Welcome to The Weekend Quiz. The quiz tests whether you have been paying attention or not to the blog posts that I post. See how you go with the following questions. Your results are only known to you and no records are retained.
I did an interview overnight with a WSJ journalist from London on the ‘political’ aspects of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). This blog post covers some of that conversation, although I started writing this a few weeks ago. Regular readers will recall I was promising a post about the ‘nimbleness’ of fiscal policy. That promise instigated the request from the WSJ. When I write about Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), I try to be careful to distinguish between what we might consider the core MMT principles (theory, description, accounting) and the imposition of my own values (political and otherwise) that is informed by those core principles. That separation is important and should (but doesn’t) stop others misrepresenting the core principles by appealing to proposals that might flow from the value imposition. An example of this separation (and confusion), a topic which I receive many E-mails from people which seek clarification, is the concept of setting up an independent fiscal authority. The proposal to establish such an authority is not a core MMT principle. It might reflect an opinion that has been expressed by someone writing about MMT but that is as far as it goes. For the record, I am deeply opposed to establishing such an authority. It would constitute the continuation of the neoliberal practice of depoliticisation and further increase the democratic deficit that is common in our nations these days. Politicians are elected to take responsibility and make decisions on our behalf. Can we trust them? We have elections to deal with those issues. Should technocrats rule? Technocrats do not stand for election. They give advice but have no democratic responsibility. Is fiscal policy agile enough to be an effective source of counter-stabilisation against the non-government spending cycle? That is what this blog post is about. This is Part 1 of a three-part series. Part 2 will be published on Monday.
It is Wednesday so very little blog writing today. One question I often get asked is what would happen if the bond market investors in a nation stopped bidding for the debt instruments being offered in the regular auctions. Interestingly, overnight I was sent some news from a Deutsche Bank information service written by their New York-based Chief International Economist, who signs himself off as “Torsten Sløk, Ph.D”. It related to these issues. The problem is that Dr Sløk seemed to want to take a snide shot at Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and just made a fool of himself. It goes on. This is what the point is.
Martin Höpner, who works at the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, recently sent me a copy of his latest paper – The German Undervaluation Regime under Bretton Woods: How Germany Became the Nightmare of the World Economy (published January 2019). He presented this research at a Makroskop workshop in Wurzburg on October 13, 2018 – I was on the same panel as him at that workshop and enjoyed some very productive conversation about these issues. It is a very interesting historical analysis of the way that the German elites (central bank, industry groups, banks, politicians, and trade unions) have collaborated since the 1950s to suppress domestic consumption and maintain the nation’s export competitiveness, even though this has undermined material prosperity for workers. The relevance of the analysis to current debates about the Eurozone and its capacity for reform are that the undervaluation regime is entrenched in Germany’s institutions, its history, its culture, and its power elites and have been that way for many decades. What the Europhile progressives, who still think reform is possible, have to show is that this entrenched position can somehow be abandoned. They have never provided any convincing argument to substantiate that hope/belief. That is why I continue to call them out as dreamers – good intentions but naive to history.
While many mainstream economists have been coming out to defend their reputations against the growing awareness that Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) presents a direct challenge to their hegemony, some of the mainstream haven’t responded at all and continue to confirm what the standard mainstream macroeconomics is about and how far removed from MMT it really is. The MMT critics claim that there is nothing new in MMT (‘we knew it all along’) in one breathe, and then ‘MMT is crazy dangerous’ in another, without seemingly realising how conflicted that juxtaposition is. But when leading mainstreamers, who are not engaging with the public MMT discussion going on, publish their Op Ed pieces, we gain an insight into what the mainstream is really about despite all the attempts by other mainstreamers to co-opt as much of MMT as they can while still claiming it is crazy. A recent Op Ed article in the Wall Street Journal (March 20, 2019) – The Debt Crisis Is Coming Soon – by Harvard economics professor Martin Feldstein – is a great demonstration of the DNA of mainstream macroeconomics. MMT presents a diametrically opposed view to this standard mainstream analysis. There is no correspondence possible between the two positions.
Here are the answers with discussion for this Weekend’s Quiz. The information provided should help you work out why you missed a question or three! If you haven’t already done the Quiz from yesterday then have a go at it before you read the answers. I hope this helps you develop an understanding of modern monetary theory (MMT) and its application to macroeconomic thinking. Comments as usual welcome, especially if I have made an error.
Welcome to The Weekend Quiz. The quiz tests whether you have been paying attention or not to the blog posts that I post. See how you go with the following questions. Your results are only known to you and no records are retained.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics released the latest data today – Labour Force, Australia, January 2019 – which reveals a weak labour market and continues the trend established in 2018 and is consistent with the very weak National Accounts data that was released earlier this month. It now looks like the stronger January result was a blip. The weak employment growth was accompanied by a decline in the labour force, and, as a result, unemployment fell by 11,700 thousand. Adjusting for the weaker participation suggests that the unemployment rate would be 5.2 per cent rather than 4.9 per cent. Last month, I concluded that the range of indicators available to us suggest that there would be a further slowdown in February and March. That is what was revealed by today’s data. My overall assessment is the current situation can best be characterised as weak. The Australian labour market remains a considerable distance from full employment. There is clear room for some serious policy expansion at present. There is clear room for some serious policy expansion at present. Where is the Labor Party on this? Chasing fiscal surpluses! Go figure.
I am now back to my Wednesday pattern of devoting more time to non-blog post writing and less time to blog post writing. But I was interested overnight in the news that the German government is trying to force (pressure) the partly-state owned Commerzbank (Zombie 1) into a merger with Deutsche Bank (Zombie 2). The result will probably just be a bigger zombie bank. It is unlikely it will reduce the vulnerability that both banks currently face as a result of poor management, risky loan portfolios (greed over prudence), massive debt burdens, and costly, underperforming branch structures (especially in the case of Commerzbank). Another example of the failure of the European Union to provide policy structures that advance prosperity and reduce the risk of crises.
In recent weeks, it has become apparent that Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) has evolved into a new ‘status’. Our work is everywhere now and has penetrated the political process (particularly in the US). At the same time, the mainstream macroeconomists continue to make fools of themselves by backtracking on some of their predictions that were made early in the GFC (about inflation, solvency, interest rates, bond yields, etc) and attacking MMT economists who actually provided correct analysis of what would happen in terms of these aggregates. The new ‘status’ means that MMT is now a visible challenger and the old guard hate that. All manner of critiques are emerging and the heartland of the mainstream approach at the University of Chicago recently trumped up a survey as evidence that MMT is crazy stupid. Some of the more odious mainstreamers then chose to disseminate the survey results as a sort of glorious statement of victory over MMT. The only problem was that the survey had nothing to do with the body of work we refer to as MMT and so was a dishonest exercise. The other problem was that the survey respondents were too insular (I didn’t say stupid) to realise they were being duped by Chicago Booth. None commented that the two questions that were under the heading ‘Modern Monetary Theory’ bore no resemblance to any core MMT statements or learnings. All this told me was that Groupthink is crippling the economics profession.