{"id":8734,"date":"2010-03-15T18:32:15","date_gmt":"2010-03-15T07:32:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=8734"},"modified":"2010-03-15T18:32:15","modified_gmt":"2010-03-15T07:32:15","slug":"today-started-out-well-but-then-went-downhill","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=8734","title":{"rendered":"Today started out well but then went downhill"},"content":{"rendered":"

\t\t\t\tToday started out well – early good waves at nearby Nobby’s Reef<\/a> which kept things interesting. After that things progressively went down hill at least in terms of the things I read from the popular press. We had the EMU-rest of the world conflation to deal with. Then the public and private debt conflation. Then the austerity is good for us hypothesis. And by then I decided to read other things that were more interesting – like mysql technical manuals. Anyway, here is a report of my descent into gloom today.
\n<\/p>\n

At the outset, top item on my news feed this morning was the Bloomberg report<\/a> that Moody’s claims the US and UK economies are moving “closer to losing” their “AAA Debt Rating”.<\/p>\n

To which I thought so what. But then you read the story and you think that these characters must have something better to do with their lives than make up spurious “thresholds” and “ratios” etc then relentlessly issue press releases threatening the nations with mayhem, when at the end of it all, their sovereign debt ratings are largely irrelevant for governments which issue their own currency.<\/p>\n

Perhaps we can send the bosses at Moody’s some retirement village brochures in places that have nice golf courses so they can just f*** off and leave everybody alone.<\/p>\n

The London MD of Moody’s “sovereign risk” desk told Bloomberg (presumably using a voice full of self-importance) that the US and UK were “substantially closer to losing their AAA credit ratings as the cost of servicing their debt rose”.<\/p>\n

So lets think about this. Both nations issue their own currency. They foolishly have falling into the conservative trap of handing out risk free government welfare annuities (bonds) to the financial markets that by them with the funds that the government itself has already spent.<\/p>\n

Then non-government sector spending collapses, mostly because of the commercial incompetence of the financial markets aided and abetted by corrupt credit rating agency practices (ratings for dollars type criminality).<\/p>\n

The governments in each nation, first of all, bail out the financial institutions so that the bosses and others can continue to get their exhorbitant and totally unjustifiable bonuses which pushes their net spending up. Then they hand out a little spending to underpin the real economy as unemployment starts to sharply rise. The support for the real economy is minimal and in the case of Britain they recessed for 6 quarters, a record.<\/p>\n

The debt servicing payments increase because of the increase in the volume of outstanding debt given that monetary policy has rates at around zero and yields not much higher. These payments “come from no-where” given that each of the governments has an infinite financial capacity to credit bank accounts in the currency units they issue. The payments provide income to the non-government sector.<\/p>\n

Where exactly is the problem?<\/p>\n

Moody’s also said that under their “baseline scenario” – a term that is used to invoke some sense of science or technical rigour:<\/p>\n

\n… the U.S. will spend more on debt service as a percentage of revenue this year than any other top-rated country except the U.K., and will be the biggest spender from 2011 to 2013 …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yes, both are very large economies and both have been enduring a very significant real recession. So what?<\/p>\n

Moody’s MD then was quoted as saying:<\/p>\n

\nUnder its adverse scenario, which assumes 0.5 percent lower growth each year, less fiscal adjustment and a stronger interest-rate shock, the U.S. will be paying about 15 percent of revenue in interest payments, more than the 14 percent limit that would lead to a downgrade to AA …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Other than yawn … you learn that after 14 per cent, the rating is downgraded to AA. What exactly is the financial and economic justification for that threshold? Why is 13 per cent AAA and 14.1 per cent AA? What materially happens to a nation when it crosses that threshold?<\/p>\n

The answer to each of the questions is that this threshold is purely arbitrary The process of paying the interest does not change – the government just credits a relevant bank account with some keystrokes.<\/p>\n

The government doesn’t lose its currency sovereignty once that threshold is passed. The real economy doesn’t fall in a heap after that threshold is passed. And there isn’t any scientifically credible evidence to show that inflation takes off after that threshold is passed.<\/p>\n

