{"id":12176,"date":"2010-11-02T17:48:53","date_gmt":"2010-11-02T06:48:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=12176"},"modified":"2010-11-02T17:48:53","modified_gmt":"2010-11-02T06:48:53","slug":"the-euro-bosses-ignore-all-the-lessons","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=12176","title":{"rendered":"The Euro bosses ignore all the lessons"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\t\t\t\tI was thinking about the recent European Council meeting today which was held in Brussels over the weekend. It is clear that the Eurozone bosses are choosing to ignore all the lessons that the current crisis has provided to them about the basic design flaws of their monetary system. They think the solution to their problems is to make it even harder for member governments to provide net spending to their economies at times of stress. They fail to articulate the most basic macroeconomic fact that confronts them &#8211; unemployment is rising across the zone and production generally is stagnant because there is not enough demand for sales of goods and services. If the private sector won&#8217;t provide that demand then the government sector has to given that they cannot rely on net exports to cure the deficiency. By deliberately restricting governments and effectively forcing them to engage in pro-cyclical fiscal responses the Euro bosses are not only prolonging the agony the citizens are facing but are also engaging in a self-defeating strategy. As we are seeing budget deficits are rising as austerity is imposed. The solution to the Eurozone problems is to disband the zone and restore individual currency sovereignty at the national level. It would be painful to do that but in the medium- to long-term it will be less painful than the trajectory they are following.<br \/>\n<!--more--><br \/>\nThe recent developments in the Eurozone are pretty depressing.<\/p>\n<p>As I reported yesterday, Eurostat (October 28, 2010) released their latest &#8211; <a href=\"http:\/\/epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu\/cache\/ITY_PUBLIC\/3-29102010-AP\/EN\/3-29102010-AP-EN.PDF\">Labour Force data<\/a> &#8211; which shows that unemployment continues to rise and is now above 10 per cent.<\/p>\n<p>The Report says that there are:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\n&#8230; 23.109 million men and women in the EU27, of whom 15.917 million were in the euro area, were unemployed in September 2010. Compared with August, the number of persons unemployed increased by 71000 in the EU27 and by 67000 in the euro area. Compared with September 2009, unemployment rose by 0.656 million in the EU27 and by 0.424 million in the euro area.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The following graph is taken from Eurostat&#8217;s publication and shows the distribution of unemployment rates across the EU. Note those out to the right.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/11\/EU_UR_Sep_2010.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2010\/11\/EU_UR_Sep_2010.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"EU_UR_Sep_2010\" width=\"780\" height=\"271\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-12177\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<div style=\"clear:both\"><\/div>\n<p>So this is a system that knows how to get the potential out of its workforce!<\/p>\n<p>Further, Eurostat report (October 28, 2010) that &#8211; <a href=\"http:\/\/epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu\/cache\/ITY_PUBLIC\/2-28102010-AP\/EN\/2-28102010-AP-EN.PDF\">Quarterly Sector Accounts<\/a> &#8211; for the second-quarter that household saving ratios and real household disposable income continue to fall in the Euro area. This is not the sign of a healthy economic block.<\/p>\n<p>Eurostat also published their latest <a href=\"http:\/\/epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu\/cache\/ITY_PUBLIC\/2-22102010-AP\/EN\/2-22102010-AP-EN.PDF\">Government deficit and debt figures for 2009<\/a> on October 22, 2010. If you examine it closely you will see that the nations that have already adopted austerity saw expanding deficits in 2009 contrary to their plans. The nations with very large changes in their fiscal positions (larger deficit to GDP ratios) are typically those out to the right of the unemployment rate graph above.<\/p>\n<p>The Euro wannabees like Estonia and Latvia are particularly problematic and their governments have lost the plot with respect to maximising the potential of their citizens. The politicians seem content to trash the living standards of their citizens so they can get to more sumptuous dinners down at Brussels.<\/p>\n<p>But the increases in deficits etc just tell me that the automatic stabilisers were working hard to provide some fiscal support for their economies as private spending continued to collapse and discretionary net spending by the governments fell. The reaction of the budget bottom line is totally predictable and to think otherwise reflects a total ideological blindness.