Regular readers will know that I have spent quite a lot of time reading the…
A “Budget Responsibility Lock” – a ridiculous proposal
The US Koch brothers provide substantial funds to the George Mason University to ensure it remains a bastion of so-called libertarian, free-market thinking. The brothers don’t really want a free market but it just serves their political and commercial aims to tell everyone that is what it is all about. The Economics Department at this university pumps out propaganda about the virtues of deregulation. One academic (Bryan Caplan) goes further and claims that democracy is a bad idea when compared to taking the advice of economists who advocate free markets. This idea that somehow policy choices conditioned by what would advance the best interests of the public are inferior to those advocated by economists who know what is best for all of us has permeated the debate over the last few decades and led to some very undesirable developments. This was on my mind when I was reading the Manifesto of the British Labour Party which proposes, wait for it – a “Budget Responsibility Lock” – as a framework for fulfilling its responsibilities to the British public. This is a ridiculous proposal.
I thought of Caplan again today, when I read Gregory Mankiw’s latest atrocity in the New York Times (April 24, 2015) – Economists Actually Agree on This: The Wisdom of Free Trade – which was highly misleading, given that the title is about “Free Trade” yet the article is in support of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among other things.
It is impossible to say anything about the TPP and we are certainly not able to conclude it is the exemplar of ‘Free Trade’ because it is shrouded in secrecy and our democratically-elected governments are behaving as if they are North Korea, their so-called pariah state.
I will write more about the TPP when I know more. At first blush, it appears to be anti-freedom which will put power in the hands of a small, unelected cartel of elite lawyers and similar and allow this group to punish states who follow the will of their voters to preserve local well-being.
If the stories about it are true then we should fight against our governments signing such a deal which will end democracy as we know it.
Mankiw’s insidious offering was to praise economists for having the wisdom to know about the benefits of such agreements and vilify anyone who dares to question the process.
This is even though “Mankiw … has no way of knowing whether TPP is a free trade agreement” (as William Black pointed out in his retort (April, 26, 2015) – Mankiw Mendacity and Morality and his League of Failed Economists).
But Mankiw’s reference to Caplan went like this:
If economists are so sure about the benefits of free trade, why are the public and their elected representatives often skeptical? One answer comes from a 2007 book by Bryan Caplan, a George Mason University professor, called “The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies.”
Mr. Caplan argues that voters are worse than ignorant about the principles of good policy. Ignorance would be random and might average out in a large population. Instead of being merely ignorant, voters hold on to mistaken beliefs.
It is a rather extraordinary proposition that economists are the knowledgeable sages and the rest of the population are not only ignorant but, as a collective, are likely to believe things that are wrong.
The last part of the proposition – that “voters hold on to mistaken beliefs” might be true – but it is also true that they get these ideas from the deviousness of economists who hold out their predictions and analysis as if it is scientific knowledge, when in fact it is ideological blather with little basis in reality.
It is the constant nonsense flowing from mainstream economists that influence politicians. PhD graduates from mainstream schools fill up treasury departments and central banks and pompously claim to know the truth.
If you have read Caplan’s book you will understand that these free-market zealots have a basic, inbred hatred for democratic choice and believe it interferes with the purity of the market and its ‘value free’ determinations.
It is a particularly odd argument when you think about it. The idea is that voters basically misunderstand economics and so pressure politicians to make poor decisions about matters relating to employment, immigration, growth, welfare etc.
But if we are so riddled with these misunderstandings how could we be trusted to ‘vote’ in the free market properly, when the optimality of that institution-free arrangement requires us to be rational decision-makers with perfect (or rational) foresight?
Caplan fudged the answer to that question by arguing that mostly we are rational – when it hurts us in dollars not to be. But apparently we are dichotomised individuals who jump from cool-headed rational decision-making when buying milk to irrational and fanciful ideas when supporting political decisions.
And our politicians who are advised by economists who know what is the best policy for the nation are constrained by what the irrational and ignorant public will accept. The political system then becomes caught up in an impasse where the politicians have to choose between poor economic policies (to retain the support of the ignorant public) and sound policies (which they know will be best for the economy).
It is an extraordinary thesis. These politicians are apparently innocents. They are not in the pay of the lobby groups and they don’t condition the public opinion, they just respond to it as best they can.
It also assumes that mainstream economists know best, a proposition that surely cannot be sound given the systematic errors that economists make when predicting outcomes of their policy advice. The IMF, for example, has an appalling record and admitted in October 2012 that the ‘modelling’ it provided as part of its role in the Troika, which conditioned the Greek bailout strategy (if you can call it a strategy) was completely wrong.
Analysis would suggest that politicians take advice from the conservative economists and then seek to construct narratives that convince the public that a particular course of action is in their best interests, when it it clear that the advice given is wrong and the action pursued detrimental to public interest.
Where does the public get the idea that fiscal deficits are bad from? It is not intuitive. If you have a conversation with a child and explain things clearly they instinctively can grasp the principles of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).