But the overriding point is that there is no solvency risk in the first place. Please read my blogs – Time to outlaw the credit rating agencies<\/a> and Ratings agencies and higher interest rates <\/a> – for more discussion on this point.<\/p>\n

Recall that in November 1998, the day after the Japanese Government announced a large-scale fiscal stimulus to its ailing economy, Moody’s made the first of a series of downgradings of the Japanese Government’s yen-denominated bonds, by taking the Aaa (triple A) rating away. By December 2001, they further downgraded Japanese sovereign debt to Aa3 from Aa2. Then on May 31, 2002, they cut Japan’s long-term credit rating by a further two grades to A2, or below that given to Botswana, Chile and Hungary.<\/p>\n

In a statement at the time, Moody’s said that its decision “reflects the conclusion that the Japanese government’s current and anticipated economic policies will be insufficient to prevent continued deterioration in Japan’s domestic debt position … Japan’s general government indebtedness, however measured, will approach levels unprecedented in the postwar era in the developed world, and as such Japan will be entering ‘uncharted territory’.”<\/p>\n

So if you read this morning’s statement about the US and UK you will see that nothing has changed in the last 10 years – same nonsense.<\/p>\n

At that time, the Japanese Finance Minister responded sensibly: “They’re doing it for business. Just because they do such things we won’t change our policies … The market doesn’t seem to be paying attention.” Indeed, the Government continued to have no problems finding buyers for their debt, which is all yen-denominated and sold mainly to domestic investors. It also definitely helped Japan that they had such a strong domestic market for bonds.<\/p>\n

And the Japanese government still has not trouble in this regard.<\/p>\n

Rating sovereign debt according to default risk is nonsensical. While Japan’s economy was struggling at the time, the default risk on yen-denominated sovereign debt was nil given that the yen is a floating exchange rate.<\/p>\n

The same is true of the US and UK today.<\/p>\n

Of-course, Moody’s are not about to undertake a downgrade. They are talking at present that “distance-to- downgrade” has “substantially diminished”. They have some technical mumbo jumpo about a so called “debt reversibility band” which requires a nation to undertake fiscal austerity to get back into the “band”.<\/p>\n

The sinister element is that Moody’s said:<\/p>\n

\nAchieving the fiscal consolidation necessary to avert a downgrade will test “social cohesion” and may involve rewriting the “social contract” between governments and their people … People have to decide what level of pain they are willing to accept to have a healthy economy.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

By which they mean, entrenched unemployment and rising poverty are required to satisfy Moody’s that the US and UK are within their “debt reversibility band”. And people actually believe this stuff.<\/p>\n

The public debt ratio will fall again when growth resumes. Growth will not resume very strongly unless it is continued to be supported by discretionary fiscal stimulus. There is no magical alternative.<\/p>\n

Private expectations are pessimistic and a consumption-led growth is the last thing we should be aiming for given the levels of household indebtedness around the Globe.<\/p>\n

Public debt interest serving payments are nothing like the volume that might force the government to reduce other discretionary spending or increase taxes to take the heat off aggregate demand.<\/p>\n

Anyway, that was the first story I read this morning. So you can see I should have stayed out in the line-up with the rest of the surf crew.<\/p>\n

The debt theme continued, however – throughout the day in fact as new stories came in on my RSS feed.<\/p>\n

I started reading – Batten down the hatches, the waters are still treacherous<\/a> by Fairfax writer and known conservative Paul Sheehan (March 15, 2010) – with some hope given the title.<\/p>\n

I thought that perhaps he was finally going to talk about the dangers of cutting back on the government spending support for economies around the world – I should have known better given the author.<\/p>\n

His article those carried a point that is now resonating across deficit terrorist land and which is one of the worst errors of reasoning they make.<\/p>\n

Sheehan said that with the talk last week of a booming Australian economy – (see my blog from last week – Its all booming down here folks!<\/a>) – that:<\/p>\n

\n… it appears we are springing back to normalcy without absorbing the reality: the global financial crisis is far from over. All the elements are in place for a second crash.<\/p>\n