<\/p>\n<p>The governments knew it too but lied. They are trying to &#8220;finish&#8221; off the neo-liberal smashing of the welfare state and taking this opportunity to do it under cover of a crisis.<\/p>\n<p>As an aside, the 2009 data for the UK shows a deficit equal to 11.4 per cent of GDP. This will rise as its austerity programs undermine growth and drive the automatic stabilisers into providing more fiscal support for the economy.<\/p>\n<p>That is all background to the latest &#8220;reform&#8221; proposals from the EU bosses.<\/p>\n<p>The Economist Magazine reporting from Brussels (October 28, 2010) where the European Council meeting was held conclude that the result is &#8211; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.economist.com\/blogs\/charlemagne\/2010\/10\/euro-zone_governance\">Game, set and match to Angela<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>You can read the full concluding statement of the EU Council meeting <a href=\"http:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/uedocs\/cms_data\/docs\/pressdata\/en\/ec\/117496.pdf\">HERE<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The Council conclusions were (chopped up a bit to save space):<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>&#8220;The European Council endorses the report of the Task Force on economic governance. Its implementation will allow us to increase fiscal discipline, broaden economic surveillance, deepen coordination, and set up a robust framework for crisis management and stronger institutions.&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>&#8220;speed up work on how the impact of pension reform&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li>&#8220;establish a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole &#8230; [and implement] &#8230; a limited treaty change required to that effect, not modifying article 125 TFEU (&#8220;no bail-out&#8221; clause).&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>&#8220;to ensure that spending at the European level can make an appropriate contribution to &#8230; fiscal discipline &#8230; to bring deficit and debt onto a more sustainable path&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>A note to support the G20 &#8220;Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, notably concerning fiscal consolidation plans, financial regulatory reform, social cohesion, job creation and the need for further structural reforms&#8221;.<\/li>\n<li>A note to broaden the IMF membership etc as agreed by the G20 meeting in Seoul.<\/li>\n<li>Some generalised motherhood statement about climate change.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>So they plan to set up a bail-out fund but not call it that and force stringent anti-people rules and conditions on any nation that dares to access it. Apparently they are going to include an &#8220;exceptional circumstances&#8221; clause thus recognising that the design of their monetary system is incapable of actually dealing with the flux and uncertainty of aggregate spending.<\/p>\n<p>But instead of abandoning the system or putting the capacity in place to deal with asymmetric demand shocks (that is, a unified fiscal authority) the European Council just introduced measures which will make the situation worse both in the short-run (getting out of the current mess) and in the medium-term, when the next negative demand shock arrives.<\/p>\n<p>They EU plans to impose harsher fiscal discipline on governments without questioning the nature of the cyclical effects on the state of member nation budgets. In other words, they will force pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal responses from government when they are beset with a major negative demand shock.<\/p>\n<p>And &#8230; meanwhile &#8230; to the East a bit, the European Central Bank will continue bailing the whole show out (so far more than 60 billion euros in purchases) with its treaty violating &#8220;fiscal policy&#8221; purchases of government debt in the secondary markets. As long as the ECB continue buying the debt that the bond traders are avoiding at lower yields the Eurozone will stumble along mostly in a state of near recession.<\/p>\n<p>The Euro bosses can then attend their sumptuous councils and summits and wine and dine to their hearts content dreaming up ridiculous &#8220;reforms&#8221; to their sinking ship. None of these reforms will help their system if the ECB curtail their &#8220;fiscal spending&#8221; policy.<\/p>\n<p>It is hard to believe these characters are taken seriously. How did they get into leadership positions? More on that later.<\/p>\n<p>Inflation-obsessed Germany has been pushing hard to introduce even harsher fiscal rules than are already in place in the Eurozone in the face of general opposition from the other member states. So the fact that the European Council went along with Germany&#8217;s wishes is the context in which the Economist considers Angela won the tennis match.<\/p>\n<p>If only it was a game!