In the wake of the decision by students at Harvard University to boycott an introductory economics lecture conducted by textbook writer Greg Mankiw, I thought this New York Times article (November 5, 2011) – Wanted: Worldly Philosophers – was interesting. It provides a much more reasoned assessment of what the issues might be than the response presented in the Harvard Crimson (the student daily) – Stay in School (November 3, 2011). The latter was signed “The Crimson Staff” and a link took us to an outlined photo of a “male” and the filename was entitled – noface_131x131.jpg. So no-one was even game to own up to the viewpoint. The male photo also suggests some inherent bias. I agree with the Crimson – walkouts should not be about ideology. But they are justified if a lecturer is offering material that is patently false and attempting to hold it out as the way the economy operates. That is why I would encourage students to walk out of mainstream macroeconomics lectures right around the globe. It is a disagreement about facts not ideology.

Many people have drawn to my attention in recent weeks the evolution of the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) Wikipedia entry and raised concern about the criticisms that are now on that site. I thought I better go and read the entry. I certainly have not added material to the site. Having said that I am happy that there is a page available. It seems that the criticisms cited are sourced to blogs by an Austrian Schooler, a graduate student blogger, and Brad DeLong. There does not appear to be an sound academic citation. The critics actually admit to basing their views on a cursory reading of the MMT literature and then only on the blogs that are out there now (including this one). The major claim is that MMT is just an accounting tautology. That just means they have read the first of hundreds of pages of MMT and then probably haven’t really grasped its significance. MMT is in fact an accounting-consistent, operationally-sound theoretical approach to understanding the way fiat monetary systems work and how policy changes are likely to play out.

This Report – The “Jobless and Wageless” Recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-2009 – published by the Center for Labor Market Studies of Northeastern University (thanks Stephan) should have received headline attention from all the American media outlets instead of the disgusting venting of religious zealotry that goes under the name “debt ceiling debate” which has dominated media space. The Report was published in May 2011 and seeks to examine the way in which the recovering real output in US is being distributed to beneficiaries – workers, firms etc. It shows that the so-called economic recovery in the US has not delivered any tangible benefits to the vast majority of citizens and has rather, concentrated real gains among the top-end-of-town. Given that the recovery has floated on the fiscal stimulus the findings reinforce the biased nature of policy in the US. That indicates poor fiscal design by an incompetent and corrupt government not that fiscal policy is inherently unsuitable for advancing public purpose.

I have noticed some discussions abroad that criticise Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) on the basis that none of the main proponents have ever actually worked on the operations desk of a central bank. This sort of criticism is in the realm of “you cannot know anything unless you do it” which if true would mean almost all of the knowledge base shared by humanity would be deemed meaningless jabber. It is clearly possible to form a very accurate view of the way the monetary system operates (including the way central banks and the commercial banks) interact without ever having worked in either. However, today, I review a publication from the Bank of International Settlements which dovetails perfectly with the understandings that MMT has provided. It provides a case for why we should abandon mainstream monetary textbooks from the perspective of those who work inside the central banking system.

There are several different strands of mainstream economic thinking and these differences manifest in the way they think about monetary and fiscal policy. The extreme mainstream position is that fiscal policy is ineffective because it 100 per cent crowds out private spending. The only role for aggregate policy then is to allow an independent (politically speaking) central bank to adjust interest rates up and down to regulate inflation (via expectations). There isn’t much for economists to do if that view was accurate. Then there are mainstreamers who think that budget deficits are generally damaging to private spending because they drive up allegedly drive up interest rates and crowd out private spending, the latter which, is considered to be more efficient because it is backed by the so-called wisdom of the “market”. So generally monetary policy should be used to stabilise aggregate demand such that inflation is stable. However, this group of economists find some time for budget deficits when there is a “liquidity trap”. From the perspective of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) – whether there is a liquidity trap or not is irrelevant.

Several readers have written to me asking me to comment on a recent paper that the New York Federal Reserve released as a Staff Report (May 2011) – A Note on Bank Lending in Times of Large Bank Reserves. Apparently, there is an impression that the federal reserve economists might be seeing the light a bit about the banking system and the way economists think about it. The reason that some readers have concluded that is because the substantive conclusion of the paper is that credit expansion is independent of the level of banking reserves held at the central bank. This conclusion is totally consistent with Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) but is at odds with the standard mainstream macroeconomic view (as taught in textbooks) that relies on the money multiplier to draw a (spurious) connection between bank reserves and the money supply. As you will see – my advice is to be very careful when reading such papers – they are not what they seem. The FRNY paper reaches the correct conclusion using erroneous theory which they partition as a special case arising from the extreme circumstances surrounding the crisis. Even in defining their “model” as a special case, they employ flawed logic. It is a case of being beware of the wolf in sheep’s clothing.