In March 2008, we released the CofFEE/URP Employment Vulnerability Index (EVI), which provides a risk assessment by suburb of job loss in event of a serious downturn. It was based on an economic model that captured the major risk factors that would predicate job loss at a local spatial scale. Some data is now coming in that provides the capacity to assess the accuracy of our framework.

Today I have been working on part of a new book I am writing on the pathology of recessions. I have written a lot about this in the past and my last book was about this topic. But you can never say it enough – recessions impose huge social costs on the most disadvantaged members of our society and it is the responsibility of national governments to do every they can to avoid them. The neo-liberal onslaught on public policy has seen governments all around the world abandon this responsibility with obvious (ugly) consequences. Anyway, here is a way of thinking about all of this. It is not a happy story.

There have been several related reports and articles in the last few days about adjustments that are going on as the economy goes into recession. New data is also available to shed light on movements in wage costs and labour productivity which can help us better understand what is going on at present and provide comparisons with the now perennial question – is this recession different to that experienced in 1991. Today I decided to write about these matters as an on-going investigation into what is happening out there in the labour market. This is sort of my other main interest in economics alongside the development and explication of modern monetary theory. Today we find that the neo-liberal dumbing down of our labour market may have saved a few jobs – but at what cost!

Today I have been examining bankruptcy data. The popular notion is that bankruptcy rises during a recession. Many are arguing that this recession will drive higher rates than ever because of the extent of household debt. These are all conjectures that form part of the popular folklore but rarely formally investigated. So this blog summarises some introductory work I have been doing to investigate this notion more fully. It will at least settle some issues.

Today among other things I have been examining the hours data more closely to further highlight the difference between the 1991 recession and our current woes. The comparison is interesting and reveals a lot about how labour markets adjust. It also provides some scope to develop further insights into total labour underutilisation. However, while the current labour market state requires an urgent further injection of net public spending the circumstances are different to what we faced in 1991.

Today I was interviewed for the ABC World Today program about the current International Monetary Fund report which has criticised the Treasury and RBA forecasts of the Australian economy and suggested the Reserve Bank should consider more interest rate cuts.

Here is some twisted logic if you ever saw it. Sydney Morning Herald main economics writer Ross Gittins wrote yesterday that the Opposition leader’s scaremongering about the build-up of debt is a faux concern and amounts to hysteria. So he sets about soothing us with some explanation. But it is the explanation that leaves out some of the more important insights which if known would alter the way the reader understood the article and the issue being discussed.

I am often sent E-mails asking me to explain succinctly (what my other explanations are not!) how public deficits finance saving. What does it mean? How does it work in a macroeconomic system? What is the difference between automatic stabilisers and discretionary budget dynamics? What would have happened if the government had not have increased the growth in spending? All these sorts of questions. So this short blog – to make up for yesterday’s ridiculously long blog – will cover those issues. It should clear up any outstanding issues about why deficits are important to underwriting growth.

Yesterday, regular commentator JKH wrote a very long comment where he/she challenged some of the statements and logic that modern monetary theorists including myself have been making. While I don’t want to elevate one comment to any special status – all comments are good and add to the debate in some way – this particular comment does make statements that many readers will find themselves asking. In that sense it is illustrative of more general principles, points etc and so today’s blog provides a detailed answer to JKH and tries to make it clear where the differences lie. Some of these differences are at the level of nuance but others are more fundamental.

In November last year, during a visit to the LSE, the Queen of England (and Australia to our eternal shame) asked some pointy heads why “if these things were so large, how come everyone missed them?” in relation to the apparent inability of the mainstream economics profession to foresee the crisis. Apparently, the Royal Academy then called a special workshop to discuss this and came up with an answer which they then relayed post haste … as “Your Majesty’s most humble and obedient servants” to Liz. The whole affair represents the standard massive denial that defines mainstream macroeconomics. There are no saving graces. It would be useful if they just desisted for a while and went and played gin rummy.