Unburdened by all the ideological conditioning that the economists introduce into the public policy space, they know that if a factory can sell something it will employ people to make the product. They know that people have to spend for there to be sales. They know in a two-person economy if the private person does not want to spend, then the public person (government) has to spend or else there would be no sales.
They know that if the government issues the currency and the public use it then the former can spend as much as they like and the latter has to get the currency from the government somehow.
They know that if there are no further real goods available to buy then the government is reaches a limit on their effective spending capacity but up to that point it can buy what it likes simply by spending the currency it issues.
All this weird stuff that fills up economic textbooks about governments running out of money, and having to issue debts to get some more money and/or taking it from the private sector via taxation, and the rest of the fiscal myths that pervade the public debate are lost on someone not burdened by the years of conservative conditioning.
But the claim that democracy (public opinion) undermines sound economic policy has spawned a range of anti-democratic developments over several years in policy making.
The so-called independence of central banks is part of the mantra. Please read my blog – The sham of central bank independence – for more discussion on this point.
The creation of independence fiscal monitoring authorities (for example, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in the US, the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) in the UK and the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) in Australia), which attempt to shift the responsibility of fiscal policy away from where it can be held accountable at elections to organisations that are replete with mainstream economists who have no responsibility to uphold public interest.
The fiscal rules implemented in the Eurozone that have ground down prosperity over the last seven years are examples of this trend.
The aim is to eliminate discretion. One of the earlier Monetarist arguments propagated by Milton Friedman was that governments should be bound by rules and not be allowed to exercise policy discretion. He claimed that policy makers were likely to be incompetent and were operating in an uncertain environment so that their discretion would mostly lead to bad outcomes.
The so-called superiority of rigid rules have left its imprint on the way politicians now behave and the way they condition the public.
As an aside, imagine if the central banks around the world had have been constrained by Friedman-type rules about balance sheet expansion in the early days of the GFC, when there was a real possibility that the world’s financial system would collapse.
The discretion used by policy makers in the US (and Australia) saved those economies from a much worse fate than was already experienced.
I was thinking about all this when I read the British Labour Party’s absurd proposition outlined in their – Economic Manifesto – the so-called self-imposed “Budget Responsibility Lock” – which is designed to present it as a party of fiscal prudence.
Its first economic statement is that it will “reduce the deficit” and “balance the books without extreme spending cuts”.
The “Budget Responsibility Lock” has three components:
We will cut the deficit every year with a surplus on the current budget and get the national debt falling as soon as possible in the next Parliament.
We will make fair and sensible spending decisions, including capping social security spending so that it is properly controlled, stopping the payment of the winter fuel allowance to the wealthiest five per cent of pensioners and capping child benefit rises for the next two years.
There is not a single policy in this manifesto that is funded by additional borrowing. There are tough decisions to be taken and we haven’t made any commitments that we can’t keep.
This apparently will “build a strong economic foundation”
The UK Guardian article (April 13, 2015) – Ed Miliband rebrands Labour as party of fiscal responsibility – reported that the Labour leader said that the “Lock”:
… does something different: its very first page sets out a vow to protect our nation’s finances; a clear commitment that every policy in this manifesto is paid for without a single penny of extra borrowing.
Those who have a grasp of MMT will know that there is no such things as protecting a nation’s finances when referring to the public fiscal policy operations. What is there to protect?
Households have to safeguard their finances to ensure they don’t overcommit relative to income sources and end up bankrupt.
But the British government can never become bankrupt.
And how is running a declining deficit each year and the guarantee of a surplus within 5 years sensible policy?
I have searched for Labour Party projections of current account balances and private domestic balances over the next five years to no avail.
None are published alongside their fiscal balance pledges. But we know that the external sector is in deficit as the much-lauded export growth strategy adopted by the current Conservative government is in tatters.
So there is income being drained from the British economy by the external sector via the deficits.
We also know that the household sector is heavily indebted and doesn’t have much scope to go further into the red.
We also know that economic growth is lagging in the UK, real wages are flat and the employment situation is being flattered by the rapid growth in self-employed – that is, the labour market is weak and productivity is low.
I take those facts together and conclude that at least in the foreseeable future, the British government deficit has to rise not fall.
Any idea that a fiscal surplus would be a sensible target to aim for given the reality is crazy.
The “Lock” looks to be like one of those gimmicks that represent fiscal irresponsibility.
Please read the following introductory suite of blogs – Fiscal sustainability 101 – Part 1 – Fiscal sustainability 101 – Part 2 – Fiscal sustainability 101 – Part 3 – to learn how Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) constructs the concept of fiscal sustainability.
Further, note that the British Opposition ties deficits together with public debt, thus perpetuating the myth that the currency-issuing government is financially constrained. It clearly isn’t and it is time that politicians started to break out of those self-imposed constraints which only serve to limit the scope of fiscal policy to achieve its aims.