The world has become an economically unstable place, with enormous unresolved issues. Australia’s economy is fundamentally sound, but the global economy is fundamentally unsound. Even a good boat can be swamped by a bad sea and Australia, as a middling economy, will be buffeted by forces beyond its control unfolding in the United States, the European Community and Asia.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I somewhat agree with this perception although I think Australia’s economy which is increasingly reliant on environmentally unsustainable industries for its growth is not fundamentally sound. But that is the topic of another blog some day.<\/p>\n

The point of agreement is that the there are major problems still in the World economy and the political processes are failing to address them. The band-aids have been applied – and then only sparingly so the wounds are still oozing – but the fundamental reform agenda is sinking under the pressure being mounted on governments by the conservative lobby groups.<\/p>\n

The global leaders have not resolved the unsatisfactory practices of the banking sector and they have only begrudgingly provided fiscal support – while plotting a return to an emphasis on monetary policy with as little re-regulation as they can get away with.<\/p>\n

So with a real estate market in the US still unwell, particularly the commercial segment; Europe basically a basket case, going down the tube because of a fundamentally flawed monetary system; and China now reporting it is struggling to maintain growth given its export markets remain weak – there is a lot to worry about in terms of the evolution of aggregate demand.<\/p>\n

As Joseph Stiglitz said last week (March 7, 2010) in his UK Guardian article – Dangers of deficit-cut fetishism<\/a>:<\/p>\n

\nIn America, for instance, bad debt and foreclosures are at levels not seen for three-quarters of a century; the decline in credit in 2009 was the largest since 1942 … even with large deficits, economic growth in the US and Europe is anemic, and forecasts of private-sector growth suggest that in the absence of continued government support, there is risk of continued stagnation – of growth too weak to return unemployment to normal levels anytime soon.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

But Sheehan has another agenda. He is worried about the debt explosion (yes he used the word)! He said:<\/p>\n

\nThe International Monetary Fund estimates the world’s 20 largest economies, the G20, will have a combined debt equal to 118 per cent of their combined gross domestic product by 2014, meaning debt will have exploded by 50 per cent in just seven years. To fund what? In Australia, debt is being used for expansion of the mining sector, which is good, but also for the ill-disciplined spending of the Rudd government and the chronically overpriced housing sector. As a result, Australia’s economy is more vulnerable to economic stress from abroad.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

So the first point to note is that he is equating the debt incurred in the currency of issue by the government of issue with private debt which is in Australia’s case is increasingly denominated in foreign currency units.<\/p>\n

That conflation alone tells you that this journalist does not understand the subtleties of the subject matter he is prognosticating about. It is very clear that rising private debt ratios increase the risk of private insolvency. This is even more likely when the debt is denominated in a foreign currency.<\/p>\n

It is also clear that a government that borrows in a foreign currency is also at risk of insolvency. Further, there is never a need for a government to borrow in a foreign currency. Some people will retort that a less developed nation would not get access to capital if it didn’t undertake foreign currency loans. My view is different.<\/p>\n

If all the developing governments were committed to only spending in their own currencies then the first-world suppliers would face a major realisation crisis and would be forced to deal on the terms presented to them. Cartels are very effective structures for getting your own way!<\/p>\n

In terms of the so-called “ill-disciplined spending of the Rudd government” he cannot be thinking in terms of the size of the fiscal intervention because that was by any standards insufficient to meet the private spending slowdown. What evidence is sufficient to establish my conclusion? GDP has slowed to well below trend growth and labour underutilisation is now about 4-5 per cent above what it was at the peak of the last growth cycle – and even then there was excessive slack in the labour market.<\/p>\n

If he is talking about the design of the fiscal intervention then I have more sympathy. There was a scant amount of funds directed at job creation and too much directed at giving people cash to buy plasma TVs with. Further, the home insulation plan, while sensible in concept, was rushed and exposed the lack of regulation in the trades sector among other things.<\/p>\n

At any rate, Sheehan then chooses to quote from an author from Sydney’s Centre of Independent Studies, which is an ultra free-market lobbying outfit that has zero credibility in terms of the research they pump out with the funding aid of corporate sector.<\/p>\n

