The OECDs perverted view of fiscal policy

It is interesting how the big neo-liberal economic organisations like the IMF and the OECD are trying to re-assert their intellectual authority on the policy debate again after being unable to provide any meaningful insights into the cause of the global crisis or its immediate remedies. They were relatively quiet in the early days of the crisis and the IMF even issued an apology, albeit a conditional one. It is clear that the policies the OECD and the IMF have promoted over the last decades have not helped those in poorer nations solve poverty and have also maintained persistently high levels of labour underutilisation across most advanced economies. It is also clear that the economic policies these agencies have been promoting for years were instrumental in creating the conditions that ultimately led to the collapse in 2007. Now they are emerging, unashamed, and touting even more destructive policy frameworks.

The OECD recently released a paper (May 31, 2010) entitled – The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation – by one Robert Price, which is in this vein – trying to regain some lost authority in the debate.

It should fail to do so given its flaws. But I guess with the media in a deficit frenzy, conservative think tanks trying to beat each other to come up with the biggest and scariest national debt clock, and witless politicians bending to every erroneous pressure that is being put on them to invoke austerity packages, this sort of paper will be referred to for the next month as something of substance. It isn’t! I would be better used as landfill.

Price says the paper:

… discusses the political economy factors which have created problems of fiscal sustainability in OECD economies and those which may have prevented or propitiated fiscal consolidation.

This is a 43-page documents so some 12,000 words or more. Not once is the string “unemployment” found in the text yet it is about fiscal policy. That one observation is enough to tell you that the OECD has a strange construction of the notion of political economy.

As you will read, the focus is all on financial ratios – deficit to GDP and public debt to GDP ratios – both of which are largely meaningless in economies with sovereign governments.

The paper presents a juxtaposition between lax governments (who create deficit biases) and the institutions that discipline this laxity:

… governments can reap a potential electoral advantage over their opponents by raising and spending money against future tax income. On the control side, the principal actors and interests include central banks and financial markets, which have an interest in preventing inflation and protecting the property rights of money and bond holders in general … As underwriters of government indebtedness the general public play an ambivalent role: they have to service government debt via taxation, but the benefits of borrowing may accrue to different groups of voters (both within and across generations) from those that pay.

I find that an extraordinary construction of the interactions. The good guys are the central banks and bond markets, the government is inherently bad and likely to be wasteful and the rest of us …!

First, democracy is about electing governments based on what we want them to do and holding them accountable if they don’t do it.

Second, the central bank and the treasury are part of government in a fiat monetary system whether they like to pretend otherwise or not. The sham of independence just means that the treasuries have become a passive partners and have allowed central banks to use unemployment as a policy tool to keep inflation stable. Central banks have thus been consistently working against the broader interests of the community. The on-going dead-weight losses arising from this strategy have been enormous and denied by the central bankers. They put out flawed and misleading research reports which try to hide the fact that the sacrifice ratios have broadly risen during the era of inflation targeting.

Third, a democracy should only have controls within the elected institutions with the right to seek legal redress where all citizens are equal unto that law. Why do we accept the fact that an unaccountable body like the central bank should have the principal macroeconomic policy role and stop elected governments from implementing their mandate? The unemployed cannot vote out or sue the central bank board for deliberately implementing policy that renders them impoverished.

Fourth, the general public do not service government debt via taxation. That is a fraudulent statement. Taxes do not fund anything in a modern monetary economy. The government taxes to create a demand for the currency and to fine-tune aggregate demand to avoid inflation. It may also tax to capture rents (as in the current mining tax dispute in Australia) or re-allocated resources away from “bads” (for example, alcohol, tobacco). A sovereign government, which issues its own currency never taxes to raise revenue even though it might say it is doing that.

Fifth, financial markets are largely unproductive and pursue greed. The maximisation of the benefits of greed should not be the basis for “controlling” what a democratically elected government should do.

The notion of “deficit bias” comes from the so-called public choice theory. Price says this literature identifies:

… an endemic bias towards deficit finance because governments can provide the electorate with benefits that do not have to be immediately paid for. Provided voters value public expenditure and consistently underestimate its costs in terms of higher future taxes, politicians can indulge in opportunistic deficit-financed public spending increases and tax cuts prior to elections, inducing a political business cycle …

However, if you are familiar with this literature then you will know it has proven to be an empirical failure. Even Price admits that the “models have come up with mixed empirical results and the hypothesis is often contradicted empirically”. But, not to let some facts get in the way of his ideologically-driven narrative Price continues to use the model anyway.

This is a common practice in mainstream economics. They invent some stupid theory which satisfies their ideological persuasion at the time. Then they decide they better “test it”. The testing models are always compromised because the theory has no empirical mapping anyway. The empirical models typically fail. Conclusion: no worries, the data was wrong! I have seen and heard this so often that it is not funny.

Price also wants to make something of this point:

Towards the end of the dotcom boom OECD-area fiscal stance became distinctly pro-cyclical, particularly in the larger euro-zone economies, pushing up structural deficits …

So what? This is an interesting point that keeps coming up – that a government should never run an expansionary fiscal stance in a growth period. Whether the discretionary component of the budget should be pro-cyclical all depends on the state of private demand and how much unemployment there is. But then Price doesn’t even consider the real economy in his polemic disguised as a credible research report.

This is the way to think about this issue.

First, the automatic stabilisers always operate in a counter-cyclical fashion. So they dampen aggregate demand in an upturn (tax revenue rises and welfare payments fall) and boost aggregate demand when economic growth falters (tax revenue deteriorates and welfare payments rise). So in a major downturn, the automatic stabilisers will always be pushing the budget balance towards deficit, into deficit, or into a larger deficit.