The public debate about fiscal policy has become so far removed from the reality of the underlying economics that it is little wonder that these politicians think these propositions are a good thing.
The British cybernetics expert Anthony Stafford Beer – introduced the term – POSIWID (the purpose of a system is what it does) – into the public sphere and it has relevance for this discussion.
What is the purpose of the economy? To answer we need to ask: What does it do? The economy is not there to deliver fiscal surpluses to the government.
The economy is where goods and services are produced, incomes are generated and people find jobs. The role of government therefore is to make those things happen not to undermine them.
Government policy makers should be firmly focused on maximising the potential of its population. The sustainable goal should be the zero waste of people! This at least requires the state to maximise employment – which means provide work for all those who desire work at the current wages.
It should not mean anything less than that. Policy should always be consistent with that goal.
Remember always that the Economy is Us
People created the economy. There is nothing natural about it. Mainstream economists think there are ‘natural tendencies’ to equilibrium where satisfaction is maximised and governments only serve to undermine that state.
But when we use terms like natural we have to ask – natural in relation to what? The mainstream define the problem away rather than address the ideological benchmark that the term ‘natural’ disguises.
The reality is that human interaction and choices, initially simple and localised, and later, significantly more complex and spatially distributed (globalised), creates what we call the economy. We are in charge here.
At some point, we realised that we needed an agent to do things that we could not do ourselves – either easily or at all. We formed governments. We also came to understand that our creation – the economy – would only serve our common purposes if it was subject to oversight and control by our agent.
We had operated under the mistaken view propagated by economists that this agency role was unnecessary because our spontaneous interactions would sort things out in our favour. This is Mankiw’s world – or so he would have us believe.
It didn’t happen and when the consequences of this failure became so obvious – during the Great Depression – we accepted the agency role as being fundamental to ensuring that the capitalist monetary system behaved itself.
We learned then that capitalism which had developed into a broad system of wage labour was subject to basic tensions between labour and capital. We also learned that the so-called “market” signals (prices that brought demand and supply together) would not deliver employment outcomes that satisfied the desires of labour for work.
We learned that this system could easily equilibrate (a state where there was no further dynamic for change) in a state of mass unemployment. The Great Depression taught us that our agent (the government) could ensure that the system did not get stuck in this state because it had the spending capacity to ensure that total spending in the economy generated enough output that would fully employ all those who wanted work.
The simple understanding of that period was that the economy was a construct we could control in order to create desirable collective outcomes such as improved living standards – better housing for all, improved public education and health standards etc. All outcomes that required real resources to be brokered by the public sector in cooperation with the private firms and workers.
While there was a strong conservative element that resisted the Post-World War 2 consensus, the government mediated the class conflict to ensure the system did deliver social as well as private returns. We understood that if employment fell it was because there wasn’t sufficient demand and because the economy was us, we knew what to do about it – spend more. The question was how would this be accomplished.
Economists certainly understood that private spending could become stuck – while the unemployed certainly had a demand for goods and services, they only sent a notional signal to the firms of that desire. The private market only works on effective demand and supply signals – that is, demand intentions backed by cash and the unemployed didn’t have any cash because they had lost their job and employment provides income which funds spending.
While the way the macroeconomists spoke of such things was reserved for the academy (full of jargon etc), the concepts were also broadly understood by the public and we knew that a government fiscal deficit was required to ensure that total spending was sufficient (for full employment) when the rest of us (the non-government sector) were not recycling all our current income back into the spending stream (that is, saving).
Once the private sector has made its spending based on its expectations of the future, the government has to render those private decisions consistent with the objective of full employment or else there will be national income losses and social dislocation.
Non-government spending gaps – defined as insufficient spending relative to what is required to sustain output at full employment levels – over the course of the cycle can only be filled by the government.
The national government always has a choice:
- Maintain full employment by ensuring there is no spending gap – that is run budget deficits commensurate with non-government surpluses; OR
- Maintain some slack in the economy (persistent unemployment and underemployment) which means that the government deficit will be somewhat smaller and perhaps even, for a time, a budget surplus will be possible.
So when a political party prioritises a particular fiscal balance target independent of the real purpose of the economy and its role as our agent not our confessor, then you know that POSIWID is being violated.
Further, it is here that I always make the distinction between a ‘bad’ versus a ‘good’ deficit and the distinction rests on understanding the automatic stabilisers.
The automatic stabilisers attenuate private spending gaps because falling national income ensures that fiscal deficits rise (as tax revenue falls and welfare spending rises) to support (to some extent) overall spending.
But in a period of spending decline, the resulting deficits will be driven by a declining economy and rising unemployment. These deficits are ‘bad’ because they are not the result of discretionary choices of our agent to advance our welfare.
They symbolise that our welfare is in decline. The decline is not due to the rising deficit. But the rising deficit reflects that decline.
Fiscal sustainability is about running ‘good’ deficits to achieve full employment if the circumstances require that. You cannot define fiscal sustainability independently of the real economy and what the other sectors are doing.
