Underlining the current obsession with fiscal austerity is an equally long-standing obsession with so-called structural reform. The argument goes that growth can be engendered by deregulating the labour market to remove inefficiencies that create bottlenecks for growth even when fiscal austerity is slashing aggregate demand and killing growth. The 1994 OECD Jobs Study the provides the framework for this policy approach. The only problem is that it failed even before the crisis emerged. But with policymakers intent on slashing aggregate demand, which they know will kill growth, they have to offer something that they can pretend will generate growth. The structural reform agenda has zero credibility in the same way that fiscal austerity has zero credibility.

Evidence is a lovely thing sometimes. Like the speck of blood on a bomber jacket that has finally convicted the racist killers in London, 19 years after the crime was committed. In a different way, economic data is continually flowing in that makes vocal elements in my profession look like idiots. The only question is how long will it take for the rest of the world to know that and for governments to stop being influenced by the opinions of these economists. Over the last few decades I have been compiling interviews and commentaries from leading economists so that I can compare their predictions with the evolving reality. Economists typically make categorical statements such as – rising budget deficits will push up interest rates and choke off private spending – and then buttress those comments with arcane models that were negated both conceptually and empirically years ago. Invariably, when the mainstream economists do make predictions or empirical statements they are invariably wrong and then it is interesting to see how they respond to the anomaly – the dance that follows to try to maintain the upper-hand in the debate. They typically respond by nuancing the issue. But there are also times when their predictions are unambiguously wrong and ad hoc responses (of the Lakatosian type) make them look even more stupid. Then they bury their head in the sand and go into denial mode and their ideology takes over. The best antidote to this sort of dogma is evidence.

Happy New Year – first serious blog for 2012. What does a macroeconomist like me do on the second day of the new year when the sun is shining warmly (about 29 degrees celsius) and everyone is seemingly on holidays? Answer: read up on central bank balance sheets. The truth is that I read two speeches today as part of another piece of research I am doing and they contained a few statements that help us understand the difference between Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) essentials and the way the mainstream economists misrepresent the monetary operations in the economy. The speeches were presented by a senior official at the Bank of International Settlements and they confirm that the central bank of the central bankers is now part of the problem. This organisation has now become part of the neo-liberal propaganda machine which is making things worse rather than better.

Japanese economist Richard Koo recently published his latest paper – The world in balance sheet recession: causes, cure, and politics – which reminds us that patience is the virtue that is required right now and that the major political responses to the crisis are exactly the opposite to what is required to safely steer the World economy back into health. The insights he provides, mostly consistent with Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), demonstrate how the current political cycle (and the imperatives that are being imposed) is so far out of kilter with what responsible macroeconomic management requires. The world economy will require continuous and historically large budget deficits in most advanced nations for many years to come. The demands for fiscal consolidation talk about this year and next year and surpluses in a few years. The reality is that deficits will be required to support growth while the private sector reconstructs its unsustainable balance sheet for more than a decade. We have to get use to that or suffer the consequences. To repeat: Historically high budget deficits will be required for the next decade – at least.

It is a public holiday in Australia today and I am not working a full day. But I have been collecting some items from the past five or so years which I am weaving into the text book that Randy Wray and I hope to have out in the coming year. When academics or others comment on public affairs it is clear that our commentary is to a certain extent time-dependent. The language we use, the topics we focus on and the conclusions we draw. So some things that are written sound quaint when we go back to them after some years. I hoard information and occasionally I access my databases to see who said what in some year and compare it to what might have happened in the interim and then what the same person might be saying in retrospect. It is an interesting exercise and when applied to my own profession reveals some amazingly nonsensical predictions or assessments. The global crisis has provided a major event to test many of the assessments made prior to the crisis. The most surprising thing is that the same sort of assessments made prior to the crisis that were demonstrated to be entirely false are still being made and still influencing policy design. But the most robust assessments have withstood the crisis and remain relevant today. I include the developments in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) in this latter category. Mainstream macroeconomics was largely wrong before the crisis and is wrong now (for the same reasons) and should be disregarded.