The failure of the Washington Consensus and it impact on Europe – Part 1

A report in Reuters (November 4, 2026) – Beaten at home, Trump faces stark choice on Iran: deal or escalation (paywall) – opened with “US President Donald Trump went to war seeking regime change in Iran” but then quotes an informed US Gulf ally as saying “Iran succeeded in regime change in America”. If it wasn’t so tragic it would be a comedy. But the concept of regime change goes well beyond the consequences of the mid-term elections for the US political balance. Trump’s behaviour on the economic front has intensified the already significant structural shifts in the World economy, which have demonstrated that the so-called – Washington Consensus – and its offshoots – such as the EMU – have dramatically failed to deliver, unless of course you define its goals as redistribution of wealth to the top end and undermining of the stability of all the advanced ‘democracies’ (I use that term reservedly). The point is that while those goals have been achieved the process in doing so has started to eat into the very wealth systems that the elites rely on and where that ends is hard to forecast. But the shifts going on at present firmly reject the Washington Consensus model and, instead, support the state-development models that delivered prosperity to most nations in the immediate post WW2 period. This is Part 1 of a short series of posts about how the current economic policy framework is now eating itself up.

This article from Al Jazeera (August 19, 2026) – Seven decades of US regime change efforts: What have they achieved? – reminds us of how much a failure the US foreign policy has been since the 1950s.

But despite the categorical failures over many decades, the US-dominated institutions have been able to define the way nations reorganised their economies.

The – Washington Consensus – was a term in 1990 by English economist John Williamson to define the liberalisation policy agenda broadly pursued by Washington based institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the right wing think tanks.

John Williamson edited a volume in 1990 – Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? – which was published in April 1990 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

He contributed Chapter 2 in that volume – What Washington Means by Policy Reform – which outlined what has become known as the Washington Consensus.

He set out “10 policy instruments” that should be deployed in dealing with restructuring (liberalisation) of economies.

It is interesting that he contextualised these instruments in what he considered to be broadly accepted economic goals:

It is generally assumed, at least in technocratic Washington, that the standard economic objectives of growth, low inflation, a viable balance of payments, and an equitable income distribution should determine the disposition of such policy instruments.

Note: equitable income distribution.

On November 6, 2002, he wrote the Op Ed – Did the Washington Consensus Fail? – where he reiterated his 10 policy areas:

  1. Fiscal Discipline. This was in the context of a region where almost all the countries had run large deficits that led to balance of payments crises and high inflation that hit mainly the poor because the rich could park their money abroad.
  2. Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities. This suggested switching expenditure in a pro-poor way, from things like indiscriminate subsidies to basic health and education.
  3. Tax reform. Constructing a tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates.
  4. Liberalizing Interest Rates. In retrospect I wish I had formulated this in a broader way as financial liberalization, and stressed that views differed on how fast it should be achieved.
  5. A Competitive Exchange Rate. I fear I indulged in wishful thinking in asserting that there was a consensus in favor of ensuring that the exchange rate would be competitive, which implies an intermediate regime; in fact Washington was already beginning to subscribe to the two-corner doctrine.
  6. Trade Liberalization. I stated that there was a difference of view about how fast trade should be liberalized.
  7. Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment. I specifically did not include comprehensive capital account liberalization, because that did not command a consensus in Washington.
  8. Privatization. This was the one area in which what originated as a neoliberal idea had won broad acceptance. We have since been made very conscious that it matters a lot how privatization is done: it can be a highly corrupt process that transfers assets to a privileged elite for a fraction of their true value, but the evidence is that it brings benefits when done properly.
  9. Deregulation. This focused specifically on easing barriers to entry and exit, not on abolishing regulations designed for safety or environmental reasons.
  10. Property Rights. This was primarily about providing the informal sector with the ability to gain property rights at acceptable cost.

The headings are familiar, I am sure, but you might be surprised when you read the detail because Williamson’s narrative did contain nuances under each heading.

The context was the so-called Latin American debt crises.

What transpired, of course, was that these somewhat nuanced ideas were hijacked by the neoliberal economists and turned into a rigid, ideological doctrine – a one-size-fits-all for all nations – emphasising extreme market fundamentalism.

One area that a distorted rendering occurred was in the area of capital flows.

A positive attitude to foreign direct investment became a free-for-all promoting financial speculation, despite history already showing that such short-term flows into speculative assets had caused financial crises (for example the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997 East Asian crisis).

Further, the 10 policy prescriptions were never intended to be anti-government.

However, that is the way they were applied by the IMF, the World Bank and various governments under their throe.

Students were increasing taught that financial markets are ‘efficient’ and never fail in any systematic way.

This promoted an out-of-control deregulation agenda and a reduction in prudential oversight and led to the GFC among other crises.

Another area where the so-called Washington Consensus was transformed into a ideological crusade related to government spending targetted at the most disadvantaged.

Williamson had made it clear that governments should redirect spending to help the poor and stop subsidising the elites and the middle class.

He wanted governments to focus on primary schooling, healthcare and public infrastructure provision.