The quoted economist claims that:<\/p>\n

\nThe legacy of four consecutive years of inflated deficits will be a level of debt more than 50 per cent higher, as a proportion of GDP, than before the [financial] crisis, and nominal debt of almost $US10 trillion ($10.9 trillion) … debt burden higher than at any time since the early post-World War II years. The difference then was that debt was in steep decline; in the current episode, it is soaring to a new plateau from which there is no prospect of a steep decline … Worse, two-thirds of this increased debt is coming from increased spending by the Obama administration … the bigger the problem becomes because the cost of debt servicing is already beginning to snowball.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

A snowball gets bigger and bigger as it rolls down the hill. As least that is my perception. I could be wrong given that I lived close to the coast all my life in generally warm conditions and have seen snow a few times.<\/p>\n

I had a look at some US data to check the snowball statement. First, from the US Office of Management and Budget<\/a> I looked at the total US Federal government interest payments as a percentage of GDP. The following graph shows you what I found.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

Then I consulted the Bureau of the Public Debt<\/a>, which is a division of the US Department of the Treasury. I captured the following graph from their charting service.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

So I don’t see any snowballs there.<\/p>\n

Sheehan’s CIS economist then claimed that:<\/p>\n

\nThe current fiscal policies contain the seeds of the next global financial crisis with its epicentre in Washington rather than New York … The problem of excessive indebtedness is in the process of being transferred to the public sector. It is not clear how simply passing the problem between sectors can be a solution to anything.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Therein lies his idiocy. There is a huge difference between private and public debt. Please read my blog – Debt is not debt <\/a> – for more discussion on this point.<\/p>\n

While I think the conservative practice of issuing public debt should be stopped, the real focus is on what the net spending is achieving not the changes to the accounting balance sheets that are accompanying the spending. They only tell you to a cent that the public deficits are building increased nominal wealth in the private sector in the form of the increased bond holdings.<\/p>\n

But the real attention should be on the underwriting of aggregate demand and the prevention of another depression. See below for further analysis of the benefits of the fiscal interventions.<\/p>\n

This claim that overall leverage has to fall is now commonly rehearsed even by so-called progressives. It relies on a fallacious juxtaposition – the conflation of public and private debt and no progressive worth their while would engage in such reasoning.<\/p>\n

We should actually applaud the transfer of private debt to the public sector. Given that it is being accomplished by the deficit spending which is “financing” the desire by the private sector to increase its saving ratio – the financing comes about through the deficits underwriting some economic growth which generates the increased income that allows the private sector to save.<\/p>\n

If the private desire to save – which is clearly apparent and a reaction to the credit binge that preceded the crisis – had not have been accomodated by the rising deficits then the negative income adjustments would have been more severe than they were and the private sector’s plans to return some safety margin to their balance sheet positions would have been thwarted.<\/p>\n

The only way the private sector can accomplish significant delegeraging is if economic growth is supported strongly by public deficits. Clearly this commentator has no idea of the macroeconomic linkages in this respect.<\/p>\n

Sheehan then conflates Greece with the UK and we give up on him at that point.<\/p>\n

While on the UK, known conservative economist Columbia University’s Jeffrey Sachs seems to be forgoing all academic credibility (he had none anyway) by teaming up with Britain’s shadow chancellor George Osborne in a piece published yesterday (March 14, 2010) by the Financial Times – A frugal policy is the better solution<\/a>.<\/p>\n

They began with the typical line:<\/p>\n

\nVirtually all policy analysts agree that the path to renewed prosperity in Europe and the US depends on a credible plan to re-establish sound public finances.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

So if you don’t agree you are a ratbag is the inference. I wear my ratbaggery with some pride let me tell you.<\/p>\n

Anyway, in what follows, Osborne reveals he knows nothing about this stuff while Sachs, who should know better, must be playing some other game. How much are the Tories paying him to say these things?<\/p>\n