<\/p>\n<p>The Germans only partially &#8220;won&#8221; though. They actually had been pushing to take voting rights off nations who violated their (stupid) fiscal rules. The Economist points out that this would have led Ireland to call a referendum about the reforms, which, given the state of the place and the voter anger, would have been lost. So either by default or the people rightfully jacking up &#8211; the Eurozone would have started to crumble &#8230; as it should.<\/p>\n<p>Earlier, on September 23, 2010, the Economist Magazine ran a story &#8211; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.economist.com\/node\/17093339\">How to run the euro &#8211; Fixing Europe&#8217;s single currency<\/a> &#8211; where they laid out what they considered to be the blueprint for an efficient solution to the current issues facing the EMU countries.<\/p>\n<p>In referring to the creation of the euro bailout fund (the legality of which is about to be challenged in a German court) and the fact that the ECB has been &#8220;funding&#8221; several governments as their deficits worsen because they are imposing austerity on their citizens, the Economist said:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nThese efforts have staved off the sense of emergency, but the euro zone&#8217;s underlying problems are not easily fixed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The temporary measures do not amount to palliative care which generally tries to ease the pain of the patient while they die. In the Eurozone case, the patients &#8211; and it is a ward full of sick nations &#8211; are being kept alive but the quacks are still forcing deep pain on them.<\/p>\n<p>The situation is getting ridiculous. The Euro statisticians are currently debating whether the Irish bailout of the state-owned Anglo-Irish Bank which is on the verge of collapse should be included as Government&#8217;s discretionary spending. At present, the Irish budget deficit is rising (and is around 12 per cent of GDP). This is generating even more shrill calls from the Euro bosses to cut back further.<\/p>\n<p>But if the bank bailout is included then the the budget deficit will jump to over 20 per cent of GDP and you can imagine what the Brussel-Frankfurt bullies will be saying next. It is sheer idiocy.<\/p>\n<p>In the European Council document I did not see one reference to the fact that the Eurozone fails all the basic tests of an optimal currency area (OCA). This concept was used way back to &#8220;justify&#8221; the decision to create the common currency although all the decision-makers at the time clearly would have realised the conditions for an OCA were absent.<\/p>\n<p>It was just another case of hiding behind some arcane economic theory to implement a political agenda.<\/p>\n<p>But at present the EMU zone looks less like an OCA than ever before. Some of the big member states (Germany, Netherlands, and Austria) are riding a manufacturing wave (which is about to break and dump them) while the southern states are in continued recession and likely to deteriorate in real terms even further.<\/p>\n<p>The European Council makes no reference to these widening disparities and the fact that some of the member states are in impossible situations. It clearly wants to deny that there is no coherent basis for the monetary union.<\/p>\n<p>Economists developed the concept of an <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Optimum_currency_area\">Optimal Currency Area (OCA)<\/a> in the 1960s although it was always a dodgy case of textbook theory, inapplicable to the real world, being applied to suit ideological ambitions.<\/p>\n<p>Three essential conditions have to exist to justify the formation of a monetary union as an OCA:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The countries should face common consequences if hit by a negative shock (no asymmetric shocks). So, for example, unemployment rates should be similar across the countries in the union;<\/li>\n<li>There should be a high degree of labour mobility and\/or wage flexibility within the group of countries.<\/li>\n<li>There is a common fiscal policy that can transfer resources from better performing to poorly performing countries.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Yes, the EMU should disband immediately using these &#8220;theoretical conditions&#8221; if they are still claiming it to be an OCA.<\/p>\n<p>You might like to compare this list of &#8220;theoretical conditions&#8221; with what emerged out of the Maastricht treaty which stipulated five conditions: convergence in interest rates, budget deficits, public debt, inflation rates and stable exchange rates prior to the formation of the union.<\/p>\n<p>These conditions are not remotely like those that were used to define an OCA and reflect more the blind neo-liberal ideology that was gathering pace at the time and was dominating policy makers.<\/p>\n<p>The point is that the EMU countries did not (and do not) satisfy the criteria for an OCA yet they still went ahead with the common currency which meant that each sovereign nation gave up their monetary policy independence and allowed the Stability and Growth Pact to hamstring their fiscal sovereignty.