The automatic stabilisers make a mockery of rule-driven budget targets. Once we focus on financial ratios – deficit to GDP ratios – public debt ratios – we are effectively admitting that we do not want government to take responsibility of full employment (and the equity advantages that accompany that end). That is why fiscal rules as stand-alone goals are meaningless or ideological.
Any financial target for budget deficits or the public debt to GDP ratio can never represent sensible policy conduct. The actual fiscal outcome is largely endogenous anyway (beyond the control of government) because it is driven by private spending decisions.
It is highly unlikely that a government could actually hit some previously determined target if it wasn’t consistent with the public purpose aims to create full capacity utilisation.
As George Osborne discovered when he went hell-for-leather with austerity in the first year or two of the Conservative government – the deficit rose as real growth plummetted.
In discussions of austerity there are often incompatible goals specified by proponents. The classic is their claim that austerity will allow both the private and public sector to reduce debt, when there is an external deficit. That is an impossible troika.
A national government in a fiat monetary system has specific capacities relating to the conduct of the sovereign currency. It is a monopoly issuer, which means that the government can never be revenue-constrained in a technical sense (voluntary constraints ignored). This means exactly this – it can spend whenever it wants to and has no imperative to seeks funds to facilitate the spending.
The real question is what are the limits on government spending? While a sovereign government is not financially constrained it is nonetheless constrained in real terms. It can only buy what is available for sale. Unemployment is a sign that at least one resource is available for sale.
It is true that there is some uncertainty in designing and introducing fiscal interventions. Please read this blog – The inexact science of calibrating fiscal policy – for more discussion.
Automatic stabilisers have the desirable characteristic of providing immediate, counter-cyclical spending injections (or withdrawals) when private activity fluctuates. They avoid the so-called policy lags which relate to the time delays in the government identifying that a significant shift in private demand has occurred, designing a policy response to that shift, providing appropriate legislation to support an intervention, and then executing the intervention.
In some cases, the time delays can result in the major part of the policy intervention arriving too late and working to destabilise the cycle. For example, if by the time the government has designed and implemented a new discretionary spending injection, the private sector has already resumed trend spending growth, then the impulse of government spending might lead to the economy overheating.
There is some sense in building public purpose goals into the automatic stabilisers so that as they go to work in a cyclical fashion the outcomes will be desirable and avoid the uncertainty of discretionary interventions (timing lags, etc).
This builds on yesterday’s blog – The Job Guarantee would enhance the private sector.
MMT shows that an unconditional, demand-driven employment guarantee, run as an automatic stabiliser, is the most superior buffer stock approach to price stability. Conditional (supply-driven) approaches not only undermine the job creating potential but also reduce the capacity of the scheme to act as a nominal anchor.
The Job Guarantee functions as an automatic stabiliser rather than as a discretionary program. It builds further endogeneity into the fiscal balance but we know that public purpose is being served when the fiscal deficit rises in this case.
When the economy turns down, the Job Guarantee pool of workers will rise as displaced workers elect to take the guarantee.
When the economy starts to improve again, the private sector merely has to offer a wage (or conditions) better than the Job Guarantee wage and the Job Guarantee pool will largely decline again.
The discretion by governments is thus reduced. A pool of projects would be agreed upon with local communities and the expansion or contraction of the scheme would be automatic. There would be no big bailouts of banks or business firms. The financial markets would be largely dealt out of the game.
The Job Guarantee is not a universal panacea. It is a safety net employment capacity that provides a nominal anchor for the macroeconomy via the fact that the government would never be competing for resources with the private sector.
The private sector can bid the workers away any time they want to pay above the minimum wage (and provide reasonable working conditions). If there are inflation pressures, tighter policy settings would redistribute workers from the inflating private sector into the fixed price Job Guarantee pool and stabilise prices. That is how buffer stocks work.
The value of this approach is that the government knows exactly how much stimulus is required to achieve this ‘loose’ full employment on a daily basis.
The tap turns off when the last worker walks in the door on any day looking for a job. This provides daily feedback to the fiscal system and overcomes the uncertainty of timing and guessing the size of the stimulus.
The fiscal deficit is calibrated to the last dollar as a minimum starting point.
Once the economy is at full employment – in this sense – the government can then design other stimulus measures that it deems to be politically sustainable (and which hopefully add social value) to create employment and activity elsewhere.
But it always knows that if the nominal demand levels come up against the real capacity of the economy then employment will just be redistributed if policy tightening is required rather than unemployment being created.
The challenge is always to make our governments work for us rather than the elites. MMT is not naive to the capture of our governments by the latter. But what we do about it is in the political domain – the class struggle etc.
MMT does provide a full employment and price stability framework which helps reduce the change of this capture.
Concepts like a “Budget Responsibility Lock” only undermine government capacity to fulfill its legitimate role. I would not vote for a political party that proposed such a ridiculous concept.