Second, the actual budget balance can be decomposed into the cyclical component (the automatic stabilisers) and the discretionary component which is now called the “structural deficit”. I have discussed how that decomposition is engineered in several blogs and noted that the mainstream approach is to overestimate the structural component.

Please read the following blogs – The dreaded NAIRU is still about!Structural deficits – the great con job!Structural deficits and automatic stabilisersAnother economics department to close – for more information on this point.

But the essential point is that there is no pre-conceived “good” structural balance. It all depends. On what? Answer: on the state of private spending.

In this context, one of the most important elements of public purpose that the state has to maximise is employment. It is not the only thing the government should be pursuing but employment is a basic connection that people have with the economy and it is usually the difference between living in poverty or not.

Once the private sector has made its spending (and saving decisions) based on its expectations of the future, the government has to render those private decisions consistent with the objective of full employment. Given the non-government sector will typically desire to net save (accumulate financial assets in the currency of issue) over the course of a business cycle this means that there will be, on average, a spending gap over the course of the same cycle that can only be filled by the national government. There is no escaping that.

The national government then has a choice – maintain full employment by ensuring there is no spending gap which means that the necessary structural deficit is defined by this political goal. It will be whatever is required to close the spending gap.

However, it is also possible that the political goals may be to maintain some slack in the economy (persistent unemployment and underemployment) which means that the government structural deficit will be somewhat smaller and perhaps even, for a time, a budget surplus will be possible.

But the second option would introduce fiscal drag (deflationary forces) into the economy which will ultimately cause firms to reduce production and income and drive the budget outcome towards increasing deficits.

Ultimately, the spending gap is closed by the automatic stabilisers because falling national income ensures that that the leakages (saving, taxation and imports) equal the injections (investment, government spending and exports) so that the sectoral balances hold (being accounting constructs). But at that point, the economy will support lower employment levels and rising unemployment.

The budget will also be in deficit – but in this situation, the deficits will be what I call “bad” deficits. Deficits driven by a declining economy and rising unemployment.

So fiscal sustainability requires that the government fills the spending gap with “good” deficits at levels of economic activity consistent with full employment – which I define as 2 per cent unemployment and zero underemployment.

Fiscal sustainability cannot be defined independently of full employment. Once the link between full employment and the conduct of fiscal policy is abandoned, we are effectively admitting that we do not want government to take responsibility of full employment (and the equity advantages that accompany that end).

So it will not always be the case that the dynamics of the automatic stabilisers will leave a structural deficit sufficient to finance the saving desire of the non-government sector at an output level consistent with full utilisation of resources.

What this means that it is perfectly reasonable for there to be on-going structural deficits reinforcing the cycle and “financing” the desire of the non-government sector to save.

Remember a government deficit is always equal $-for-$ to the non-government surplus (and vice-versa).

This is how Price captures the emergence of the neo-liberal era. He notes that prior to the OPEC oil shocks, the dominant view was that “deficit finance could stabilise output, subject to some trade-off with inflation”. So up until the mid- to late-1970s governments used fiscal policy to maintain full employment (broadly). Price then says:

But the process of globalisation – by which trade leakages and interest rate effects reduce fiscal multipliers, especially for small, open economies – tended to create a relative conformity of views with respect to what fiscal policy can achieve compared with a growth-oriented policy of structural reform, where the public sector’s contribution is to create the conditions for private sector wealth creation. The financial crisis has called this consensus on public sector ‘neutrality’ into question, since large discretionary fiscal interventions have taken place which has been labelled a ‘new fiscal policy activism’

That is a very soothing description of the paradigm shift in macroeconomics that occurred during the stagflationary period that began with the oil price hikes.

Price’s claim that globalisation technically renders fiscal activism fraught reflects a poor understanding of the monetary system works. Given that the Bretton Woods system had already collapsed (1971), the increasingly globalised economy actually presented sovereign governments with increased capacities to use fiscal policy to pursue domestic policies.

Monetary policy no longer had to deal with managing the exchange parity and so fiscal policy was not subject to the “stop-go” growth constraints coming from the the current account.

The way governments reacted to the OPEC price hikes was nonsensical. They treated a supply shock as a demand shock and deliberately contracted their economies and added the “stag” to the “flation”. The correct way to deal with the shock was to insulate what was effectively a real terms of trade deterioration (for all oil dependent) nations from the domestic cost structure.

In effect, each nation experienced a real income loss (from the imported raw material price rise) and so there was less available for distribution to other claimants on real output – workers and capital. The correct response would have been to mediate this distributional incompatibility by ensuring that all claimants took the loss proportionately until the oil dependency was reduced by consumer and producer substitution (smaller cars, no oil heating, etc).

This policy incompetence not only created the stagflation but also allowed the neo-liberals (motivated by Friedman’s natural rate hypothesis and all the rest of the nonsense that the mainstream of my profession pumps out) to look credible. And so the demand-side management approach (so-called Keynesian approach) that had delivered sustained full employment was abandoned in favour of the pro-market, deregulation, persistent unemployment approach.

We have been living with that waste ever since and the global financial crisis was the culmination of the trends that had been building up for many years – a growing gap between real wages and productivity growth and a massive redistribution of real output to profits; the casualisation of the labour market; the deregulation of financial and other markets; etc.

The global financial crisis has demonstrated beyond doubt that the so-called “conformity of views” about the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy has dramatically failed. It should be abandoned. Private markets do not self-regulate, they are prone to dishonest and corrupt behaviour, they cannot deliver full employment, and they periodically need huge public bailouts. That sort of model cannot be the blueprint for a sustainable future.