They write:<\/p>\n

\nWithout such a plan, the travails which have hit Greece and which are threatening Portugal and Spain will soon enough threaten the UK, US, and other deficit-ridden countries. In the recent duel of macro-economists, one camp has called for early budget consolidation, followed by further measures over five years. We agree. Others want more fiscal stimulus, delaying deficit reduction. We believe delaying the start of deficit reduction would put long-term recovery at risk. Such an approach misjudges politics, financial markets, and underlying economic realities.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

So once again we conflate non-sovereign nations (Greece, Portugal and Spain) with sovereign countries (UK and the US). That conflation immediately lets you know that there is nothing credible being said in this piece. Along the same lines of those who conflate private and sovereign debt.<\/p>\n

As Stiglitz said last week:<\/p>\n

\nReducing government spending, especially in harder-hit economies like the UK, is a risk not worth taking at this point\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

But I noted that Osborne and Sachs talked about “politics, financial markets and underlying economic realities”.<\/p>\n

They are critical of “lax financial regulations” in the lead up to the crisis. I agree with that but the article does not outline a comprehensive reform strategy. Rather it reinforces the Moody’s-type line that “financial markets are perfectly capable of getting spooked about the prospects of debt financing in the medium term” and can cause damage – and Greece is used as the example.<\/p>\n

Greece was a sitting duck – bound by a monetary system where the financial market bullies could pick it off at will. As noted above, Japan showed the “markets” that they don’t rule at all. And on countries with non-sovereign monetary systems, Argentina really showed them.<\/p>\n

They claim that economic theory undermines the view promoted by “Keynesians” that:<\/p>\n

\n… delay is beneficial in the short term because it provokes more spending today – irrespective of future debt burdens … If the starting position is a large structural deficit, further fiscal “stimulus” can darken consumer and business confidence by creating fears about future debt burdens. These fears may be translated directly into higher borrowing costs today for government and the private economy. There are many well-studied examples of “negative fiscal multipliers”, in which credible fiscal retrenchments in fact stimulated the economy, via greater consumer and investor outlays, by reducing borrowing costs and spurring confidence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

All the well-known studies that eschew the use of fiscal policy are fraudulent in various ways – theoretical model that doesn’t stack up; faulty econometric techniques; poor datasets. The reasonable conclusion from the vast array of literature on the topic is that fiscal multipliers are positive, there is no Ricardian Equivalence effects operating, and a growing economy boosts consumer and investment sentiment.<\/p>\n

It is hard to sit there view that fiscal cutbacks must be made immediately with their vision for the future. They say that the public sector should aim to deliver high quality “modern infrastructure, high-quality education, pre-commercial innovation, and a world-class science and technology base”.<\/p>\n

They conclude that:<\/p>\n

\nOur priority should be a medium-term fiscal framework, with the first steps starting this year. That must be matched by improvements in the delivery of health, education, skills, and technology; social protection for those in need; and a decent regard for the long-term investments needed to rebuild an economy crushed by the bubbles of wishful thinking.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yes, I totally agree with all of that.. And the years of neo-liberal neglect of these essential public sector roles in almost every country one can think off has led to a severe degradation in these important areas of infrastructure – public infrastructure, health, education, transport and urban planning systems, renewable energy and all the rest of it.<\/p>\n

But committing to that sort of vision will require substantial continuous deficits into the future even when the economies return to growth. The share of public activity in total real GDP will have to rise to ensure that these enhancements are effectively pursued. I don’t see any case for austerity in that sort of schema.<\/p>\n

They claim that we have to avoid financial and property bubbles. I agree but that means less resources have to be made available to consumers and a significant recasting of the regulative environment for banks and financial markets. These requirements have nothing to do with austerity.<\/p>\n

I agree with Stiglitz – austerity will just cause more damage and steer the debate away from base level reform.<\/p>\n

He represents the alternative, more considered view of the current debate about fiscal policy. He said:<\/p>\n

\nA wave of fiscal austerity is rushing over Europe and America. The magnitude of budget deficits – like the magnitude of the downturn – has taken many by surprise. But despite protests by yesterday’s proponents of deregulation, who would like the government to remain passive, most economists believe that government spending has made a difference, helping to avert another Great Depression.<\/p>\n

