My friend Sean Carmody, sometime commentator and always obstinately objective, introduced me to this work – The Debunking Handbook – written by a physicist and psychologist. It serves to focus thoughts because it considers the pitfalls that arise in an exercise aimed at debunking myths and strategies that might be deployed to effectively achieve this aim. The authors appear to be motivated by the climate change debate but the discussion is equally effective in the context that I work within – how to convince people that mainstream macroeoconomics is largely devoid of meaningful content and predictive capacity.

I was at a social function last weekend and the conversation turned to economics – surprise surprise. I was the only professional economist in the group. I try very hard to avoid discussing economics in these circumstances because experience tells me that misunderstandings quickly occur as the “intuitive” or “common-sense” economists seek the floor. I would much rather talk about weeds growing than the sustainability of budget deficits in times like that. But, alas, someone said “but we’ve got a 50 million-dollar deficit who is going to pay for that?” Another member of the group, who is very articulate and fairly well-read in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) but not a professional economist stepped in to save the day. She proceeded to explain how common sense is a dangerous guide to reality and that not all opinions should be given equal privilege in public discourse. The conversation deteriorated because the “deficit worrier” and others immediately personalised this observation and considered it to be a attack on their life’s experience. Notwithstanding the tenseness of the situation, it was an interesting demonstration of the flaws in logic that govern the way people think about economics and the way politicians exploit our (flawed) reliance on common sense. Our propensity to generalise from personal experience, as if the experience constitutes general knowledge, dominates the public debate.

Amidst all the political turmoil in the Australian government this week, there was a highly significant report issued by the government (finalised December 2011 but released by the Government on February 20, 2012) – Review of Funding for Schooling – which showed not only how unequal our education system is but also how far behind we have fallen relative to other nations (particularly those that are more important trading partners). For a government which pretends to be concerned with equity and efficiency the Report posed huge challenges. Not only did it suggest current policy was failing, the Report estimated that over AU$5 billion should be invested in education reform to not only improve standards but also ensure that the massive inequalities between rich and poor with respect to educational access and outcomes are reduced. The response by the Australian government was that its priority remained the achievement of a budget surplus in 2012. Here is a classic demonstration of how a failure by the Government to understand the characteristics of the monetary system that it runs leads to poor outcomes in the short-run, but also undermines the future prosperity of the nation.

It is a public holiday in Australia today and I am not working a full day. But I have been collecting some items from the past five or so years which I am weaving into the text book that Randy Wray and I hope to have out in the coming year. When academics or others comment on public affairs it is clear that our commentary is to a certain extent time-dependent. The language we use, the topics we focus on and the conclusions we draw. So some things that are written sound quaint when we go back to them after some years. I hoard information and occasionally I access my databases to see who said what in some year and compare it to what might have happened in the interim and then what the same person might be saying in retrospect. It is an interesting exercise and when applied to my own profession reveals some amazingly nonsensical predictions or assessments. The global crisis has provided a major event to test many of the assessments made prior to the crisis. The most surprising thing is that the same sort of assessments made prior to the crisis that were demonstrated to be entirely false are still being made and still influencing policy design. But the most robust assessments have withstood the crisis and remain relevant today. I include the developments in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) in this latter category. Mainstream macroeconomics was largely wrong before the crisis and is wrong now (for the same reasons) and should be disregarded.