That is enough for today!
(c) Copyright 2015 William Mitchell. All Rights Reserved.
This Post Has 19 Comments
We still have the House of Lords, the Privy Council and Monarchy in the UK. All unelected grouping of ‘our betters’ with still quite a lot of power.
However the power over fiscal matters was removed following the constitutional crisis of 1910 where the House of Lords vetoed the ‘Peoples Budget’.
So as well as taking the economic system back to the 19th century, mainstream economists want the political system taken back further to the time of Kings and Barons.
With them as the Barons obviously and the rest of us tugging forelocks and hoping for a crust.
Perhaps neo-feudalism is a more appropriate term for mainstream economic thought?
Here are some mistaken beliefs held by most voters:
1 – saving is good, borrowing is bad
2 – exports are good, imports are bad
3 – budget deficits are dangerous
4 – government debt is a burden on all of us
5 – people can be supported by their savings and investments because income can be transferred to the future
6 – taxes have to be progressive in order to have an egalitarian impact
7 – inflation results from too much money in the economy
I would like to ask some questions. While I think the above is all good advice, I wondered how an ideal Labour government should proceed.
Do you think that while deficit spending, or should I say injections of real money into the economy are necessary to increase employment and well being, that also there should be a major restructuring of debt, as Michael Hudson and Steve Keen argues? Would a debt jubilee prevent the need for government to create too much money by writing down the debts?
While banks create 97% of the money supply as credit and pile it all into property, too much of what people earn is poured into the abyss of debt service. Some pressure groups in Britain are arguing for monetary reform as in Iceland, where government creates all the money through the central bank, to prevent the build up of economic bubble on property. Do you think this reform is necessary, or can governments contain this problem with regulation and deficit spending alone?
As one of the past duped general public, I would like to thank you for the intellectual respite you have supplied through your blog. Before my exposure to your blog, and the MMT writers in general, I was the classic “fly in the fly bottle (as stated by Wittgenstein)”. I knew something was wrong and furiosly smashed my head against the “balanced budget” conundrum, but couldn’t see a way out. It wasn’t until I was shown another way of looking at the problem that I saw the trap for what it was, and was “easily able to fly up out of the opening”. Thank god that us who are not untrapped children still have someone with the patience to repeatedly trace the outline of our invisible prison, so we might see our way free.
Bill, I have a question about JG?
When you take a new job, takes about month before first get paid. So if you exit JG there is a small gap between that and employment.
What seems to be missing, here, is a yet to be declared human right….the “the right to be a productive human being”–a given in primitive societies, but lost in the age of industrialization-where, it appears, we are used and discarded “at will”–and governments conflicted on what to do re the displaced worker. Unemployment is a “social” problem, with pernicious social consequences-both for the individual and the larger society-and we, the larger society, have an absolute responsibility to find a solution-so why on earth do we stand on one foot and then the other waiting on anything as erratic as the market to solve a problem–the data shows it is incapable of solving? Unemployment is a “No One Wins”–the jobless loses, civility loses, and the market loses…..We can get lost in socialism, or communism, and all other isms….but that does not absolve us of our responsibility to find a solution-the adverse consequences remain as we get lost down blind alleys…..the point is that we need to start with the above “right”–and then design policies to insure its enforcement….Amen
Bill wrote: “The Great Depression taught us that our agent (the government) could ensure that the system did not get stuck in this state because it had the spending capacity to ensure that total spending in the economy generated enough output that would fully employ all those who wanted work.”
1) Is there an MMT consensus as to why this lesson hasn’t become part of a more broadly accepted ‘economic canon’?
2) How would one portray this lesson as a theory that has been validated by the ‘experience’ of the Great Depression?
