One of the major demands that the Germans made on its partners leading into Maastricht in 1991 was the need for a politically independent central bank that was focused on price stability alone. This was claimed to be essential because it would stop politicians imposing so-called short-termism onto monetary policy (read: caring about people who might be unemployed or otherwise in need of fiscal assistance), which would compromise the inflation fighting process. These unaccountable, unelected central bank boards were then free to do what they wanted and demonstrated a willingness to use unemployment as a policy tool rather than a policy target to ensure economies were as close to deflating as possible, irrespective of what that meant for economic and employment growth. It is, of-course a farce to think that a central bank can be independent anyway either in a political sense or an economic sense. But the neo-liberal hype about independence was to ensure governments could absolve themselves of the public ignominy of rising unemployment and the political costs that went with that, and, instead, blame the central bankers. The bankers had no political constituency to manage or groom and could hide behind the ever-present paranoia about hyperinflation to ‘justify’ their policy approach. But the central bankers are ‘independent’ only when it suits them. Or should we say ‘independence’ is a one-way street. If the politicians dare to comment on monetary policies there is a hue and cry. But central bankers feel they can provide advice to the democratically elected governments whenever they choose and the media hardly blinks. Hypocrisy has no bounds.