Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you understand the reasoning behind the answers. If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
Just as the recent monetary data from the Eurozone has revealed the parlous state of demand there, the money supply data released by the Bank of England yesterday revealed a collapsing borrowing by households and firms in Britain scale not previously seen. It is clear that the December data shows that households are deleveraging (paying credit cards down) and business firms are now in full retreat similar to the worst of the recent downturn in 2009. The evidence for that conclusion is to be found in the fact that the Bank of England’s broad money supply measure contracted by 1.4 per cent in December, which the Bank noted was the largest single month contraction on record (shared with December 2010). Just like the latest ECB monetary aggregates are showing what the real situation is like in the Eurozone, the Bank of England’s data is painting a very grim picture of life in Britain as the draconian fiscal austerity drives that economy into the ground. The data also provides a continued rejection of mainstream macroeconomic theory, which is an interesting aspect in its own right.
Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you understand the reasoning behind the answers. If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
When I read the latest news from the IMF early this morning I sent out a tweet saying that it was the height of hypocrisy for the IMF now to be trying to reclaim the high ground in the current economic debate by lecturing nations about the dangers of fiscal austerity. The IMF will always be part of the problem rather than the solution. They are consistently the architects of misinformation and bully national governments on the basis of that misinformation only to come back 3 months later and say “gee whiz”, look how bad things become. Currently the IMF is pleading for more funds. If I was a national government contributing to this bullying, incompetent organisation I would immediately cancel the cheque and, instead, spend the money pursuing domestic growth for the benefit of the citizens is that rely on my decisions. The current position of the IMF represents the height of hypocrisy. Further their forecasts are significantly error prone as usual. Wrong models will generally produce terrible forecasts that have to be continually revised. In the case of the IMF, these errors are also systematically biased by the ideological nature of their approach to macroeconomics.
On November 16, 2011 by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) published a – Discussion Paper – Implementing Basel III liquidity reforms in Australia – which details how the prudential regulator plans to implement the new Basel III reforms which aim “to strengthen the liquidity framework for authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs)”. in that paper, APRA indicated that there were not enough assets in the Australian financial system to satisfy the new liquidity requirements. In other words, there are not enough government bonds on the issue that the banks can use for this purpose. This is a consequence of the excessive pursuit of government surpluses over the last 16 odd years. APRA indicated that a country-specific solution to this asset would be required. in this context, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) a new facility – the Committed Liquidity Facility (CLF), which will provide high-quality liquidity to the commercial banks to allow them to meet the Basel III liquidity requirements. What the CLF demonstrates once again is that a currency issuing government is not financially constrained and can maintain integrity of the of the financial system and purchase any goods and services that are available for sale in its own currency any time that it chooses.
Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you understand the reasoning behind the answers. If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
In early January 2012, the IMF published the following working day – Central Bank Credit to the Government: What Can We Learn from International Practices? (thanks Kostas). In terms of the title you can’t learn very much if you start off on the wrong foot. The bottom line is that if the theoretical model that you are using is flawed in the first place then you wont make much sense applying it. The other point is that while this paper presents some very interesting facts about the legal frameworks within which central banks operate and provide a regional breakdown of their results, their policy recommendations do not relate to the evidence at all. This is because they fail to recognise that the patterns in their database (the legal practices) are conditioned by the dominant mainstream economics ideology. So concluding that something is desirable because it exists when its existence is just the reflection of the dominant ideology gets us nowhere. Their conclusions thus just amount to erroneous religious statements that make up the catechism of the IMF and have no substance in reality.
Today I am in the nation’s capital, Canberra presenting a class at the European Studies Summer School which is being organised by the Centre for European Studies at the Australian National University. My presentation is entitled – the Euro crisis: fact and fiction. I will have more to say about that in another blog. Today I am considering the issues surrounding the decline in personal consumption spending and increased household saving ratios. The argument is that this behaviour which is now clearly evident in most economies marks an end to the credit-led spending binge that characterised the pre-crisis period of the neo-liberal era. But with that era coming to an end and more typical (“normal”) behaviour emerging, the way we think about the government (as the currency-issuer) will also have to change. There is clearly resistance to that part of the story, in part, because there is a limited understanding to the central role that the government plays in the monetary system. As private sectors become more cautious, we will required continuous budget deficits to become a part of this return to the “new” normal.
