Today there were two feature articles in the Australian press which attracted attention. The first article was an interview with the former Australian prime minister (Howard), who (by the way) was called a “lying rodent” by one of his own colleagues during his time in office. The second article was by the Sydney Morning Herald’s political editor who claims the Time has come for Rudd to face the big test. Both articles carry the same messages which are relevant to the macroeconomic debate in all nations (so this is not a parochial Australian discussion). They also nonsensical pieces of fiction when you consider them from the perspective of modern monetary theory (MMT). They show the power of the mainstream macroeconomics “textbook straitjacket” which has the world debate in a vice-like grip.

Today I have been working on a new book and have been deeply emeshed in paradigmic debates. The practical relevance, other than the work gives me another day’s pay to maintain my part in keeping aggregate demand growth moving, is that two Nobel prize winners (Phelps and Krugman) have had a recent paradigmic dispute about similar themes. One attack was implicit (Phelps on Keynesians), the other very direct and personal (Krugman on Phelps). Neither understand modern monetary theory (MMT) although Krugman is closer than Phelps. Phelps’s work, in my view, has been used by neo-liberals for years to undermine the employment prospects of millions of workers. It is also a primary IMF tool for keep less developing countries poor. Sounds like a topic to be discussed.

Today we consider the current debate about whether we need to return to fixed exchange rates and create a new reserve currency for the World – which might even be a supra-national currency. In general terms the calls for these sort of reforms reflect a misunderstanding of how a modern currency operates and also the opportunities the fiat monetary system presents to a national government which desires to advance public purpose (full employment and price stability). The claims for this type of currency reform also reflect serious misunderstandings about trade and the financial flows which accompany trade. More worrying is that the fixed exchange rate call is becoming a cause celebre for progressive economists who see flexible exchange rates as somehow a cornerstone of a neo-liberal free market plot against prosperity. Talk about being misguided. So this blog introduces these issues – and will probably be the first of several on the topic.

Its Sunday morning in Kazakhstan and cold. My meetings in Almaty are over and I am heading home today via Dubai (backwards to go forwards). It has been a long week and it hasn’t been helped by the fact I have come down with a heavy cold. But overall a lot was accomplished, not the least being the startng dialogues with the Central Asian government officials. I have also been thinking about the book on economic development that we have started working on (with a colleague at the Asian Development Bank). In this context, today’s blog is about development, trade and modern monetary theory (MMT). Many readers have asked me to comment on recent articles in the Australian press about our current account situation. So-called experts (not) are claiming the budget balance has to be cut back quickly to avoid an external crisis. The reality is that they fail to understand what the current account balance is about.

The weekend’s Sydney Morning Herald carried a syndicated article from the UK Telegraph – Why the economy needs to stress creation over distribution – which bears on the recent discussion about financial market profits and executive packages. If we were to follow this remuneration pattern then things would be very different in the world. Probably for the better. It also shows how the explanations for earnings provided by mainstream economics textbooks are ridiculous in the extreme. Another reason to stay clear of those courses at University.

Several readers have asked me to explain in a little more detail what I mean by statements such as investment brings forth its own saving or government budget deficits finance non-government saving. So this blog is about those topics and takes you on journey from what you won’t learn if you study macroeconomics in a typical university through to a clearer understanding of the way macroeconomies work via modern monetary theory (MMT).

Today I read an interview with Richard Koo from the Nomura Research Institute in Japan who is the touring the world promoting his views of why the fiscal stimulus packages are so important. His views are drawn from his extensive experience of the Japanese malaise that began in the 1990s. The interview was published in the September 11 edition of welling@weeden which is a private bi-weekly emanating from the US. I cannot link to it because you have to pay to read. Anyway, much of what he says reinforces the fundamental principles of modern monetary (MMT) and is quite antagonistic to mainstream economic thinking. It is the latter which is now mounting political pressure to cut the stimulus packages. Koo thinks this would be madness, a view I concur with.

With the debate now over (more or less) I caught up on my backlog of reading today. I store articles from all over in a database and then access them when I have time. So on this very wet Sunday, I was working on two papers for an upcoming field trip to Kazakhstan on an Asian Development Bank contract, and, in-between, I read some (so-called) analysis. The basic conclusion is that none of these economics journalists portray the slightest understanding that we are no longer living in a convertible currency system (ended in 1971) and that most national governments issue their own currencies within a flexible exchange rate environment. If a car mechanic tried to apply the art that was practised before electronic ignitions and computerisation to our cars they would go out of business very quickly.

