Seventy years ago today there was a major mobilisation – D Day – designed to free Europe from the German military (and ideological) oppression. The allied troops stormed the beaches at Normandy as part of the so-called ‘Operation Overlord’, which quickly liberated France and set up the campaign that would end Germany’s dominance. Unfortunately, modern day Europe is caught up in a different form of German ideological oppression and the economic consequences have been devastating. The European Central Bank showed yesterday how stifling this oppression is when they made what were considered ‘historic’ changes to policy, which any reasonable assessment would conclude will do very little to stimulate growth. The policy mentality is in denial of history and economic logic. But with fiscal policy bolted down by the neo-liberal ideology there is no room to grow. Another major invasion of Europe is needed – an intellectual storming of the beaches. That is the only way the euro-zone nations will liberate themselves from the current malaise.

I am not doing much work today. But I was organising some snippets that I collected last week and I thought I would pass this one on – it doesn’t need much analysis – it is from the chief economist at the European Central Bank, Peter Praet who gave an – Interview with La Stampa – last weekend. While the interview was focused on Italy specifically, he presented the sort of message that we are used to getting from him and the ECB in general. A sort of warped triumphalism – extolling the success of the Euro and the role played by the ECB in achieving that success. And then, as is often the case, straying from the brief as a central banker and lecturing all and sundry on the need for more fiscal discipline (meaning increase the vandalism quotient)! It makes me laugh that when it suits them these central bankers cry that they should be independent from government but then at other times of convenience they assume they can use their “official independence” to lecture governments on how to behave. Anyway, Praet thinks the Eurozone is a big success and the policy makers have some “major” and “enormous achievements” under their belts. The interview was in English but not a dialect I understand.

This is the first part in what might be several blogs. I will see where my curiosity takes me. Today I want to invoke that well-known piece of inductive reasoning the – Duck Test. We all should know how that goes. But consider this reasoning. We have an institution that is 100 per cent government owned. It borrows millions and its liabilities are 100 per cent guaranteed by the federal government. It spends, I mean lends millions each year at very low rates to all manner of firms, organisations and even builds infrastructure. It also takes equity positions (provides capital) to a range of enterprises. It pays no tax having the same status as the central bank. It is not a duck but looks very much like a government fiscal entity. Welcome to the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit Institute) or as it is now known the – KfW. This bank was created in 1948 as a German vehicle to faciliate the infrastructure rebuilding under the Marshall Plan. It has since grown (and diversified) into one of the largest banks in Germany (taken its main business units into account) and pumps millions of Euros in the domestic economy and the export sector (via IPEX, its 100 per cent owned subsidiary). It is a major reason why the public debt ratio in Germany is 80 per cent rather than close to 100 per cent. It is a major reason why the federal deficit has been reduced without scorching the German economy. It is a story about smoke-and-mirrors accounting, German-style.

The Euro crisis is over! The Euro crisis is over! I suppose if one says it loudly enough and often enough it might drown out what the data tells us. The most recent data – inflation slowing, real GDP growth slowing, no movement on unemployment – tells us that while the politicians have an incentive to talk up the situation and proclaim the crisis is over, the reality is different. The fact that the bureaucrats are now realising that Eurozone budgets in many nations are not going to come close to meeting the harsh (revised) Stability and Growth Pact requirements tells us that the policy structures in place are not delivering on their promise. When a 0.1 per cent growth rate is celebrated you know something is amiss – that is how far standards have dropped in a region that cannot deliver sustained prosperity to its citizens as long as it ties a massive anchor round its feet! The industrialists and elites talk continually of structural reform – which is code for cutting workers pay and rights and retrenching welfare systems for the disadvantaged, the major structural weakness stares them in the face – unnoticed. That structural weakness is the flawed design of the monetary union. Until that is addressed the situation will limp along, perhaps get a surge of growth here and there, until the next major negative demand shock hits from somewhere (like the US, or China) and then the whole drama begins again.

During the late 1980s and into the 90s when the Monetarists (mostly holed up in Britain) were boasting that the widespread privatisation and labour market deregulation strategies they had instigated were containing inflation and setting up their economies for sustained growth with reductions in unemployment my response was “what do they do they do for an encore”. It was obvious that if you scorched domestic demand and pushed up unemployment that the inflation rate would drop and the reduced imports would flatter the external balance. The question then was – what do you do next? Once growth returns in domestic demand rises on the back of increased income growth, imports start catching up and workers start demanding wage rises to make up for lost real income during the deflation and you end up with nothing much being achieved except for a extended period of lost real income, and rising inequality given the lower income groups carry the burden of the recession. The conservatives became slightly more astute in more recent years arguing that the recession provided the opportunity for nations to undergo radical restructuring so that growth could be driven by exports as a result of increased competitiveness. That’s the European model at the moment. Is it working? The IMF doesn’t think so.