Price also claims that the capacity of citizens (voters) to influence government policy creates a deficit bias. Fancy that. Isn’t that what the process of politics is about? Politicians say they will do A, the citizens want A, they elect the pollies who will deliver A, they use deficit spending to do so, and according to Price this is dysfunctional.

He also calims that “a lack of political cohesion appears to make it difficult to muster political support for fiscal consolidation when the necessity coincides with periods of cyclical weakness”. No! Governments are politically sensitive and when they deliberately inflict wide scale damage and hurt onto their voters, the voters get annoyed.

Further, there is never a case for fiscal consolidation (meaning austerity) in periods of cyclical weakness. That is the raison d’etre of fiscal policy activism – to counter periods of cyclical weakness driven by a collapse in private spending. It almost amazes me that the OECD can allow its workers to write this stuff and think that it is serious work. What concept of fiscal policy does Price have? Certainly, it cannot be remotely akin to what every reasonable person would consider to be its purpose.

Price then takes us into the grubby world of Ricardian equivalence (RE) (without mentioning the term until later). He claims that the private sector might respond to fiscal expansion by reducing their own spending but that:

The evidence that does emerge on private sector responses to budget deficits is mixed, but private and public saving do tend to vary inversely

There is no credible evidence supporting the RE view of the world. It was fraud from the start. Please read my blog – Pushing the fantasy barrow – for more discussion on this point.

But the so-called evidence Price notes – private and public saving do tend to vary inversely – inasmuch as we can attach any meaning to the terms is not evidence at all.

First, it makes no sense to say a sovereign government is saving in its own currency when it runs a budget surplus. Saving is the act of foregoing consumption now in order to have more consumption in the future. It is the act of a revenue-constrained spending unit (such as a household).

A sovereign government can spend whenever there are real goods and services available for sale in the currency it issues and it past budget outcome has no bearing on this capacity.

Further, budget surpluses do not go anywhere – in the sense that the savings of a household are stored in an accounting system and can be drawn down on request. There concept of the government storing up its surpluses is just inapplicable and devoid of meaning. The sovereign government issues the currency so how can it save it?

So what Price is really saying is that there is an inverse relationship between government budget balances and the non-government balance. Clearly that is true as an accounting statement and is derived as such from the system of national accounts. The government cannot run a surplus without the non-government sector running a deficit and vice versa.

Second, with that in mind, consider the causality. When private saving rises, consumption and/or investment spending falls, output and employment fall, and the budget balance moves into deficit (or larger deficit) via the automatic stabilisers. Does this inverse relationship tell us anything about the private sector attitudes about the effectiveness of fiscal policy? Not a lot at all.

Further, when there is a downturn and governments use discretionary stimulus measures to bolster aggregate demand, output and income rises. This, in turn, stimulates private consumption and saving. So the observation that rising saving accompanies expanding deficits doesn’t indicate that private agents are behaving in Ricardian manner – consumption also rises.

While Price cautions interpreting the “inverse correlation” in a Ricardian way, he still chooses to leave the impression that private agents may act to thwart the effectiveness of fiscal policy. But there is no credible evidence that suggests they do.

Price then considered the “role of financial market discipline” on governments. He claims that “markets can sometimes penalise governments for over-borrowing” and that:

… Real bond yields do seem to be pushed up as governments compete for loanable funds with the private sector, although the extent is subject to some controversy … Most research shows the effect to be very incremental and small …

Apart from the fact that governments do not compete for loanable funds given that they provide all the funds they borrow back via the spending, what exactly is the point? If there is no credible evidence available then you cannot generalise and say that markets penalise governments for over-borrowing.

He then acknowledges that “for long periods, financial market influences can be benign. The budget constraint eased in the 21st century, as evidenced by historically low bond yields” – he considers this to be “too accommodating”. He says it was a ‘conundrum’ “that the build-up in US government and external debt did not trigger a market reaction in the United States”.

It was only a puzzle to those who don’t understand that a sovereign government borrows back what it spends (irrespective of the institutional arrangements that seem to disguise that fact). Further, public debt is risk-free private wealth with a guaranteed income stream attached to it. The performance of pension funds etc over a fairly long period is not much better (risk-adjusted) than cash! So public bonds as a store of wealth are not exactly unattractive.

Price almost acknowledges this:

Subsequent to the crisis, governments (with some exceptions where sovereign risk premia have increased) have been able to finance large increases in debt at continuing favourable rates, partly because risk premia on other financial instruments have risen. The markets have thus been party to the process of fiscal ‘deconsolidation’. This behaviour would seem to be consistent with historical experience of a strong market appetite for government debt when inflation is low, but does not preclude a sudden reversal.

The exceptions are not sovereign governments.

I love the term “fiscal deconsolidation”. How biased the debate has become when a discretionary response to the worst calamity since the 1930s is constructed as being a negative outcome. The only negative outcomes relate to the real economy – the lost incomes, the lost jobs, the lost industries, etc. The budget outcome is what it is.

But moreover, his initial claim that the financial markets will kick heads doesn’t seem to be consistent with “historical experience”. Just ask Japan about that also.

The paper then considers the concept of fiscal sustainability. Price says:

There is no consensus on, and no accepted theoretical basis for, judging the extent to which a budget position is fiscally sustainable … At its simplest, sustainability can mean debt stability – present or future. But even if fiscal parameters are adjusted to the point where the debt ratio will eventually stabilise, there is no guarantee that it will be financeable without pushing up interest rates and ‘crowding out’ the private sector, generating inflation, or raising tax rates to unsustainable levels .. The most operationally influential consolidation objectives have been the 3% deficit rule, as imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, a balanced budget rule, or a balanced budget excluding public investment (the ‘golden rule’).