Today, I offer Part 2 of my responses to the comments raised in the debate so far. I am still about 40 comments shy of the total. In general, I thank Scott, JKH, Ramanan, Sean and others who have provided excellent interventions into this debate based on their knowledge of how the monetary system actually works rather than a stylised representation of it which leaves out the government sector and is liberal with the accounting conventions applied to account for asset and liability flows and flow to stock relations. But there still appears to be major confusions which I will try to address here.

As indicated yesterday, Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve’s site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today.

Readers of my blog often ask me about how modern monetary theory sits with the views of the debt-deflationists (and specifically my academic colleague Steve Keen). Steve and I have collaborated in the last few days to foster some debate between us on a constructive level with the aim of demonstrating that the common enemy is mainstream macroeconomics and that progressive thinkers should target that school of thought rather than looking within.

It continues to amaze me how humans lock themselves into constrained debating positions on almost every topic imaginable. In doing so we stand in denial of our history and therefore operate in a sort of “current ignorance”. But also we deny ourselves the adventure of thinking laterally about how new ways of proceeding might help us solve our problems. So we are neither backward or forward looking but churn our debates around and around within a tight set of ideas which we presumably think is safe. In macroeconomics, the problem is that most of these “safe” ideas are based on false premises and actually expose us to on-going danger of the type we are witnessing in this current global recession. I was reminded of this again today when I was reading the latest New York Times debate about Saving the World, Without U.S. Consumers.

Household saving ratios (saving as a percentage of disposable income) have risen significantly in most countries since the onset of the recession. In many countries this has come after a period of increasing indebtedness as national governments pursued budget surpluses. As a result, the macroeconomic concept of the paradox of thrift has been resurrected in the popular press as a discussion point. There are fears that the end of the “consumer boom” will lead to stagnancy. A recently published IMF paper addresses this point but just cannot let themselves address the elephant in the room. They present a new way version of deficit hysteria.

The mainstream economics profession is not saying much during the crisis apart from some of the notable interventions from conservatives and a few not-so conservative economists. In general, what can they say? Not much at all. The frameworks they use to reason with are deeply flawed and bear no relation at the macroeconomic level to the operational realities of modern monetary economies. Even the debt-deleveraging (progressives) use such stylised models which negate stock-flow consistency that their ability to capture sensible policy options are limited. This blog discusses New Keynesian theory which is a current fad among mainstream economists and which has been defended strongly by one of its adherents in a recent attack on Paul Krugman. The blog is a bit pointy.

Today the retail sales data came out in Australia and showed a 1.0 per cent fall in the month of July and the beginnings of a declining trend (2 negative months in a row). Many economists are seeing this as a sign that the impacts of the fiscal stimulus packages have come to a screaming halt and all we have left for our troubles is a public debt burden that will kill our kids and pets. While the fall-off in retail activity is a problem I don’t think we are about to follow the US path into temporary oblivion. Further, debates about retail sales allow me to extend my Austrian theme. Attack dogs on the ready!

Mostly, financial markets (the wealth shuffling casino) and the real economy (where people live and work) run as parallel universes. But occasionally as in the case of the GFC morphing into a full-blown real crisis with massive income and job losses the two merge. In many cases the merger is driven by a poor understanding of the way the fiat monetary system operates. As a consequence we get decisions taking by the gamblers (they prefer to be called speculators – it sounds better) based on faulty analysis of how the econmy works, pushing asset prices up (or down) which in turn affect the way governments are reacting to the “real crisis”. The surge in gold prices in the last few days might be an example of that.

On July 8, 2009 a world first occurred in Sweden when the Swedish Riksbank (its central bank) made announced that its deposit interest rate would be set at minus 0.25. While this has set the cat among the pidgeons around the financial markets, it is a classic example of “central banking gone crazy” or more politely “quantitative easing on steroids”. The only problem is that performance enhancing drugs seem to make athletes ride or run faster. This move will do very little to make the Swedish economy increase output or employ more people. For a background to my analysis on this event in central banking history you might like to read my blog – Quantitative Easing 101.

In yesterday’s (August 23 2009) Financial Times, so-called financial markets expert Nouriel Roubini wrote that The risk of a double-dip recession is rising. The American academic was recently in Australia as a speaker at the Diggers & Dealers Forum which is an annual mining conference. The problem is that Roubini is an influential advisor to the US Government and so will have a hand in determining the direction of fiscal policy. He continually demonstrates, however, that he does not understand how the fiat monetary system operates and in that context becomes part of the problem.