<\/p>\n<p>The ability to absorb external shocks is very different across the Eurozone countries. The stronger industrial countries like Germany (who has a huge external surplus) as do the Netherlands, are in totally different situations to the capital importers such as Spain. The stronger nations can absorb shocks much better than Spain.<\/p>\n<p>Finland, for example retains close cultural and trading ties to Norway and is not linked much in trade with Spain. Ireland maintained strong trading relationships with the UK and less with continental Europe.<\/p>\n<p>The labour mobility criteria is required because if unemployment rises in one country, the workers are able to move within the union to find other work. Given that national identities are still strong in Europe, labour mobility is relatively low.<\/p>\n<p>One of the interesting side effects of the coincidence of a major real crisis and a housing collapse is that labour mobility is now reduced (in all countries). <\/p>\n<p>In bad times, those that can move tend to move to chase job opportunities elsewhere. However, when there is a major real estate collapse this mobility doesn&#8217;t occur as significantly because people cannot afford to move &#8211; especially those with negative equity in their residences.<\/p>\n<p>You might get mobility (according to the theory of an OCA) if there was wage flexibility across the union. So workers in recessed regions would reduce their wage demands and make it easier for firms to hire them. Allegedly, this would also lower prices of final goods and services produced in that region which improves their competitiveness.<\/p>\n<p>So while the EMU is really a fixed exchange rate system imposed on a number of countries and so nominal exchange rate depreciation cannot occur, real terms of trade changes can happen if relative unit labour costs change.<\/p>\n<p>This is how the &#8220;textbook&#8221; theory claimed it would work. The recessed nations could improve their competitive by cutting wages and unit labour costs (a real rather than a nominal depreciation) which would attract firms into that region away from other regions in the union.<\/p>\n<p>Of-course, this assumes that employment is driven by wage levels. If a nation such as Spain tried to cut real wages (engineering this would be difficult in itself) then there would be a huge drop in demand by Spanish workers. It is highly unlikely that the so-called &#8220;real depreciation&#8221; impacts would offset the local income effects on demand.<\/p>\n<p>One of the other constraints on mobility is that the EMU did not develop a common language. Workers are thus disadvantaged when they move into a different language zone.<\/p>\n<p>There is very little wage flexibility across the European economies (which is a good thing) but hardly consistent with the OCA criteria. Unions still play significant roles in wage determination and resist nominal wage cuts, especially in times of hardship.<\/p>\n<p>But Germany also made sure that these &#8220;competitive&#8221; effects would not occur. They were aggressive in implementing their so-called &#8220;Hartz package of welfare reforms&#8221;. The Hartz reforms were the exemplar of the neo-liberal approach to labour market deregulation. They were an integral part of the German government&#8217;s &#8220;Agenda 2010?.<\/p>\n<p>The Hartz process was broadly in-line with reforms that have been pursued in other industrialised countries, following the OECD&#8217;s Job Study in 1994; a focus on supply side measures and privatisation of public employment agencies to reduce unemployment. The underlying claim was that unemployment was a supply-side problem rather than a systemic failure of the economy to produce enough jobs.<\/p>\n<p>The reforms accelerated the casualisation of the labour market (so-called mini\/midi jobs) and there was a sharp fall in regular employment after the introduction of the Hartz reforms.<\/p>\n<p>The German approach had overtones of the old canard of a federal system &#8211; &#8220;smokestack chasing&#8221;. One of the problems that federal systems can encounter is disparate regional development (in states or sub-state regions). A typical issue that arose as countries engaged in the strong growth period after World War 2 was the tax and other concession that states in various countries offered business firms in return for location.<\/p>\n<p>There is a large literature which shows how this practice not only undermines the welfare of other regions in the federal system but also compromise the position of the state doing the &#8220;chasing&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>In the current context, the way in which the Germans pursued the Hartz reforms not only meant that they were undermining the welfare of the other EMU nations but also drove the living standards of German workers down.<\/p>\n<p>Further, the OCA concept required that there be a union-wide fiscal capacity to maintain uniformity of outcomes within the nations that made up the monetary union in the face of demand shocks.