Sandra, Beware the oversimplistic mantra of the positive money movement. They would like to eliminate commercial banking as it now exists, and have ‘debt free money’ created by a panel of ‘experts’. Apart from a concern over who would be on this panel of so-called ‘experts’, and also apart from a quibble over the fact that all modern money is (in a sense) different forms of debt (even government created fiat money can be seen as such), positive money misunderstands how a financial system under capitalism has to work. The economy requires an elastic supply of business credit. This means banks need to be able to extend credit, at the prevailing interest rate, when there is a demand for it. Lending cannot be constrained by a strictly controlled supply of government-issued money, or that part of this supply that lending institutions have been able to attract from the public. Any attempt to increase such a system would almost certainly lead to highly volatile interest rates, and have to be quickly abandoned. Attempts to restrict the supply of cash to the banking system have been tried, for just a few days in China in 2013, and briefly in the US in the early 80s. They have had to be abandoned, as they cause a crisis almost straight away. Some positive money people respond to these facts by arguing that the supply of money from the panel of experts would be elastic enough to deal with this problem. Either it would involve lending funds on demand to private sector lending institutions, or it would not be elastic enough. If the former is the case, then it would not be a real reform at all. Lending institutions would still be able to create money by lending to the public and borrowing on demand from the state monetary authority. That would be exactly like the current system, with a tax on the banking system, and not really a reform at all. If you are disturbed by the behaviour of private commercial banks, as I am (and I have spent a lifetime training bankers), then the options are to tighten up on regulation (and one way to do that is to greatly increase the ratio of required reserves of capital, or shareholders’ funds, which banks are required to hold) or to go further and nationalise the banking system. I sympathise with those who would do the latter, but think the former is more likely to happen (and in a very minor and insufficient way has already started to happen). There are other things which need to happen too. The fact that banks create most of what many people define as measures of ‘the money supply’ , subject to regulation (as mentioned above – they do need reserves of capital if they are to expand their balance sheets by creating deposit money), isn’t the main issue. And yes, deficit spending, as Bill describes, can and does mean that private sector financial instability need never cause an increase in unemployment and involuntary poverty. MMT is based on a completely realistic understanding and description of how monetary systems actually work and can be made to work – positive money is a set of ideas developed by well meaning people, and is supported with a quasi-religious fervour by some of these people, but it has no basis in reality. It is, moreover, supported by plenty of people we would generally regard as neoliberals, and has a bias towards the promotion of direct finance through financial markets (as opposed to traditional financial intermediation), so it is appropriate to be highly sceptical about PM.
I will now stand by and wait for a volley of incoming missiles, and even more people telling me I don’t understand Positive Money! 🙂
You include in your list of “mistake beliefs”
“taxes have to be progressive in order to have an egalitarian impact”
There’s nothing in MMT to support your view. What’s wrong with a progressive system of income tax? There is hardly anyone on the left, or even the more sensible right, who would say there is anything wrong at all.
If MMT is going to win acceptance we need to be more careful in our explanation of what MMT is. Instead of being too hard-core, too quickly, we need to be more circumspect. We start from where people are in their understanding. Not where we might like them to be.
In any case, taxes on the super-wealthy aren’t at all about raising money as we all know. But let’s tax them anyway! If they then decide to clear off to Monaco or wherever, good riddance. We should then confiscate the assets they leave behind.
POLITICS AS SALES.
Posted on: March 25, 2015 by William Waite
Category: Social Credit Views
The opening lines of Douglas’ The Monopoly of Credit, first published in 1931, say:
“It cannot have escaped the observations of anyone interested in the welfare and orderly progress of society that, more especially in the years which have intervened since the close of the European War and the present time, the centre of gravity of world affairs has shifted from Parliaments and Embassies to Bank Parlours and Board Rooms. It is probable that this shifting is more apparent than real; that, in fact Parliaments and Embassies have not for a long time been more than the salesman of policies which were manufactured elsewhere.” 
Most people who are committed to the idea that Australia is a democracy will recoil from assertions like these. Given the predominance of men and women in politics of verbal attainments only, it is not difficult to imagine the politician as salesperson. However, to test Douglas’ claim that politics is a sales technique for policies manufactured elsewhere, we will glance at a particular, not insignificant case: the Trans-Pacific-Partnership Agreement………cont………….
Dork – as always is even easier to observe in Ireland.
I remember when the local Irish overlord (Peter Sutherland ) appeared on the Irish Late Late show more than 20 years ago now.
In fairness to this demonic individual he is quite upfront about his friends plans for us.
He declared quite openly that politics serves no real function.
In this he was correct and merely rubberstamped the old social credit position on Anglo type democracy ( its a sham to disguise the workings of the scarcity engine )
“There’s nothing in MMT to support your view. What’s wrong with a progressive system of income tax? ”
Nothing all James is saying is there doesn’t HAVE to be there. Which matters because many left wingers think the govt would only have enough money if it was not for tax evasion.
And remember “progressive income tax” does not target the ultra-wealthy. Many upper middle class people caught in it along with ridiculously high rents/house prices in London where all the jobs are.
“We should then confiscate the assets they leave behind.”
What sort of process do you have in mind Peter? I can’t really see what you think is the problem. I would say the main problem is extracting rents but that is easy enough to solve – land value tax/property tax and lower interest on bonds or ZIRP/end bonds, and tax/ban luxury goods imports so there is no decline in balance of payments. Then, let them do what they wish.
Sandra, please read:
To Bob (from your link)
“” The Fundamentals
Sovereign money stimulates the economy by increasing the price of and therefore reduce the level of bank lending and then replaces that in the economy by increased government spending or tax cuts. Essentially the government does the borrowing from its own bank so you don’t have to.””
So wrong, it’s hard to know where to begin, but the question becomes, what proof is offered that this is true?
It’s a blanket, false, proposition.
There is NOTHING about the Sovereign Money proposals out there (sovereignmoney.eu) that either calls for or results in:
1. Increase the price of borrowing and lending. (the opposite)
2. Reduce the level of lending (credit) by banks. (the opposite)
3. Increased government spending, unless via a separate policy decision.(it can happen, like now.)
4. The government borrowing from the CG, or anyone. (the opposite … NO Guv borrowing)
5. Any limitation on private borrowing at all. (Promotes private sector credit creation), though in a way that has zero effect on the money supply …. the banks provide the velocity for the money supply in existence).