First, there is an accepted basis for judging the extent to which a fiscal position is sustainable. From the perspective of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) sustainability for a sovereign government can only be assessed in how the fiscal position contributes to the achievement of real goals – such as environmentally-sustainable growth, full employment and rising standards of living distributed across all persons.

It is also acknowledged that price stability is desirable and does not have to be compromised by a government pursuing the real goals noted in the last paragraph.

The financial ratios mentioned are largely irrelevant and are endogenous and driven by private spending and saving decisions.

Please read my suite of blogs – Fiscal sustainability 101 – Part 1Fiscal sustainability 101 – Part 2Fiscal sustainability 101 – Part 3 – for further discussion.

I also laughed when I read that the “most operationally influential consolidation objectives have been the 3% deficit rule” from Maastricht. Yes, very operational was my first thought. Adherence to the rule in the non-crisis period has forced governments to deliberately maintain persistently high levels of unemployment and stifle economic growth.

And in the crisis period, it was breached quickly as the automatic stabilisers went to work. So what sort of rule is it that would force the discretionary component of fiscal policy to work against the automatic stabilisers in a time of crisis? Only a rule that failed to represent the purpose of fiscal policy. It is a rule that deliberately sets out to undermine fiscal policy.

Further, I also love the way these writers work. Previously, Price has noted that financial markets have been benign and there have been low yields historically associated with public debt. But then, he just cannot help saying that even if you stabilise the debt ratio “there is no guarantee that it will be financeable without pushing up interest rates and ‘crowding out’ the private sector, generating inflation, or raising tax rates to unsustainable levels”.

None of those outcomes have been consistently related to budget deficits in the past. Just because the erroneous mainstream macroeconomics textbooks tell us these are the problems means nothing. These textbooks were incapable of presenting any theory that explains what has been going on over the last decade. All their predictions have been demonstrated to be wrong.

The paper goes onto to consider the benefits of fiscal rules and independent fiscal institutions.

Price says:

Fiscal rules have been central to the search for fiscal discipline. The number of fiscal rules in force has increased continuously over the last fifteen years, especially within the European Union …

And … if we compare the economic performance – the real sector – jobs and growth – we will see that nations that impose these rules have performed much worse than those without strict rules.

The EU is not a shining example of anything remotely sensible when it comes to managing the member state economies – either before or during the crisis.

The trend that is emerging in the current macroeconomic policy debate is to introduce further voluntary constraints on our elected governments to prevent them expressing free will. I see this as a fundamental shift to totalitarianism – the denial of the voter to discipline economic policy settings.

Please read my blog – Fiscal rules going mad … – for more discussion on this point.

In terms of the “case for independent fiscal institutions” Price says:

The spread of fiscal rules has been associated with an expansion of independent fiscal institutions, the underlying rationale for which is that specific tasks of fiscal policy should be delegated to bodies which are less likely to be affected by distorted incentives …

So deny the citizens their right to determine the course of fiscal policy.

Towards the end of the paper Price rehearses the ageing population myth arguing that governments should run surpluses to pre-fund “at least some future social service liabilities — especially pensions” but face political problems convincing their electorates of the advantages of this strategy.

He says that sovereign funds can help:

A minority of OECD countries have built Sovereign and Public Pension Reserve Funds (SPFs) to finance at least part of the implicit liabilities stemming from pay-as-you-go public pension schemes … Investing surplus assets in privately issued securities could impose large deadweight losses on the economy because it creates incentives for private firms to lobby for public investments and the temptation for political intervention in the allocation of funds could increase. Alternatively, if the assets accumulate with the central bank it may jeopardise its independence, as noted above. An approach is thus needed that avoids the deadweight losses from private lobbying and inefficient investment of surpluses and ensures the diversification of funds across marketable assets.

The whole debate is founded on flawed reasoning. There is no financial crisis ahead for governments with pension liabilities. The only issue will be the availability of real resources. Please read my blog – Democracy, accountability and more intergenerational nonsense – for more discussion on this point.

But the sovereign fund issue is one of the big deceptions in this debate.

An understanding of MMT will tell you that a sovereign government’s ability to make timely payment in its own currency is never numerically constrained by revenues from taxing and/or borrowing. Therefore the purchase of a sovereign fund in no way enhances the government’s ability to meet future obligations. In fact, the entire concept of government pre-funding an unfunded liability in its currency of issue has no application whatsoever in the context of a flexible exchange rate and the modern monetary system. That is, it represents lunacy!

The misconception that “public saving” is required to fund future public expenditure is often rehearsed in the financial media. In rejecting the notion that public surpluses create a cache of money that can be spent later we note that Government spends by crediting an account held by banks at the central bank. There is no revenue constraint despite the image the elaborate institutional structures that government erect to suggest there is.

But government cheques don’t bounce!

Additionally, taxation consists of debiting an account at an account held by banks at the central bank. The funds debited are “accounted for” but don’t actually “go anywhere” and “accumulate”.

The concept of pre-funding future liabilities does apply to fixed exchange rate regimes, as sufficient reserves must be held to facilitate guaranteed conversion features of the currency. It also applies to non-government users of a currency. Their ability to spend is a function of their revenues and reserves of that currency.

So at the heart of all this nonsense is the false analogy neo-liberals draw between private household budgets and the government budget. Households, the users of the currency, must finance their spending prior to the fact. However, government, as the issuer of the currency, must spend first (credit private bank accounts) before it can subsequently tax (debit private accounts). Government spending is the source of the funds the private sector requires to pay its taxes and to net save and is not inherently revenue constrained.

However, trying to squeeze the economy to generate these mythical “pools of funds” which are then allocated to the sovereign fund as if they exist is very damaging. You can think of this in two stages. First, the national government spends less than it taxes and this leads to ever decreasing levels of net private savings.