<\/p>\n<p>The design of the Eurozone deliberately prohibited such a capacity being established. An OCA clearly requires a single fiscal authority that can transfer net spending from one region to another to even out economic performance. This criteria is absolutely essential in defining a theoretical OCA.<\/p>\n<p>However, the real politik that led up to the creation of the EMU was not even remotely consistent with the criteria. Germany (and to a lesser extent France) were paranoid about the possibility that some of its southern neighbours (Italy and Spain) would use fiscal policy in an irresponsible manner. This led to the prohibitive clauses in the Growth and Stability Pact that force all EMU members to limit their budget deficits to 3 per cent of GDP or face penalties.<\/p>\n<p>If the EMU countries were serious about creating conditions consistent with an OCA they would have handed over their fiscal powers to the European Parliament. But the European Council&#8217;s latest intent &#8211; to make the SGP rules even more stringent and to enforce them more closely is exactly the opposite to what is required. The decision is just making the design flaw even more glaring.<\/p>\n<p>The logic of the Euro bosses was this &#8211; they had to severely constrain fiscal policy because they believed that if say, Italy spent up this would cause inflation and the ECB would &#8220;have&#8221; to (as if they have no choice) increase interest rates for all nations and damage growth generally.<\/p>\n<p>The other opinion on this reflected Germany&#8217;s inflation obsession. They considered the ECB would start &#8220;printing money&#8221; to fund the deficits and this would cause inflation or that the Germans would have to raise taxes to bail out Greece or Italy or some other nation without the Teutonic discipline.<\/p>\n<p>However, the resulting design provided no sensible capacity to deal with the negative demand shock that came along with the GFC. The automatic stabiliser impacts drove budgets outside of the rules quite apart from any discretionary changes in government fiscal policy.<\/p>\n<p>Spain was an exemplar of Euro fiscal discipline and is now staring at more than 20 per cent unemployment, an impending collapse of its banking system and nowhere to turn.<\/p>\n<p>It is mindless to design a monetary system and impose rules whereby the normal operations of the automatic stabilisers force a nation to violate those rules. It is even more mindless to then turn on that nation and impose pro-cyclical policies which further damage the welfare of the citizens.<\/p>\n<p>The Economist Magazine says:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nThe euro allowed these internal imbalances to grow unchecked and now stands in the way of a speedy adjustment, because euro-area countries whose wages are out of whack with their peers&#8217; cannot devalue. For critics of the euro this only points up how far the zone is from being an &#8220;optimal currency area&#8221;. America&#8217;s regional economies may often diverge: a drop in oil prices might prompt a consumer boom in California while leaving Texas depressed. But wages and prices are far more flexible in America and workers have generally been more inclined to move from state to state to find work. By contrast, say the sceptics, the economies of the euro area are too diverse to live with the same money and too inflexible to adjust to imbalances when they arise.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>And moreover, the US government provides strong fiscal transfers to the states that are triggered in times of need. They are not sufficient and in the current context need to be much larger but the fact is that the US system has a central fiscal capacity which is absent in the design of the EMU and is only operating at present &#8211; and outside of the rules &#8211; courtesy of the ECB &#8220;fiscal&#8221; actions.<\/p>\n<p>The Economist, however, doesn&#8217;t get it. They claim that:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nThe euro&#8217;s weaknesses can, with difficulty, be addressed and measures can be put in place that should at least mitigate the build-up of similar problems in future. The zone&#8217;s woes are not unique. Few single countries would meet the academic criteria for optimal currency areas. America has its share of depressed spots-and since almost a quarter of those with mortgages owe more than their houses are worth, America&#8217;s workers are less mobile than they were. Nor is the euro wholly to blame for the credit booms in parts of the zone. Low interest rates and an underpricing of risk were widespread: credit boomed in many countries-America, Britain, Iceland-with floating exchange rates.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The only reason why American states are in as much trouble as some of the EMU states or that Britain and Iceland are suffering can be traced to a common problem &#8211; an inadequate fiscal response. However, that is where the comparison ends. Member states in the EMU are not sovereign whereas the US, Iceland and the UK governments remain sovereign in their own currencies.