Since we began the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) project in the mid-1990s, many people have asserted (wrongly) that the analysis we developed only applies to the US because it is considered to be the reserve currency. That status, the story goes, means that it can run fiscal deficits with relative impunity because the rest of the world clamours for the currency, which means it can always, in the language of the story, ‘fund’ its deficits. The corollary is that other countries cannot enjoy this fiscal freedom because the bond markets will eventually stop funding the government deficits if they get ‘out of hand’. All of this is, of course, fiction. Recently, though, the US exchange rate has fallen to its lowest level in three years following the Trump chaos and there are various commentators predicting that the reserve status is under threat. Unlike previous periods of global uncertainty when investors increase their demand for US government debt instruments, the current period has been marked by a significant US Treasury bond liquidation (particularly longer-term assets) as the ‘Trump’ effect leads to irrational beliefs that the US government might default. This has also led to claims that the dominance of the US dollar in global trade and financial transactions is under threat. There are also claims the US government will find it increasingly difficult to ‘fund’ itself. The reality is different on all counts.