The private deficits are manifest in the public surpluses and increasingly leverage the private sector. The deteriorating private debt to income ratios which result will eventually see the system succumb to ongoing demand-draining fiscal drag through a slow-down in real activity.

Second, while that process is going on, the national government is actually spending an equivalent amount that it is draining from the private sector (through tax revenues) in the financial and broader asset markets (domestic and abroad) buying up speculative assets including shares and real estate.

That is what sovereign funds are about. It amounts to the treasury competing in the private equity market to fuel speculation in financial assets and distort allocations of capital.

However, as you can see from pulling it apart, this behaviour has been grossly misrepresented as providing “future savings” to pay for the superannuation liabilities. Say the sovereign government ran a $15 billion surplus in the last financial year. It could then purchase that amount of financial assets in the domestic and international capital markets. But from an accounting perspective the government would no longer have run that surplus because the $15 billion would be recorded as spending and the budget would break even.

In these situations, the public debate should be focused on whether this is the best use of public funds. It would be hard to justify this sort of spending when basic infrastructure provision and employment creation has been ignored for many years by neo-liberal governments.

How can the government justify purchasing speculative financial assets which it has lost several billion on while holding when there were more than 9 per cent of willing labour resources either not employed at all or being forced to work less hours than they desired because of overall spending constraints in the economy?

If we want to provide for a better future the government should be spending sufficient amounts to make sure everyone has a job. That is a minimum requirement for improving the future prospects. Then it might spend some of the $60 billion it put in the speculative sovereign funds on medical research to find cures for cancer and HIV and to make our public schooling system the best that money can buy. That would be a funding the future. The sovereign funds do nothing to enhance the futures of the citizens.

Please read my blog – The Futures Fund scandal – for more discussion on this point.


So you can see where the literature from these international economic organisations is heading. The pressures on government to relinquish their democratic responsibilities are going to be immense in the coming years. The democratic repression will increase not decrease and the only ones who will suffer will be us – and particularly the most disadvantaged citizens who will languish in unemployment and poverty.

I have worked out a new fiscal rule which should be implemented: All members of the government and the central bank board members lose a certain percent of their annual salary for every percentage point the broad rate of labour underutilisation exceeds full employment. After some gap – maybe a labour underutilisation rate 2 or 3 per cent higher than full employment the salaries go to zero!

That is enough for today!

This Post Has 25 Comments

  1. “Once the private sector has made its spending (and saving decisions) based on its expectations of the future, the government has to render those private decisions consistent with the objective of full employment.”

    Only if the political objective of the government is to create full employment. Keeping a section of the population in thrall is a political strategy that people can decide on collectively – the Roman Empire for example.

    “Given the non-government sector will typically desire to net save (accumulate financial assets in the currency of issue) over the course of a business cycle this means that there will be, on average, a spending gap over the course of the same cycle that can only be filled by the national government. There is no escaping that.”

    Can’t it be filled by the external sector as well, or did I misunderstand that bit.

  2. “The correct response would have been to mediate this distributional incompatibility by ensuring that all claimants took the loss proportionately until the oil dependency was reduced by consumer and producer substitution (smaller cars, no oil heating, etc).”

    In practical terms how would you do that in a way that would be politically acceptable.

  3. “I find that an extraordinary construction of the interactions. The good guys are the central banks and bond markets, the government is inherently bad and likely to be wasteful and the rest of us …!”

    Which is why we need to do away with central bank independence and shift to a no-bonds policy before these morons create a global depression.

  4. “The trend that is emerging in the current macroeconomic policy debate is to introduce further voluntary constraints on our elected governments to prevent them expressing free will. I see this as a fundamental shift to totalitarianism – the denial of the voter to discipline economic policy settings.”

    Bravo. The “road to serfdom” doesn’t necessarily lead through socialism, which Price’s libertarian premises rest on. In fact, world history indicates that the road to serfdom has almost never come from the direction of socialism, but rather typically rom the opposite direction. Price is proposing a return to feudalism, where the world is in liege to the bankers.

  5. “So you can see where the literature from these international economic organisations is heading. The pressures on government to relinquish their democratic responsibilities are going to be immense in the coming years. The democratic repression will increase not decrease and the only ones who will suffer will be us – and particularly the most disadvantaged citizens who will languish in unemployment and poverty.”

    One of the favorite conspiracy theories going around for some time is that the “New World Order,” which envisions a cabal of bankers and other technocrats meeting secretly on a periodic basis to plot their takeover of the world. While this can probably be dismissed as more imaginative than factual, there is substance to the idea that there are coordinated forces at work in this direction. The problem with conspiracy theories is that they involve a degree of conscious coordination that is implausible. However, coordination can and does take place in other less overt ways.

    In fact, this is the basis of the Marxian critique that class interests are forces at work that are not necessarily conscious and intentional. The fact is that people belonging to particular classes and subclasses interact primarily with each other and both shape and reinforce each others ideas and norms. Employment is not a subject of discussion in the upper echelons for the simple reason that it is irrelevant at those levels. Their theories focus on interest rates, property rights, asset values, money as a store of value, etc., because those are the interests of that class.

    This view has the backing of social sciences other than economics, as well as the cognitive sciences. It is also borne out by the philosophy of language. From this point of view, mainstream economics is more a religion (values system, set of norms) than a science (description and explanation of observable fact). It is the religion of the upper echelon of contemporary Western society. In fact, economics from its modern inception with Adam Smith has been a predominantly Anglo-American field and reflects those mores.

    In this view, globalization involves the transition to a new world economic order in which independent central banks and transnational corporations replace national sovereignty as the de facto government force. This order is anti-democratic and beyond accountability. So, yes, I guess one would call it totalitarianism.