Most economists also agree that it is a mistake to look at only one side of a balance sheet (whether for the public or private sector). One has to look not only at what a country or firm owes, but also at its assets. This should help answer those financial sector hawks who are raising alarms about government spending. After all, even deficit hawks acknowledge that we should be focusing not on today’s deficit, but on the long-term national debt. Spending, especially on investments in education, technology, and infrastructure, can actually lead to lower long-term deficits. Banks’ short-sightedness helped create the crisis; we cannot let government short-sightedness – prodded by the financial sector – prolong it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I thought it was interesting that both Osborne\/Sachs and Stiglitz were claiming that “most economists” agreed with their diametrically opposed view points.<\/p>\n

But the message is clear – now is the time for governments to undertake some serious investment in renewable technology, in human capital augmentation, in building research capacity in our universities and that will require on-going deficits.<\/p>\n

The public infrastructure base they are working with is severely diminished as a consequence of a few decades of relative austerity (pursuit of surpluses etc) and corporate welfare payments.<\/p>\n

The other interesting point that Stiglitz makes which is well-known but worth repeating over and over again:<\/p>\n

\n… the appropriate size of a deficit depends in part on the state of the economy. A weaker economy calls for a larger deficit, and the appropriate size of the deficit in the face of a recession depends on the precise circumstances … [and in terms of forecasting what will happen] … (t)he risks are asymmetric: if these forecasts are wrong, and there is a more robust recovery, then, of course, expenditures can be cut back and\/or taxes increased. But if these forecasts are right, then a premature “exit” from deficit spending risks pushing the economy back into recession. This is one of the lessons we should have learned from America’s experience in the Great Depression; it is also one of the lessons to emerge from Japan’s experience in the late 1990s.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This is an understated point. While the politics may not be as easy as counting to 10, the government can more easily pull back a growing economy than it can rescusitate a seriously sick one. The Japanese experience is a lesson we should not forget (in all its dimensions).<\/p>\n

Further, the upside risk is inflation while the downside risk is much more damaging – lost income, lost human and physical capital investment, human impoverishment, increased crimes, increased family breakdown, increased alcohol and substance abuse, increased mental illness incidence and more.<\/p>\n

I am not advocating an inflationary growth strategy but that is the risk at high pressure. Economies are so far away from that risk zone at present and staring at all the downside risks which are much more costly both in the short- and long-run – that serious leadership should involve staring down the deficit terrorists and mounting political campaigns to starve them of “public oxygen”.<\/p>\n

The problem is that governments everywhere are fuelling the frenzy and volunatarily offering premature fiscal austerity strategies which are exposing their citizens to all the downside risk.<\/p>\n

It is totally irresponsible and the anathema of prudent and enlightened leadership.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

First, you cannot compare public debt with private debt. Such a comparison is inapplicable. Further, if you really are committed to reductions in private debt levels (scaled by income) then, given the conservative arrangements about debt issuance, you will have to learn to tolerate higher public debt levels.<\/p>\n

With that said, most of the statements made about public debt levels are pure fiction and reflect ignorance and ideology rather than substance.<\/p>\n

Second, you cannot draw conclusions about different monetary systems as if they are the same. The EMU is a totally different monetary system to that which the UK or the US operates. All EMU governments face the risk of insolvency while the UK and US governments never face such a risk.<\/p>\n

Third, if we really want to restructure national economies and reform financial markets etc, then the role that the public sector will have to play in infrastructure provision and regulation has to increase not decrease. That will necessitate on-going budget deficits. The terrorists will just have to get used to that.<\/p>\n

Fourth, the downside risk involved in engaging in fiscal austerity is far more damaging than the risks of overheating the economy by some degree.<\/p>\n

That is enough for today!\t\t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Today started out well – early good waves at nearby Nobby’s Reef which kept things interesting. After that things progressively went down hill at least in terms of the things I read from the popular press. We had the EMU-rest of the world conflation to deal with. Then the public and private debt conflation. Then…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8734","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-economics","entry","no-media"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8734","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8734"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8734\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8734"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8734"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8734"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}