The Australian Prime Minister, trailing hopelessly in the public opinion polls, made a fool of herself yesterday by commenting on last week’s S&P downgrade of European government debt ratings. she not only gave S&P more credibility than they are worth, but also demonstrated, once again, the mangled macroeconomic logic that is driving her own government’s obsessive pursuit of budget surpluses to our detriment. But there has been a lot of mangled logic about the S&P decision from a number of quarters in the last few days. Ultimately, the decision is only as relevant as the EU authorities allow it to be. The reality is that the fiscal capacity of the Eurozone is embedded in the ECB, which while ridiculous and reflecting the flawed design of the EMU, still means that the private bond markets can be dealt out of the game whenever the ECB desires it. In that context the S&P decision is irrelevant except for its political ramifications. And they arise as a result of the government’s own flawed rhetoric with respect to the role the ratings agencies play. That flawed rhetoric is exemplified by the Australian Prime Minister’s weekend offerings not to forget the French central bank governor’s recent claims that S&P should downgrade Britain’s debt ratings before it downgrades France. But does the downgrading matter? Answer: only if the ECB allows it to matter. The ratings agencies do not wield power. The issuer of the currency in any monetary union has the power – always.
Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you understand the reasoning behind the answers. If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
One of the extraordinary things that arose in a recent discussion about whether employment guarantees are better than leaving workers unemployed was the assumption that the costs of unemployment are relatively low compared to having workers engaged in activities of varying degrees of productivity. Some of the discussion suggested that there were “microeconomic” costs involved in having to manage employment guarantee programs (bureaucracy, supervision, etc) which would negate the value of any such program. The implicit assumption was that the unemployed will generate zero productivity if they are engaged in employment programs. There has been a long debate in the economics about the relative costs of microeconomic inefficiency compared to macroeconomic inefficiency. The simple fact is that the losses arising from unemployment dwarfed by a considerable margin any microeconomic losses that might arise from inefficient use of resources. in this blog, I discuss some of those issues.
Underlining the current obsession with fiscal austerity is an equally long-standing obsession with so-called structural reform. The argument goes that growth can be engendered by deregulating the labour market to remove inefficiencies that create bottlenecks for growth even when fiscal austerity is slashing aggregate demand and killing growth. The 1994 OECD Jobs Study the provides the framework for this policy approach. The only problem is that it failed even before the crisis emerged. But with policymakers intent on slashing aggregate demand, which they know will kill growth, they have to offer something that they can pretend will generate growth. The structural reform agenda has zero credibility in the same way that fiscal austerity has zero credibility.
A striking characteristic of the last few decades has been the way the so-called “progressive” political parties have adopted policy frameworks and thinking that were previously the exclusive domain of the conservatives. Nothing could be more obvious than the way in which all the major parties around the world now speak neo-liberal economics as if it was the only way of thinking about the economy and economic policy. Slowly but surely the options that parties are willing to consider have been narrowed down and policy is now conducted in a straitjacket which cannot deliver prosperity for all as well as advancing environmental objectives. It is understandable that during recessions expectations become downgraded by workers about the types of jobs they will except, by consumers about the level of spending they can sustain, and by firms about what investment projects will be viable in the period ahead, etc. But it is strange that when the prevailing economic paradigm not only caused the great recession but is prolonging it at great cost, that the major parties remain locked down in the neo-liberal mire – blinded to other options. It is clearly time to think outside of this box and that is what I try to promote in this blog. But we also have to be careful that when we go wandering we are still on solid macroeconomic ground.