  6. Dear Tom,

    The last comment is great! Assumptions, hypothesis, invariant logic I must congratulate you! I find it very refreshing. Regardless of ehether you agree onot it has a reasoning that causes you to think. Excellent food for thought!

  7. Tom,

    your proposition is also supported by behavorial economics. Some time ago I read an article “To become an extremist, hang around with people you agree with” by Cass Sunstein.

    “Political extremism is often a product of group polarisation and social segregation is a useful tool for producing polarisation. In fact, a good way to create an extremist group, or a cult of any kind, is to separate members from the rest of society. The separation can occur physically or psychologically, by creating a sense of suspicion about non-members. With such separation, the information and views of those outside the group can be discredited, and hence nothing will disturb the process of polarisation as group members continue to talk. Deliberating enclaves of like-minded people are often a breeding ground for extreme movements. Terrorists are made, not born, and terrorist networks often operate in just this way. As a result, they can move otherwise ordinary people to violent acts. But the point goes well beyond such domains. Group polarisation occurs in our daily lives; it involves our economic decisions, our evaluations of our neighbours, even our decisions about what to eat, what to drink and where to live.”

    Hmmm … Bill must invite some libertarians, free banking proponents and gold bugs to comment more often. Otherwise we’ll become MMT extremists and radicals.

  8. Stephan,

    Excellent point. This is how extreme groups at the tail end are split and formed by exclusion from the classes that Tom talks about. However, the point that Tom makes is how common attributes/rights develop that form groups in a community. I would add that the force that brings this about is symbiosis.

  9. Stephan,

    Warren Mosler says something akin in G20 Says Expansionary Fiscal Policy Not Sustainable. It’s a closed universe of discourse, and opposing views would be entirely excluded if it weren’t for the Internet. At least we can talk to each other, and globally, too. In the Sixties and Seventies, that was not possible. The only way to get some attention was through massive demonstrations, and, of course, the media coverage was almost always completely biased, even though the popular mindset was more liberal than now.

  10. Tom,

    I like the idea of neo-liberal totalitarianism. Maybe it can be used as ammunition against them. I’m reading “Thinking the Unthinkable” by Richard Cockett which describes how the economic liberals organised themselves from the late Thirties onwards. They were facing circumstances sort of a mirror image to our own, in a time when so-called conservatives were advocating Keynesian central planning, so it’s an inspiring read provided you keep a ‘through-the-lookingglass’ frame of mind (quote from the blurb: “It’s a bit like seeing Star Trek with the Klingons as the good guys”). Maybe our currrent liberal anti-heroes can be portrayed as betraying their idols – Hayek and the rest.

    How far are we really from totalitariamism in Europe right now? When we must all be united in our Great Struggle to dismantle public institutions – oops, I meant “tackle the deficit.”

  11. Interesting read. Personally, the OECD is an aged and completely irrelevant organisation.

  12. Agog, I don’t see a frontal assault as being effective. Anyone doing this will just get lumped in with the conspiracy theorists. What is needed is a counter-attack that provides an alternative new world political and economic order for globalization that is fair and practical, in addition to being effective and efficient. A viable alternative also has to recognize that upper echelon will defend its interest mightily, and at present the elite hold all the reins of power. A frontal assault would be futile.

    Moreover, a major difficulty today is that the problem is not yet widely recognized. The world is still recovering from the Cold War, and the fear of “socialism” is still strong enough to elicit a knee-jerk reaction among many people. Neoliberalism is seen as victor and savior, rather than threat.

    The history bears examining. The liberal West was locked in a duel with the Marxist East, and this duel was viewed as one testing capitalism versus socialism. When Kruschev predicted that the USSR would “bury” the West, he was speaking economically, not militarily. Of course, that didn’t happen, and the West was convinced that not only that capitalism had won, but that the victory was inevitable. It wasn’t. Incredible mistakes were made, and the People’s Republic of China survived. This contest is hardly over.

    However, it was much more complicated than that, of course. There isn’t space to go into it here, but what needs to be recognized is that the Great Depression was a wake up call for Western leadership. Most people today have forgotten how “revolutionary” things got then. FDR and Keynes were both men of the upper echelon who came forward with middle of the road plans to prevent a more radical scenario from developing. Out of this grew a recognition for the need to placate the middle and lower classes, and things went fine post-WWII, until the ’70’s oil crisis signaled that the cheap oil on which suburbia depends was not guaranteed. However, after the Berlin Wall fell, the need to placate the masses passed, and the upper echelon began to reassert its interests as paramount. That is where we are now.

    While some people at the top undoubtedly recognize what is happening and are consciously and intentionally putting in effect a plan to install a technocratic government led by the West in the age of globalization, that, I suspect, is a very small number in comparison with the size of the upper echelon and its cohort. Most who are members of this cohort are just pursuing their class and subclass interests, unmindful of the larger context. But most of them probably think that they are living in a meritocracy and deserve what they have, while others deserve what they don’t have, too.

    Even Keynes, who is still regarded as somewhat of a saint economically and politically by the left, was actually a firm believer in the rule of technocrats. He was not a democrat by any means. Like Aristotle, he thought that democracy was dangerous because of the possibility of the rabble coming to rule. But it was still to be preferred over other system, because there was accountability, and regimes could be changed. However, democracy had to be controlled in order to prevent a rule of the rabble.

    This, I believe, remains the deep-seated fear, e.g., if the people get their hands on the purse strings, then they will act irresponsibly. If non-Westerners are allowed at the table, well, they don’t share our values and history. And so on. These are visceral phobias that provoke gut reactions.