However, the austerity bias that was pursued by the World Bank, the IMF, the EU, etc were all characterised by attacks on social spending and a withdrawal of the state from redistribution to the poor.

Instead, the government became an agent for capital and redistributed income and wealth from poor to rich.

The IMF also oversaw shifts in exchange rate regimes that in some cases – such as dollarisation and dollar-pegs – were damaging to the nations in question.

Finally, while Williamson did support privatisation and deregulation, the way in which this was applied went far beyond anything he imagined would be beneficial.

He wanted to keep occupational health and safety rules, environmental protections and prudential oversight of the financial markets.

Instead, the neoliberals pursued massive sales of public assets that transferred significant wealth in to private hands with little oversight or accountability.

Further, the new corporations often became private monopolies without a proper regulative framework and gouged profits from consumers while reducing the quality and reliability of the public services.

The ‘Consensus’ underpinned the – Shock therapy (economics) – approach following the breakdown of the Soviet system, although its first implementation came after the CIA-coup in Chile in September 1973 and the ‘invasion’ of Milton Friedman’s gang (the – Chicago Boys).

I was working in Kazakhstan on a major project for the Asian Development Bank some years after the Shock Therapy squads went into the former Soviet satellite states.

I asked the driver who picked me up at Almaty airport to drive me into town what all these corrugate iron sheds were lining the road near the airport.

He explained that before the collapse and the entry of the ‘Washington Consensus’ economists from the IMF and the US in general, people who worked all their lives were provided with a basic retirement pension and a fixed rent apartment as acknowledgement of their contribution to the nation.

After 1991, the Shock Therapy gang, following Jeffrey Sach’s Russian blueprint, implemented rapid, market-based changes which included scrapping the previous pension system and forcing all rents to be at market rates.

Not only did the changes cause a severe economic depression and hyperinflation but it also meant thousands of older people were forced out of their homes – into the corrugated iron sheds as beggars.

More than 1.6 million people lost their jobs and their savings.

The oligarchs took over the state-owned enterprises under the imposed privatisation regime and became wealth siphons to further enrich the top-end-of-town.

What I saw first hand in Almaty was repeated throughout the world as the ideologues marauded around applying the extreme version of Williamson’s framework.

Not only did the Shock Therapy impoverish millions and create fertile ground for the emergence of the oligarchs who essentially took private control of massive swathes of state assets but it also fuelled many financial corruption scandals – for example, the Harvard-USAID Russia scandal.

See this 2005 memo from Harvard University – Harvard University reaches settlement agreement with USAID – for more information.

Clearly, in that 2002 Op Ed, Williamson expressed regret at the way his policy prescriptions had been applied as:

… a set of neoliberal policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery.

When he developed the framework, he said he “never intended my term” (the Washington Consensus):

… to imply policies like capital account liberalization … monetarism, supply-side economics, or a minimal state (getting the state out of welfare provision and income redistribution), which I think of as the quintessentially neoliberal ideas …

He concluded that the application of his hijacked ideas have delivered results that “have been disappointing, to say the least, particularly in terms of growth, employment, and poverty reduction.”

He said that no country should “have adopted the Washington Consensus as an ideology.”

I am documenting all this because I see it as relevant to an update I am doing for my 2015 book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (published May 2015).

I have been waiting for the Brexit implications to become more obvious given that the Pandemic blurred all waters and made it very hard to decompose what was causing what.

The Middle East crisis has also complicated assessments.

In that book I discussed the implications of the ‘Washington Consensus’ for developments in Europe, which led to the adoption of the common currency.

I wrote that Williamson’s pro-growth policy framework had been implemented by “institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the right wing think tanks” as a:

… neo-liberal agenda based on free market fundamentalism, fiscal austerity, broad based deregulation of financial and labour markets and privatisation.

The claims at the time that this agenda was responsible for eliminating inflationary pressures and putting the world on a path to prosperity unfettered by damaging government interference.

I wrote that:

The underlying neo-liberal narrative that dominated policy making in the 1990s as the EMU was being crafted, was that if private markets were left free of regulation and central banks were allowed to concentrate on price stability, unfettered by the political process, then economies would be able to maintain long periods of stable output and employment growth. The neo-liberal economists believed this period of ‘stability’ vindicated their claims that there was no further role for governments to use fiscal policy, the hallmark of Keynesianism, to try to ‘stabilise’ total spending in search of low unemployment. They prosecuted that view with zeal and arrogance.

And the agenda failed miserably.

The ideologues designed the Economic and Monetary Union in the image of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (the ideological version) and the monetary architecture that was implemented has proven to be incapable of adapting to the challenges now facing it.

Europe is now in a massive structural void of its own doing and the state-owned development model of say China, which was eschewed by the ideologues promoting the Washington Consensus, is now exposing the weaknesses and chronic incapacity of that consensus.

Conclusion

In Part 2, we will examine the structural failure of the EMU and how it is being destroyed by its own monetary architecture.

That is enough for today!

(c) Copyright 2026 William Mitchell. All Rights Reserved.

This Post Has 0 Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Back To Top