It is late Sunday afternoon as I write this in Colombo, Sri Lanka and about 4.5 hours to the west the Greeks are getting ready to vote in their national election. It has been hailed as a make or break-type of affair but from what I know from inside-type conversations with some of the players and from general reading it has the hallmark of a fizzer, even if Syriza wins the ballot. Essentially, none of the main players seem to be willing to actually solve the problem. The entrenched interests have helped create the problem and are impoverishing the Greek people (themselves excepted). So they are part of the problem. Syriza talks bit about freeing Greece from the Troika-yoke but has a set of proposals that are mutually inconsistent. They might help around the edge and redistribute income a bit but what is needed is a massive boost in national income and that can only come from a massive increase in spending. The non-government sector is not going to do provide the source of that spending boost to get things moving again. So, ladies and gentleman you know what the answer is – there is only one other sector left in town to do it. And, you also know what is stopping them – membership of the Eurozone and the requirement to obey fiscal rules that restrict necessary spending to stagnation-enduring levels. That is why Syriza’s strategy is mutually inconsistent. Even a debt jubilee – the current favourite of the progressives, which warms their hearts so they can convince themselves that they are different from the neo-liberals will not solve the problem. Repeat: a massive fiscal boost is required, which means deficits above 10 per cent of GDP for many years forward. Repeat: that can only be accomplished within the current political reality if Greece leaves the Eurozone. It should have done that in 2008. It should never have joined. It should do it next week.

In my soon-to-be-published book on the Eurozone I examined the case of Denmark in some detail in the context of the evolution of the European Monetary System, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and the ratification process of the Treaty of Maastricht. Denmark was a participant in all the attempts to maintain fixed exchange rates after the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. Further, while Denmark did not formally enter the monetary union by adopting the euro that doesn’t mean that they have maintained their currency independence. They chose instead to peg the Danish kroner against the euro (effectively continuing the ERM parities), which immediately meant that its central bank had to follow ECB monetary policy. Fiscal policy then became a passive player to ensure it didn’t exacerbate the peg parity and Denmark also bought into the Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules. This meant that internal devaluation (wage cutting) was the only real counter-stabilisation option available to them when facing external imbalances and domestic recession. It hasn’t worked well as one would expect. In fact, the euro peg works against the interests of the Danish people, particularly low income workers prone to unemployment. Yet the nation has an obsession with maintaining it. Groupthink abounds. The correct policy strategy which would give the Danish government a wider range of policy tools to enhance the well-being of its people would be for Denmark to abandon its euro peg. It should do that virtually immediately.

When I was in Europe recently, I had interesting discussions about the future of Italy, Greece and Spain with various people, particularly in relation to trying to understand the apparent dissonance between the strong support for the euro and the devastation that membership of the common currency has created in these countries. It is, of course, a very complex issue that goes well beyond economics (as most things do). I formed two alternative views from what I was heard from those on the so-called progressive side of the debate. Either they are kidding themselves or that they have crafted a plan to force Germany (mainly) to break up the currency union. The alternative scenarios was also quite distinct along national lines with Italians more likely to be in the former group and Greeks in the latter group, although my sample sizes were relatively small.

There was an article in the French-language edition of Huffington Post last last week (December 10, 2014) – Sans Europe fiscale, le projet européen est condamné (Without taxes, the European project is doomed) – written by the President of the French Socialist delegation in the European Parliament, Pervenche Berès. Her committee role as a member of the EP includes the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affaris. She has been active in the debate over tax avoidance in the Parliament. Her substantive claim in the article is that the European Project, by which she includes retention of the Eurozone, will fail unless national governments work out how to raise more taxes to balance their fiscal positions. The article qualifies for inclusion in my – Friends list this – series. Although I accept it could be reasonably argued that the French socialists gave up any pretensions to progressive agendas some time ago and could reasonably be included among the groups we would consider to be neo-liberal. But that issue, while important, is not the topic of this blog.

Today is a blog lay day only because I now have to pay the piper for being Australian but having to undertake work commitments in Europe – a very long tiring flight. At least I can read a lot of detective novels. But there was a story on Monday in the Italian media that I report on now as a conclusion to my stay here in Italy. The only conclusion is that the Italian left should hang their heads in shame for being surrender monkeys to the neo-liberal forces defined by the Troika.