    This just scratches the surface of issues that need to be taken into account in fashioning an alternative new world economic and political order and a strategy for implementing it in the face of formidable opposition, which in many ways still has the majority of the public on its side. People still salivate over “freedom,” “democracy,” “free market capitalism,” and the like, and these terms have been solidly co-opted. They are now memes that have been burnt into brains as early impressions and they are difficult to divert into neural pathways that don’t converge on neoliberalism. Memes form norms that dominate the universe of discourse as fundamental criteria, as well as providing the foundations of “common sense” and giving rise to conventions and institutions.

    This is a huge project, and, of course, MMT cannot do it alone. And it needn’t. Lots of folks are focused on this, even though they don’t much media coverage at present.

    However, MMT does provide a solid financial and economic theory, which is empirical and reality-based. In contrast, neoliberalism is the public religion, resting on dogma and belief without either logical pedigree in national accounting identities or empirical warrant in evidence that supports its assumptions. It is a dangerous superstition, and it has a lot of people mesmerized. Some are also very likely using it disingenuously.

    The world faces not only a totalitarian future of sorts if Western technocrats dominate world finance and the global economy. They may regard it as benign management, but if looking around the world at the consequences of past policies is any indication, “benign” has a strange meaning. In other words, “austerity” is fine as long as it is someone else’s livelihood.

    The world is also approaching the limits of growth and sustainability is increasingly an issue. That means that distribution of resources is going to be an issue, too. Given past behavior, we can hypothesize that the upper echelon will use its power and influence to garner more than its share as vital resources become scarcer. The issues are legion, so I’ll it here.

    We can do better.

  13. Well said Tom.

    As to Bill’s point about the government’s role filling the spending gap, I came across an account of the 1945 Full Employment bill (which was watered down and passed as the Employment Act of 1946) that’s an interesting read. One of the sections of the 1945 bill that was cut provided for ‘compensatory finance’, “the Federal government shall provide such volume of federal investment and expenditure as may be needed…. to assure continuing full employment”.

    If such a bill were being considered today, it’d be worthwhile to replace the unemployed as the economy’s anti-inflation Sin Eater with a market system like this: “Prof. Vickrey proposes a penalty tax on excess markups, as a means of containing inflation. Starting from a proposal by Prof. A. Lerner to develop “a market in rights to raise prices, with those wishing to raise prices being permitted to do so only by purchasing the right from others willing to lower theirs to a corresponding degree”. :o)

  14. I totally disagree with this passage of Bill’s “The way governments reacted to the OPEC price hikes was nonsensical……. The correct response would have been to mediate this distributional incompatibility by ensuring that all claimants took the loss proportionately until the oil dependency was reduced by consumer and producer substitution (smaller cars, no oil heating, etc).”

    We all knew that at the time! The average politically and economically astute fifteen year old knew it at the time! Problem was that (at least in the UK) trade unions were demanding and getting 15% pay increases.

    UK Governments tried to “mediate this distributional incompatibility by ensuring that all claimants took the loss proportionately” and unions told them to “F” off.

    What is a government supposed to do in those circumstances? There is only one thing they can do: use the unemployed to control inflation. If you are in a sinking ship and the only option is to get passengers to bail it out on pain of being shot, then you threaten to shoot them. Not nice, but sometimes the least bad option is pretty bad.

    Or as Neil Wilson puts it above: “In practical terms how would you do that in a way that would be politically acceptable?” Good question: which Bill doesn’t answer.

    I agree with Bill on MMT, but his grasp of political realities (at least as regards the UK) leaves room for improvement.

    Neil Wilson: Re your question “Can’t it be filled by the external sector as well, or did I misunderstand that bit?” My answer: Yes, it could be “filled by the external sector”, but a government cannot rely on this sector. If the external sector comes riding to the rescue at just right time, then great. If not, government has to do something.

  15. Ralph,
    Recent history here in US. In 2008, speculative demand shock drove oil up to about $150/bbl. Price for gas at the pump went to about $4.00/gal. which was about $2.25/gal more than normal, or what people were used to. (over half imported so it kicks up the (X – I) ). US used about 400M gal/day of gasoline at the time so in a month that was about a $27B additional burden on consumers. this hurt, and went on a few months without any govt response.

    Then in about May, Bush/Chaney implemented a $165B tax rebate to all taxpayers (not for any specific reason mind you) that was distributed over about 90 days, ($55B/mo.). This helped in the short term at the time. It was equivalent to about the previous six months of increased costs to consumers for the spec driven commodity price shock. tragically it wasnt continued and things fell apart by september and here we are.

    So it seems to me that just a simple pro-rata fiscal adjustment from the national tax authorities could be a fair, short term solution to such a price shock, until the underlying real issues can be met head on with other long term policies. It worked in the US for a short time in 2008. Resp,

  16. Tom,

    “It’s a closed universe of discourse, and opposing views would be entirely excluded if it weren’t for the Internet. At least we can talk to each other, and globally, too.” That depends. To some extend the Internet is a closed universe too. I’ve uploaded a graphic of how political blogs are linked to each other. It’s from the book “Connected”. Looks like instead of one there are now two closed universes?

  17. Beowulf, you are real sleuth. This article by David Colander about Nobel Laureate Paul Vickery’s ideas on resolving unemployment that you posted a link to at Warren’s, I believe, is a gem. Not all academicians and technocrats are neoliberals.

    Macroeconomics: Was Vickery ten years ahead?

    There is also a complimentary (short) article about Wynne Godley at FT that shows his prescience using his sectoral balance approach:

    The dreadful potential of frugality by Edward Chancellor

    Many years ago, he [Godley] also criticised the institutional arrangements of the European Monetary Union. Writing in The Observer in August 1997, he noted that members of the eurozone were not only giving up their currencies but also their fiscal freedom. Within the union, a government could no longer draw cheques on its own central bank but must borrow in the open market. “This may prove excessively expensive or even impossible,” he warned.

