Monetary policy is not fit for purpose
I have said this many times – monetary policy is not fit for purpose and central banks should be prevented from having discretionary powers to alter rates at will. There are two levels of justification for that assertion. First, at the ideological level, a major (dominant under neoliberalism) arm of macroeconomic policy should not be outsourced to an unelected, unaccountable body of technocrats. This subverts the operation of democracies by allowing elected officials to depoliticise policy settings through their ‘pass the parcel’ approach – ‘oh the central bank is independent and we never interfere in their decisions’ type narrative. Second, on a technical level, the officials have little idea of when and what the impact will be of their policy changes. There are too many unknowns, mostly relating to the distributional consequences of interest rate changes (creditors win, debtors lose) which make it impossible to predict when the creditors will spend up their gains and debtors cut their spending. As a result, there are many examples in history of central banks moving too early (relative to their stated objective) or too late, with the outcome being that they make matters worse, particularly prolonging recessions. This situation is once again looming up in Japan at the moment.