That link is an ignorant barrage of self-serving pablum.
What else do you have?
No, Steve, it’s not appropriate to be highly skeptical of PositiveMoneyUK, once you actually understand their proposal (which you obviously do not).
Why is it you think their work is the foundation for the likes of Lord Adair Turner (former top banking and finance regulator in the UK) THIS from Volcker’s Group of Thirty,
and Martin Wolf, international business economist for the Financial Times, to sign onto the PM proposals? Their learned positions are informed by PM’s proposals, because they are both ‘needed’ and ‘sound’ money system reforms.
For someone who claims to have spent a a lifetime ‘training bankers’ (hopefully at Mahjong) your understanding of the difference between money (what governments would create under the PM proposal) and credit (which private commercial banks would continue to create) is simply appalling.
But I do think that your fear-mongering of a National Monetary Authority will get a little traction, until people learn the truth that all the MA does is determine the potential growth in the GDP, given economic parameters, and then determine the quantity of new money that would then actually be created by the government, in its normal budgeting process ( just like MMT CLAIMS they do now)..
The budgeting difference would normally be a recognition of “seigniorage income” where today we put “additional public borrowing” on the “revenue” side. The spending side would be exactly the same.
IOW, there is no attempt to restrict the supply of ‘cash’ to the banking system, the limitation being on the banks’ power to create and issue the money they lend…… a progressive political posture since we printed the Greenbacks over here.
“”Either it would involve lending funds on demand to private sector lending institutions, or it would not be elastic enough.””
LOL. Steve, first, it would NOT be the former, except in an extraordinary circumstance at the request of the bank. And, second, guessing that maybe you trained bankers in ‘money elasticity’, how’s that working out right about now? That money-elasticity thing charade?
Ignorance is bliss, but when it results in a debt-saturated global recession, that is what you call NO ‘elasticity’ (balance sheet recession), and besides, ‘elastic currency’ is the Billboard behind which that capital-induced Booms and Busts reside.
Gee, Steve, the currency isn’t elastic enough to put people back to work …… too much debt, not enough money, so …………… let’s borrow more.
“”The fact that banks create most of what many people define as measures of ‘the money supply’ …… isn’t the main issue.”” LOL, again.
Actually, Steve, it isn’t ‘most people’ that determine the money supply, it’s the rules of the FRBS in this country. They make the definitions of monetary aggregates and credit aggregates, the former of which is what the money supply “IS”.
And, here’s a clue, Steve.
‘Who’ creates the money, public versus private, and, ‘how’, debt versus equity, IS the main issue.
“”MMT is based on a completely realistic understanding and description of how monetary systems actually work””
“Based on”? Or, it IS ?
Very loosely so, I would say.
It is a stylized monetary construct that for some reason distorts reality.
Our national sovereign government is not the issuer of the national currency … how can it be when 97 – 99 percent of the ‘money’ is issued by private banks.
Is bank credit not ‘currency’?
Is it not legal to tender in settlement of any debt, public or private?
Government does not create money when it spends …. Government is a ‘user’ of the privatized money systems everywhere. That’s why governments can, and do, run out of money.
That’s how this Creditocracy works.
Private banks lend to governments, whose sovereignty gives them the power to create that SAME money.
That’s HOW, “The Rich Get Richer, and the poor get the picture”
It’s the Creditocracy.
Lastly, Gawd, speaking of spitball “guilt by association” memes, who are the Neoliberal economists supporting the PM proposal?
For the Money System Common
To Sandra Crawford,
Thanks for some true orthodoxy in your questions and observations.
My basic caution would have to do with the ‘debt jubilees’ mentioned – by both Steve Keen mostly, and Michael Hudson, lesser.
There’s nothing to the Debt-Jubilee beyond the “face-time’ it offers to Steve.
Michael Hudson is correct that there WILL indeed be un-payable debts, but they will be a ‘defaulted’ loss, and not Jubileed, out of existence.
Unless we truly reform the money system.
The only history of a debt jubilee is by the issuer of the ‘coin of the realm’, when the sovereign actually HAD the money power. So, today, given that we have PRIVATIZED our money systems, and private bankers have the money power, there ain’t never gonna be a private-banker Debt Jubilee. We’ll suffer and die first. No help there. (Sounds good, but no help)
Keens earlier proposals were merely another private-to-public debt transfer …… no debt is ‘vaporized’ from existence ….. being accomplished by freeing the private bankers from debt-collections. This is further accomplished by having the government borrow the money used to relieve the private borrowers’ obligations.
Massive debt transfers from private bankers to the Public are hardly a Debt Jubilee, although they may by OK with ‘some’ of the MMT econs.
