This category focuses largely on matters pertaining to Japan

Towards a progressive rebuttal of the far Right narratives

I saw a clip from John Stewart’s Daily Show yesterday where he showed some Fox News commentators (I think) talking about how they hate ‘woke’ and how they now have to put up with public events featuring “half naked men” (their slight against the gay community). Stewart then showed the next clip – the cage fight at the White House where two half naked men were featured. The way he presented it was (as usual for the show) very funny. Yesterday (June 17, 2026), the leader of the far Right party in Australia (One Nation) gave her first ever – Speech – to the National Press Club in Canberra and apart from several outrageous statements (such as “Businesses also tell me you can’t sack people these days, they’re on their phones, they don’t work, they don’t turn up, they actually are lazy” and the “hoax of global warming”), she announced that Australia cannot be a multicultural society and that “we must be monocultural”. The fact checkers have already exposed her lack of honesty with respect to the actual data surrounding many of her assertions. But the question of culture and national cohesiveness is a subject that I am working on as part of my aim to publish a sequel to my 2017 book – Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World – which I co-authored with Thomas Fazi. The question that the sequel begins with relates to what defines a viable currency area and what legitimates government fiscal policy. I see this issue as a central extension of the work on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) because it provides a sociological basis for currency sovereignty. One needs to develop a concept of the – Demos – to answer that question. I use that concept in the original sense.

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Monetary policy is not fit for purpose

I have said this many times – monetary policy is not fit for purpose and central banks should be prevented from having discretionary powers to alter rates at will. There are two levels of justification for that assertion. First, at the ideological level, a major (dominant under neoliberalism) arm of macroeconomic policy should not be outsourced to an unelected, unaccountable body of technocrats. This subverts the operation of democracies by allowing elected officials to depoliticise policy settings through their ‘pass the parcel’ approach – ‘oh the central bank is independent and we never interfere in their decisions’ type narrative. Second, on a technical level, the officials have little idea of when and what the impact will be of their policy changes. There are too many unknowns, mostly relating to the distributional consequences of interest rate changes (creditors win, debtors lose) which make it impossible to predict when the creditors will spend up their gains and debtors cut their spending. As a result, there are many examples in history of central banks moving too early (relative to their stated objective) or too late, with the outcome being that they make matters worse, particularly prolonging recessions. This situation is once again looming up in Japan at the moment.

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Article 4 of the Bank of Japan Act 1997 ensures fiscal and monetary policy must work together

Last week, the RBA increased interested rates claiming there was a growing capacity constraint (even though there is 10.2 per cent labour underutilisation) and inflationary expectations were increasing and in danger of propelling inflation even further. The RBA governor once again threatened the Treasurer along the lines of ‘unless you cut net spending we will continue to hike rates’ – which not only demonstrates that the central bank is not politically independent but also reveals how poor monetary policy then compromises fiscal policy. The double jeopardy of New Keynesian macroeconomics – pretend monetary policy is effective and then cripple fiscal policy (which is effective) by subjugating it to the central bank whims. If we look at what is going on in Japan at present, we get a different angle to this. The Bank of Japan is certainly worried about inflation but it is being tethered to some extent by the Prime Minister who is placing a specific emphasis on Article 4 of the Bank of Japan Act. The resulting policy dynamics stand in sharp contrast to the way the RBA acts and thinks it is appropriate to bully the government into pursuing austerity when there is massive wastage of available labour resources.

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A structured approach for progressive political ambitions – Part 6

This is Part 6 of the short series of briefing notes that arose out of discussions I recently had in London about how a progressive political party might want to break out of the shackles that the British Labour Party has bound itself in with its obsession with fiscal rules and an adherence to the fiscal fictions of mainstream macroeconomics. The thoughts, in my view, are relevant for all aspiring progressive political parties that might have fallen prey to the fictional world of mainstream economics and cannot find a way back. In the first part, I suggested a way forward was to shift the focus of what can be done with fiscal policy away from financial matters towards an emphasis on real resource constraints – that is, what productive resources are available for public use. In this sense, the discussion becomes focused on how much nominal spending growth is possible without sparking inflationary pressures as a result of nominal spending growth outstripping the productive capacity of the economy. In Part 2, I focused on aspects of the institutional structure that should be considered to support that shift in focus, including a planning network and a return to a public employment service. In Part 3, I began an examination of the long debate about economic planning, In Part 4, I continued that discussion. In Part 5, I discussed how the age of rapid, networked communication systems eliminate the basis of the pro-market, anti-planning critics. Today’s discussion focuses on the importance of institutional structure in government with a special case study of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan and the role that it played in that nation’s spectacular rise out of the ravages of World War 2 and US Occupation.

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Inflation in Japan – invariant to monetary policy and be careful what you wish for (tourism)

I have been thinking about the recent inflation trajectory in Japan in the light of constant calls from mainstream economists (including a bevy of private bank economists who work for institutions that benefit from interest rate hikes) for the Bank of Japan to hike rates. What is driving CPI movements? What has been the impact of the yen depreciation? How responsive is the yen to interest rate changes anyway? Are the increasing yen-denominated import prices being passed on to Japanese consumers? Why doesn’t the Takaichi Administration realise that in the face of supply-side inflation the remedy is not to expand fiscal policy? How responsive are exports to the yen depreciation? All these questions are popping up continually in the financial media at the moment. I haven’t time today to answer all these questions in detail. But here is a start.

