfD who want it scrapped. That tension is what I am researching at the moment among other things.

There are repeating episodes in world macroeconomics that demonstrate the absurdity of the mainstream way of thinking. One, obviously is the recurring debt ceiling charade in the US, where over a period of months, the various parties make threats and pretend they will close the government down by failing to pass the bill. Others think up what they think are ingenious solutions (like the so-called trillion dollar coin), which just gives the stupidity oxygen. Another example is the European Union ‘budget’ deliberations which involve excruciating, drawn out negotiations, which are now in train in Europe. One of the controversial bargaining aspects as the Member States negotiate a new 7-year deal is the rather significant quantity of joint EU debt that was issued during the pandemic to help nations through the crisis. How that is repaid is causing grief and leading to rather ridiculous suggestions of further austerity cuts and more. My suggestion to cut through all this nonsense is that the ECB takes over the debt and insulates the Member States from repayment. After all, the debt wasn’t issued because the Member States were pursuing irresponsible and profligate fiscal strategies.

One would reasonably think that if someone had been exposed in the past for pumping out a discredited academic paper after being at the forefront of the destructive austerity push during the Global Financial Crisis, then some circumspection might be in order. Apparently not. In 2010, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a paper in one of the leading mainstream academic journals – Growth in a Time of Debt – which became one of the most cited academic papers at the time. At the time, they even registered a WWW domain for themselves (now defunct) to promote the paper and tell us all how many journalists, media programs etc have been citing their work. While one can understand the self-promotion by Rogoff and Reinhart, it seems that none of these media outlets or journalists did much checking. It turned out that they had based their results on research that had grossly mishandled the data – deliberately or inadvertently – and that a correct use of the available data found that that nations who have public debt to GDP ratios that cross the alleged 90 per cent threshold experienced average real GDP growth of 2.2 per cent rather than -0.1 per cent as was published by Rogoff and Reinhart in their original paper. So all their boasting about finding robust “debt intolerance limits” arising from “sharply rising interest rates” – and then “painful fiscal adjustments” and “outright default” were not sustainable. Humility might have been the order of the day. But not for Rogoff. He regularly keeps popping up making predictions of doom based on faulty mainstream logic.