Also, not sure your Icelandic description is of what’s happening now, or what has been proposed by government leaders there.
Thanks, and good luck.
For the Money System Common.
Is bank credit not ‘currency’?
Is it not legal to tender in settlement of any debt, public or private?
No, it is not. Bank credit is not and cannot be used by banks to settle liabilities to the central government. Banks may get easy credit (discount window) from the government for a while, but governments can and do close banks that owe them too much or otherwise break government regulations.
A simple way to conceptualize the difference between bank credit and currency is by drawing a distinction between a bank extending a loan and creating an entry in the customer’s deposit account, and the customer withdrawing currency at the window. The bank can create entries on its own spreadsheet, .e.g, credit a deposit account, but it obviously cannot print or coin the currency under the existing system. The bank has to obtain the currency from the government, which it does through the central bank, in order to meet window demand for cash withdrawals. So bank credit cannot be equivalent to currency other than being denominated in the unit of account that a government specifies, e.g., the USD. EUR, or AUD. Governments are the sole providers of their currency in the existing monetary system. Government the currency issuer and non-government is comprised of currency users in transactions involving that currency. This distinction is key.
Here’s where it gets a bit more complicated, but the principle remains the same. Banks have to obtain what they cannot issue from the issuer, which is the government through the central bank acting as the agent of the government. Here is how that works.
Banks get vault cash to meet window demand by exchanging bank reserves (settlement balances) at the central bank. Bank reserves (settlement balances) exist only on the central banks’ spreadsheets and are creatures of the central banks, which means in effect, a government. Bank reserves are only used to settle accounts among banks and with the government. As Some Guy points out, governments require settlement in the currency it issues, either by cash payment at a government payment office or by using settlement balances at the central bank.
Banks can only get bank reserves or cash either by borrowing from the central bank, or in the interbank market, or from the government spending into the economy by crediting accounts of bank customers, which is done by the central bank crediting the reserve account of the bank at the direction of the Treasury. for example, when a social security payment is credited, the bank’s reserve account is credited at the central banks and the bank credits the customer’s deposit account. If the customer withdraws cash, then the bank’s vault cash decreases and the bank replenishes it by exchanging bank reserves at the central bank.
To SomeGuy at 8:02
Not really sure of the whole point that you are trying to make here.
“No, it is not.”
Sooo, Bank credit is not ‘currency’, or legal to tender?
Of course it is for every bank account holder in the country.
You say NOT for “bank” owesies’ to the government?
So, what do they pay with?
The bank creates the ‘credit’ (ALL money [c.e.])in my bank account ….. I use that bank account credit to pay my tax to the GUV, then ……to pay the bank my mortgage payment, which, upon receipt of the same bank-credit, the BANK cannot pay its taxes (or whatever)to the GUV ….?????
If the bank cannot use bank-credit to pay its bills to the GUV, then what CAN it use to pay its taxes? Only cash? Which is also ‘issued’ by the banks?
(Or, am I misunderstanding the point being made here?)
To Tom H.
A lot of truth in there, but, why?
We have a distinction without a difference here, when it comes to ‘money’.
And that was BEFORE it got ‘complicated’.
If a legal tender law (sovereign nation money statutes)’validates’ a private bank issuance of ‘anything’ to settle a private and//or public debt in that nation (private Banknote or private bank credit), then that ‘thing’ is fulfilling the whole definition of what a national currency(money) IS. There is no difference as to the qualities of a currency between bank credit and paper currency, here issued by the private bankers. You can pay your whole public or private ‘money’ debt with half bank credit and half paper money or three-quarters of one OR the other. They are the same unit of currency as defined in the money statutes, being what gives them ‘legal to tender’ status.
MMT likes to say that the banks issue the ‘money’, but the government is the ‘monopoly’ issuer of the currency (something , again, legal to tender to settle debts).
I say that in any country without a nationalized (public) central bank, the banks are the issuers of the ‘whole’ currency(c.e.) , and in those BoE-like countries, the banks are the issuers of 97 percent of the currency.
But, again, here…. Why the distinction?
Bringing in bank ‘reserves’ only allows further fog around this ‘money’ issue. Bank reserves are not money, never were, never will be. Nobody reading this has ever earned or spent a Dollar or Pound of ‘reserves’. TBF, nobody cares a hoot about bank reserves, and their nuances.
Reserves are, as you said, merely INTER-BANK settlement media … that never enter circulation and do not fulfill ANY country’s definitions of either currency or money. But, they sure seem really complicated …. Only being made relevant if that is the purpose for discussing them.
If we get outside the ‘fog around the money’, what we discover is that money IS ‘purchasing power’ in a national economy. A national economy involves the exchanges of goods and services between producers and consumers thereof. Reserves have no purchasing power, no power at all to effect an exchange of goods and services, and should really remain unspoken of when people are tying to understand how the money system works for The Restofus, and not the bankers.
Unless fogging our understandings actually IS the purpose thereof.