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Those who invoke the ‘Truss Moment’ should look at what is happening in Japan

In the annals of ruses used to provoke fear in the voting public about government deficits, central bank currency issuance, and fiscal activism, the experience of Germany in the 1920s was a long-standing favourite, that could be wheeled out on demand and have immediate effect. Wheelbarrows full of money being pushed to the local bakery to buy the daily bread, etc. It was a very effective vehicle for advancing the interests of the ruling class because it created a political brake on government action to reduce poverty and maintain full employment. More recently, Zimbabwe became the vehicle. It was equally effective even though it, like the Weimar ruse, was largely based on fiction. Even more recently, we have a new ‘ruse on the block’, the so-called ‘Truss Moment’, which is particularly effective in the UK. The current Labour government is petrified to do anything that might resemble a Labour government because they have a deep-seated paranoid ideation that the ‘City’ is out to get them, and the ‘Truss Moment’ is used as the summary event that apparently justify that delusion. They might have looked to the East, to Japan, to see why the ‘Truss Moment’ was about something quite different to the popular narrative that accompanies the mention of the ill-fated few months in British politics.

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Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund and the yen – mainstream macro myths driving bad policy

With a national election approaching in Japan (February 8, 2026), there has been a lot of discussion about the so-called ‘weak yen’ and whether the Bank of Japan should be intervening to manage the value of the currency on international markets. PM Takaichi has been quoted as saying that the weak yen is good for Japanese exports and has offset some of the negative impacts on key sectors in Japan, including the automobile industry. She also said that the government would aim to encourage an economic structure that could withstand shifts in the currency’s value, largely by encouraging domestic investment. The yen depreciation is another example of the way mainstream economists distort the debate. They argue that the Bank of Japan should be increasing interest rates further to shore up the yen. Previously, they pressured the government into creating a pension fund investment vehicle to speculate in financial markets to ensure the basic pension system doesn’t run out of money. These two things are linked but not in ways that the mainstream public debate construes. It turns out that pension myths, are directly responsible for the evolution of the yen. This blog post explains why.

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Japan goes to an election accompanied by a very confused economic debate

These notes will serve as part of a briefing document that I will send off to some interested parties in Japan. Japan is about to go to the poll for a snap national election on February 8. The recently installed Prime Minister, Ms Takaichi is betting that her recent solid showing in the polls will allow her to capture more seats in the Diet and reduce or even eliminate her dependency on the ‘uncomfortable’ coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) aka Ishin. That coalition was formed after Mr Ishiba, the previous PM, also bet on a snap election result, which saw the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) go backwards (losing 68 seats) and the coalition partner Komeito also lose seats. Together the ruling coalition lost its majority in the National Diet (for the first time since 2009) and Shigeru Ishiba’s popularity began to evaporate. The background to that loss was a major political funding scandal among the Cabinet ministers and the election result signalled that the Japanese people had seemingly had enough of the corruption at the top. Ms Takaichi took over after Mr Ishiba could no longer sustain his position as PM. The old coalition between the LDP and Komeito fell apart because the Buddhist Komeito could no longer stomach the new PMs imperialist ideology nor her unwillingness to deal with he insidious corruption in her party. This forced Ms Takaichi to forge a new coalition – hence the rather unlikely pairing with Ishin, which is a right wing populist party espousing neoliberal economic policies. The government is proposing a major fiscal expansion but the debate during the campaign that is now underway is very confused. The confusion arises because all the main players keep wheeling out mainstream economic arguments that tie them up into nonsensical policy proposals.

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When contraction is called expansion – Japanese government style

Well my holiday is over. Not that I had one! This morning we submitted the manuscript to the publisher for the Second Edition of our Macroeconomics text, which will come out later this year. Finishing a massive project like that is always non-linear – the last few months are hideous – checking everything and filling gaps. Anyway, that was the Xmas break. And as the New Year starts, one always hopes that humanity learns from the mistakes of the previous year. In economics, though, that is the hope of the forlorn. I read this morning’s Japan Times newspaper and lo and behold there are predictions of dire consequences as a result of the current Cabinet decision to shift focus away from pursuing a primary fiscal surplus to massaging the public debt ratio. The mainstream economists are arguing about the relative virtues of each and forecasting gloom. The reality is that neither target is worth attention. Meanwhile, the privatised rail companies are negotiating with communities for the closure of certain rail segments because they are loss making. All that discussion is about costs per passenger km, rather than satisfaction gained from bringing people together. The priorities are all wrong.

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Video – Japan at a Crossroads: Fiscal Policy, China, and the Growth

I have limited time today to write a blog post and last night I was sent a new video that I recently recorded with my research colleague at Kyoto University, Professor Fujii where we talk for some hours on the topic – Japan at a Crossroads: Fiscal Policy, China, and the Growth. It was a conversation we had via Zoom that was recorded on Friday, December 5, 2025. We reflect on recent developments in Japan and its relationship with other major countries (US, China, etc) and consider the policy challenges facing the new Takaichi Cabinet. It is a very long session. The transcript was generated by YouTube AI I believe and then edited and is not perfect. A lot of unnecessary aspects are edited out and the latter part of the transcript is really just an AI summary. But I think the record is acceptable. At times, the discussion changed from English to Japanese, where there was some ambiguity in terminology etc, and those segments have been cut from the transcript. I put in timestamps during the transcript to help you zoom into topics of interest. I hope you find something useful in our long discussion.

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