This category focuses largely on matters pertaining to Japan
This weekly report will provide some insights into life for a westerner (me) who is working for an extended period at Kyoto University in Japan but who over the years of working here has increasingly began to understand the language and local cultural traditions.
I know I am venturing into the world shared by sociologists, cultural anthropologists, cultural historians, and economists in the current research that I am pursuing. The question is whether traditional Japanese values are compatible with a mainstream ideology that pursues ever increasing GDP growth as a goal, if not a reality. The current Japanese government is pursuing what they previously referred to as a ‘high pressure’ growth strategy and aim to end the decades of low GDP growth deflation which has become embedded in the psyche of the corporate and household sector. This strategy is running into severe constraints, not the least coming from the demographic shifts that will see the population shrink to around 105 million by 20250 (from 123 million currently). In past posts I have suggested that Japan represents an ideal model to demonstrate how a degrowth strategy would work to maintain essential material prosperity yet reduce the nation’s ecological footprint. I am now looking into whether the degrowth notion has roots in the traditional cultural values of the nation. This is my first report (Part 1) on that theme.
In this blog post, I am continuing my work on examining the constraints in the Japanese infrastructure sector that would reduce the effectiveness of the fiscal expansion that the current government is proposing as a strategy to kickstart the economy and lift productivity. One approach is to decompose employment changes in the sector into the demand-side and supply-side components, which helps us assess whether there is a shortage of spending or a shortage of workers. The data shows two unambiguous patterns. First, construction employment is driven strongly by government spending on infrastructure. When that wanes, activity plummets. Second, in recent years, the overwhelming reason employment in the sector is declining is due to a contraction of labour supply. Taken together, while it is a relatively straightforward path to stimulate the industry – increase public investment spending, the supply constraints make that approach difficult to implement. This will bear on the effectiveness and outcomes of the current fiscal expansion proposed by the Takaichi government in Japan.
This weekly report will provide some insights into life for a westerner (me) who is working for an extended period at Kyoto University in Japan but who over the years of working here has increasingly began to understand the language and local cultural traditions.
I am currently working on developing models that help evaluate the constraints on fiscal expansion in Japan arising from the ageing workforce in the construction sector. The current government under Ms. Takaichi is pursuing what they call a “responsible proactive fiscal policy” that aims to utilise large-scale public investment spending to crowd-in private investment expenditure and create a high-pressure economy, where productivity growth is enhanced. The strategy also involves significant fiscal reform – moving away from single-year fiscal cycles (obsessing about primary surpluses) to a long-term, multi-year spending plan that provides certainty to the non-government sector. The combined public-private investment blueprint proposes to spend ¥370 trillion in the period to 2040 across 17 strategic sectors. Most mainstream commentary is focused on the implications of the increase in public debt arising from the proposals (given that the government still unnecessarily matches net spending increases with debt issuance) for bond market yields and whether the government will run out of money. An irrelevant focus! However, the intent of the plan can be contested given the need to reduce the ecological footprint of all nations. But even if we ignore that issue, the practicalities of the proposal can be contested within a Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) framework based on resource availability.
This weekly report will provide some insights into life for a westerner (me) who is working for an extended period at Kyoto University in Japan but who over the years of working here has increasingly began to understand the language and local cultural traditions.
On September 28, 1976, then British PM gave an historic speech at the Annual Labour Party Conference held in Blackpool. The speech was written by his son-in-law, one Peter Jay, who himself was mired in scandals throughout his career. For example, the nepotism allegations after he was appointed British Ambassador to the US, his wife’s extra-marital affair with Carl Bernstein, his own affair with the family nanny at the embassy and the resulting paternity lawsuit that Jay initially denied but was found to be the father, not to mention his demeaning relationship with Robert Maxwell. A good candidate for a speech write. In that speech, Callaghan more or less claimed that the Keynesian consensus up to that point (from the Great Depression) was dead and that the fiscal tools that had delivered prosperity in the post WW2 period were no longer effective and should fiscal deficits should be abandoned. How exactly when the non-government sector as a whole desired to spend less than they earned overall was not specified because the lie that cutting government spending was a growth tool dominated. This narratives that Callaghan introduced have been repeated many times since that time when conservative commentators and economists seek attention. The latest appeared in the Financial Times (September 5, 2026) in the form of an article by former Bank of England board member Andy Haldane – Is Keynesianism dead?. He says yes, I say no!
In recent months, the mainstream media commentators have been issuing increasing lurid predictions of how the ‘out of control’ fiscal situation in Japan is killing the yen and a full-scale currency crisis was imminent, after the yen moved across the ‘fabled’ 160 mark against the US dollar. What is ‘fabled’ about that threshold is anyone’s guess, but mainstream economists and their mouthpieces in the press love to come up with disaster thresholds that generate headlines. There is nothing significant about 160. Last Tuesday (September 1, 2026), the yen reached 160.20. At the time of writing, the yen was sitting on 155.95 to the US dollar. Why is the yen appreciating again? And why have the short-sellers become very wary? Especially, as the Takaichi government is clearly intent on pushing ahead with the rather significant fiscal expansion, which the mainstream think will kill the currency. This post argues that the yen dynamics have little really to do with fiscal policy settings. Other factors are more significant and often reflect the skittishness of the financial markets chasing profit wherever they can find it. The commentators and the financial market spokespersons might claim the dynamics are all about excessive government debt and all that political stuff, but the reality is very different. As you were!
Most of the economics commentary in the last few weeks about Japan has been about the need for higher interest rates or, relatedly, the ‘desperate’ foreign exchange intervention where the US allegedly bailed out Japan to prevent currency failure. All side issues really. The forex intervention said more about US paranoia than anything about Japan’s challenges. The US clearly doesn’t want Japan to sell off its stock of US Treasury bonds and cause yields to rise (not that that would matter anyway) and it also knows that Japanese manufacturers have become very competitive (and are booming) in the US market. That is what that is all about. But the real news, in my view, is the decision by the Japanese Cabinet to cut the sales tax on food from 8 per cent to 1 per cent, even if the cash registers in the big retail stores would have needed massive upgrades to accommodate the planned zero sales tax. A 1 per cent compromise solved that piece of archaic infrastructure. But the sales tax proposal, which will see the first cut since the tax was introduced in April 1989 is a significant plank in the current government’s desire to shock the economy out of its damaging deflationary mindset. While I support the move, it would have been better for the government to scrap the sales tax completely. But the current proposal is a small but significant step in the context of Japanese politics and the surrounding economic commentariat. So we should be thankful for small mercies.
The prophets of doom (Japan division) are back in town predicting the worst for the country. The UK Guardian even is getting in on the act (July 25, 2026) – Can Japan avoid a Liz Truss-style shock as its PM embarks on a giant spending spree?. It is interesting now that the prophets have a new ‘case study’ to provide them with a reference point for their predictions of chaos. I wrote about that in this blog post – Rinse and repeat – Truss chaos – the new benchmark (March 28, 2024) – and gave some Japanese context sometime later in this post – Those who invoke the ‘Truss Moment’ should look at what is happening in Japan (February 12, 2026). Apparently, the plans by the Japanese government to revitalise public infrastructure and crowd in private investment will see the “International investors” will lead to a “Liz Truss-style economic shock”. I wonder every day what these journalists think of their lives when they reflect on what they write. It can’t be a very fulfilling life when it is based on beat-ups, conspiracy-style fictions, and the rest of it. One of the rules of composition that I was taught in university was that an argument had to be internally consistent. These types of articles cannot even get that rule right.