The European Commission released its – European Economic Forecast – Autumn 2014 – which is its bi-annual statement of economic outlook. In his editorial to the outlook, Director General Marco Buti admits that “euro area is still projected to have spare capacity in 2016”, which means the Commission is overseeing economic policy choices that will deliberately impose a recessionary bias for the next two years (at least) and deliberately force millions of Europeans to endure joblessness, savings erosion and the march towards poverty and despair for the next two years. Its a statement of monumental policy failure and the Director General Marco Buti should resign immediately just after he sacks his policy advisers.

The battlelines between the European Commission and France and Italy over the – Corrective arm – of the Stability and Growth Pact are firming up after the Italian Government publicly released a ‘strictly confidential’ letter from the Vice President of the European Commission – La lettera della Commissione Europea all’Italia – on the homePage of the Ministry of Economy and Finance late last week. The European Commission expressed hostility towards the Italian government hinting that there was a lack of trust involved. Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is that the Commission wants to keep its dirty work away from the public eye because it knows that deliberately creating unemployment and poverty is not exactly an endorsement for its common currency model. But this little skirmish last week between the technocrats and the Italian government is just part of a war that is to come over the implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure in both France and soon, Italy. We have been here before – 2002-03 – but this time, Germany was in the trenches with France. Now it is playing the role of the enforcer. It all goes to show however, if we ever needed reminding what a sorry, failed enterprise the Eurozone actually is.

The central bankers of the World met at Jackson Hole, Wyoming last week for their annual gathering far from the madding crowd. And as far away from the mess they have helped to create as you could imagine. Out of sight out of mind I guess. The ECB boss felt it his purpose at the gathering, which you can guarantee is plush in all respects (catering, wines, etc), to urge politicians to introduce more “growth-friendly policies”. He claimed in his speech – Unemployment in the euro area – that the so-called “sovereign debt crisis” had disabled “in part the tools of macroeconomic stabilisation”. Which is only true if one accepts that a central bank should play no role in supporting fiscal policy and that fiscal policy should be constrained by innane rules that deliberately prevent it from having sufficient latitude to meet foreseeable crises. Which is about as inane as one could get. But then none of these central bankers are accountable for anything much. They can swan around to meetings and issue ridiculous statements about growth-friendly policies, while supporting austerity, and nothing much happens to them personally.

According to data just published by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), its national statistics agency, the French economy has stalled in the second-quarter 2014. In its – Informations Rapides, Principaux indicateurs 14 août 2014 – n°186 – we learn that the “le PIB en volume est stable”, which is a cute French way of saying that real GDP growth was zero, building on the zero growth from the first-quarter, which means their terminology that it is “stable” is accurate but an understatement. The latest data from Eurostat (August 14, 2014) – GDP stable in the euro area and up by 0.2% in the EU28 – show that the three largest economies in the Eurozone (and Europe) are either in recession (Italy) or teetering on recession (France, Germany). The French Finance Minister reacted to this news by calling for a rethink of economic policy in Europe with a shift in emphasis to growth. He indicated that the French government would reduce its deficit in its own time without undermining new stimulus measures aimed at kickstarted domestic growth and reducing the unemployment rate. It is looking like 2003 all over again.]

One of the major demands that the Germans made on its partners leading into Maastricht in 1991 was the need for a politically independent central bank that was focused on price stability alone. This was claimed to be essential because it would stop politicians imposing so-called short-termism onto monetary policy (read: caring about people who might be unemployed or otherwise in need of fiscal assistance), which would compromise the inflation fighting process. These unaccountable, unelected central bank boards were then free to do what they wanted and demonstrated a willingness to use unemployment as a policy tool rather than a policy target to ensure economies were as close to deflating as possible, irrespective of what that meant for economic and employment growth. It is, of-course a farce to think that a central bank can be independent anyway either in a political sense or an economic sense. But the neo-liberal hype about independence was to ensure governments could absolve themselves of the public ignominy of rising unemployment and the political costs that went with that, and, instead, blame the central bankers. The bankers had no political constituency to manage or groom and could hide behind the ever-present paranoia about hyperinflation to ‘justify’ their policy approach. But the central bankers are ‘independent’ only when it suits them. Or should we say ‘independence’ is a one-way street. If the politicians dare to comment on monetary policies there is a hue and cry. But central bankers feel they can provide advice to the democratically elected governments whenever they choose and the media hardly blinks. Hypocrisy has no bounds.