    He went on to caution that without a common European budget, there was a danger that “the budgetary restraint to which governments are individually committed will impart a disinflationary bias that locks Europe as a whole into a depression that it is powerless to lift”.

  18. Tom,

    The FT article says “He predicted that the US economy was headed towards a day of reckoning”

    In his article “Seven Unsustainable Processes” written in 1999 (last edited 10/5/00) he wrote

    Moreover, if, per impossibile, the growth in net lending and the growth in money supply growth were to continue for another eight years, the implied indebtedness of the private sector would then be so extremely large that a sensational day of reckoning could then be at hand.

    Am sure he wouldn’t have believed the timing of his forecasts so strongly, but its kewl.

  19. Stephan, great graphic. That that believe in public purpose and those that think that the role of government is solely to protect life and property.

    What I meant by “closed universe of discourse” is that only the mainstream had access to the communications media, other than the telephone, and at the time long distance calls were quite costly. The only communication that activists had in the US was the alternative (“free”) press. There were WBAI in NYC and KPFIA in CA, but that was about it on the radio. Not much better than samizdat in the USSR.

    The net changed all that. Isn’t technology grand? 🙂

  20. Ramanan, Godley nailed it, and he hasn’t gotten the recognition he deserves. I believe that will change. Too bad it will be posthumous, but I think he is going to emerge as a real hero in all this before the shootin’ is over.

  21. Food for thought.

    The equivalent condition for an economy that is a non-issuer of currency (i.e., EMU state) and must finance its fiscal deficit with debt, it should be that its debt is issued free of collateral (“naked”) with an unlimited facility for renegotiation with reshedule and restructure at no cost.

  22. Thanks for the kind words Tom.

    And that Wynne quote is something else, he nailed that one. It reminds me of the Chappelle show skit that showed a club DJ playing a newly released single by the late Tupac Shukar…

    The twist in the skit comes when Chappelle, rhyming as Tupac, speaks about issues and items well past his 1996 death, such as the popular Blackberry phones, President George W. Bush securing enough votes and the war with Afghanistan. Chappelle takes the skit to an extreme when he rhymes as Tupac about observations in the club. He points out a stain on a young lady’s clothing and warns a guy not to hit the table, before assuring the club crowd that he “wrote this song a long time ago.”

  23. Tom, I forgot to add that David Colander has written a lot of interesting stuff. Most notably, he and Abba Lerner modified the original (1943) functional finance rules.

    1. The government shall maintain a reasonable level of demand at all times. If there is too little spending and, thus, excessive unemployment, the government shall reduce taxes or increase its own spending. If there is too much spending, the government shall prevent inflation by reducing its own expenditures or by increasing taxes.
    2. By borrowing money when it wishes to raise the rate of interest and by lending money or repaying debt when it wishes to lower the rate of interest, the government shall maintain that rate of interest that induces the optimum amount of investment.
    3. If either of the first two rules conflicts with the principles of ‘sound finance’ or of balancing the budget, or of limiting the national debt, so much the worse for these principles. The government press shall print any money that may be needed to carry out rules 1 and 2…

    To these three original rules, Lerner and Colander add in 1980:

    4. The government must establish policies which stabilize the price level and coordinate both the money supply rule and the aggregate total spending rule with this stable price level at the unemployment level it prefers.

    Colander writes, “To integrate the necessity of dealing with the institutional problem of sellers’ inflation by changing institutions rather than accepting whatever unemployment was required to stop inflation, Lerner and I arrived at [this] modification of the rules of functional finance… With this fourth rule the rules of functional finance can once again be relevant to modern economic problems”.
    “Functional Finance, New Classical Economics and Great Great Grandsons”

  24. I can’t seem to come to much insight into the “Fourth” regarding taxes in the above article…..Any reference or suggestions here!

  25. Ken, the Fourth rule is an addendum to this line in the First– “If there is too much spending, the government shall prevent inflation by reducing its own expenditures or by increasing taxes”. However, there was two problems with controlling inflation by fiscal means, 1. the wheels of the sausage factory grind slow (to mix metaphors), by the time Congress acts, the result will likely be too little, too late… President Kennedy’s proposal in the 1962 State of the Union for Congress to grant him standby authority to cut tax rates during times high unemployment would help here. 2. It doesn’t distinguish demand inflation from cost-push inflation or what Robert Gordon calls “built-in inflation” (i.e. inflationary expectations). Demand inflation can be effectively dealt with as the First rule says, tax more or spend less. However the other two kinds are trickier, raising taxes will slow down the economy (leading to higher unemployment) but won’t slow down inflation–its not Saturday Night, but you’ve got the Fever, Stagflation (see, just thinking about it transports you back to the ’70’s). :o)

    Anywho, what Lerner/Colander and Vickrey have done is propose markets where before a business may raise its “gross markups” (which makes it an anti-rent seeking tax as well), a business must go to the market to buy warrants from other businesses wiling to lower their gross markup (which I have believe is identical to the “value added” in a VAT) by an equal amount, resulting in zero net inflation in aggregate. Of course, Tsy could step into the market to buy or sell these “growth warrants” whenever it desired lower or higher inflation rates, there’d be no need for the Fed to use interest rates or the unemployment as tools to reduce inflation. This synthetic inflation market could be set up in tandem with Warren Buffett’s similar synthetic exchange rate “import certificate” market to tackle inflation and the trade deficit at the same time ( the trade deficit may be a net positive for the US economically, but politically its a huge negative. Buffett’s plan is the most economically efficient way to eliminate it).

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