According to the popular legend Nero, Roman Emperor from 54 to 68 and the last in the Julio-Claudian dynasty allegedly “fiddled while Rome burned” (played his lyre and singing) during the fire in 64 which destroyed most of Rome. His rule (and dynasty) ended 4 years later. The imagery of this out-of-touch and cruel leader strumming/plucking his stringed instrument (rumour notwithstanding) while his city and, soon after, his dynasty collapsed is powerful. Last Friday, Eurostat released the latest unemployment data for November 2011. The results were shocking with unemployment rates in Spain now close to 23 per cent (as at November 2011 and rising) and Greece 18.8 per cent (as at September 2011) and rising. Greece’s unemployment rate rose 4.8 per cent in the first 9 months of last year. Meanwhile, the European Commission is occupying itself with other concerns. Its Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner and Vice President, Olli Rehn has been sending letters out to member states indicating that he is disappointed they are falling behind their budget deficit reduction targets under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact) and that the EC would be considering fines.
Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you understand the reasoning behind the answers. If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
The current Eurozone crisis is getting worse and has concentrated our minds on the most recent period of European history. As in all these situations where focus is very immediate our memories get a little blurred and we are inclined to accept propositions that closer analysis of the data suggest do not hold water. January 1 was the tenth anniversary of the date when Euro notes and coins began to circulate. It had of-course been operating since January 1, 1999 but only in a non-physical form (electronic transfers etc). If you believe the rhetoric from the Euro bosses in the first several years of the Euro history and didn’t know anything else you would be excused for thinking that it was a spectacular success. The Celtic Tiger, the Spanish miracle, the unprecedented price stability and all the rest of it. But the reality is a little different to the hype. The fact is that the common currency did not deliver the dividends that were expected or touted by the leaders leading up to the crisis. All the so-called gains that the pro-Euro lobby claim were in actual fact a sign of the failure of the design of the union although it took the crisis to expose these terminal weaknesses for all to see. My view is that the Euro was failing from day one and it would be better to disband it as a failed experiment that has caused untold damage to the human dimension.
I have been digging back in time and re-reading Unemployment: a problem of industry by William Beveridge (published 1909). Beveridge is most known for his 1944 book – Full Employment in a Free Society and the related Social Insurance and Allied Services – (1942 aka the Beveridge Report). The point is that to understand the motivation for the Beveridge Report you also have to appreciate the earlier document and the role that it played in labour history in the UK (and elsewhere). Why am I considering this? The British Labour Party is appealing to the 1942 Report as a motivation to introduce radical reform to the British welfare system. They think that by attacking the most disadvantaged citizens in Britain at a time when unemployment is so high and poverty is rising that they will gain some traction with the electorate. The word despicable comes to mind. However, it is clear they are just remaining faithful to their earlier corrupt past.
Happy New Year – first serious blog for 2012. What does a macroeconomist like me do on the second day of the new year when the sun is shining warmly (about 29 degrees celsius) and everyone is seemingly on holidays? Answer: read up on central bank balance sheets. The truth is that I read two speeches today as part of another piece of research I am doing and they contained a few statements that help us understand the difference between Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) essentials and the way the mainstream economists misrepresent the monetary operations in the economy. The speeches were presented by a senior official at the Bank of International Settlements and they confirm that the central bank of the central bankers is now part of the problem. This organisation has now become part of the neo-liberal propaganda machine which is making things worse rather than better.
Here are the answers with discussion for yesterday’s quiz. The information provided should help you understand the reasoning behind the answers. If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
Since I published Wednesday’s blog – MMT is biased towards anti-crony – there seems to have been a fair bit of commentary on other sites some bordering on personal attacks (against me). I’ll steer clear of that level of discussion. I also note that John Carney over at CNBC responded with this article – Can the Government Guarantee Everyone a Job? – saying that if the notion of employment buffers is a central aspect of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) then “it would mean that MMT is wrong”. I found his response interesting but essentially a rehearsal of the mainstream errors that arise when you haven’t really come to terms with what MMT is adding to macroeconomic theory. So today’s blog is a supplement to the Wednesday’s blog (and many others) and aims to provide some more context especially to those interested in the evolution of ideas and schools of thought. The point is that whatever else happens we are left with a choice – employment or unemployment buffer stocks. MMT provides the theoretical insights to show that employment buffers are superior whether you like them or not.