<\/p>\n<p>In the EMU, there will typically be an inadequate fiscal response by construction. That is the design flaw that makes the whole system dysfunctional and the current ECB actions <em>ad hoc<\/em> to say the least. Necessary but totally arbitrary and in defiance of the logic of the system.<\/p>\n<p>In the case of the US, Iceland and Britain the pain is totally voluntary &#8211; their respective governments refuse to use the fiscal capacity they have as sovereign nations.<\/p>\n<p>But reflecting how misguided the Economist Magazine usually is, they argue, under the heading &#8220;the fiscal fix is in&#8221;:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nNew rules to encourage fiscal discipline should help the euro area. They will reassure the bond-market vigilantes-and should come in handy if the vigilantes drop off again. Now would be a good time for national governments to adopt home-grown fiscal rules, as Germany already has. And as euro members are to underwrite each other&#8217;s debts through the EFSF, it is natural that they should demand more say in each other&#8217;s budgets. European reviews of national budgets for the coming years have already been brought forward by six months. Firmer sanctions, such as withholding of EU funds or suspending members&#8217; voting rights in the euro group, may be considered, but they would be politically fraught.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>But reflecting how misguided the Economist Magazine usually is, they argue, under the heading &#8220;the fiscal fix is in&#8221;:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nNew rules to encourage fiscal discipline should help the euro area. They will reassure the bond-market vigilantes-and should come in handy if the vigilantes drop off again. Now would be a good time for national governments to adopt home-grown fiscal rules, as Germany already has. And as euro members are to underwrite each other&#8217;s debts through the EFSF, it is natural that they should demand more say in each other&#8217;s budgets. European reviews of national budgets for the coming years have already been brought forward by six months. Firmer sanctions, such as withholding of EU funds or suspending members&#8217; voting rights in the euro group, may be considered, but they would be politically fraught.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>You might like to read this blog &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=3038\">Fiscal rules going mad &#8230;<\/a> &#8211; where I outline the recent constitutional developments in Germany that aimed to outlaw budget deficits in the coming years.<\/p>\n<p>I repeat my earlier point &#8211; if the normal operations of the automatic stabilisers violate the rules (when there is a severe negative demand shock) and the stricter imposition of these rules will force even harsher pro-cyclical policy responses &#8211; then the system is flawed at the most elemental level. Imposing even harsher rules just exacerbate that situation.<\/p>\n<p>What this proposal for increased &#8220;governance&#8221; is really about is making sure they don&#8217;t get embarrassed again by nations that breach their ridiculous fiscal rules. They are prepared to impoverish millions of European citizens just so they can hang onto some ill-conceived neo-liberal rules that make no sense in a complex economic world subject to major demand and supply shocks &#8211; which, in turn, are asymmetric in their regional impacts.<\/p>\n<p>Given the diversity of the EMU member nations this asymmetry is lethal to the weaker nations. It beggars belief that the citizenry in those weaker countries would ever tolerate this entrenched austerity for very long.<\/p>\n<p>What benefits do the workers in these nations gain from being subjected to a significantly higher risk of unemployment, declining real wages and working conditions; and diminished access to public infrastructure?<\/p>\n<p>It is clear that the Eurozone leaders haven&#8217;t really learned anything from the crisis at all. Their system has failed to meet the first crisis it faced. Some might say that it succeeded because no government has defaulted. But that is only courtesy of the ECB &#8220;fiscal&#8221; operations disguising the design flaws. Overall, the Euro bosses have breached the strict intent of the &#8220;no bailout&#8221; rules.<\/p>\n<p>Further, the only sustained fiscal response to the crisis by the EMU has been to pressure member governments to employ pro-cyclical policies to get back within the &#8220;rules&#8221; even though the rise in the budget deficits was driven significantly by the automatic stabilisers. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy is the exemplar of bad policy practice and defies the concept of sustainable fiscal intervention.<\/p>\n<p>There are only two ways out: (a) disband the system; or (b) create a central fiscal authority.<\/p>\n<p>The Economist magazine addressed the second option. After noting some advantages (&#8220;cheaper and more efficient to raise taxes centrally&#8221;; &#8220;cheaper to borrow&#8221; (not that a sovereign fiscal authority has to borrow); etc, they reject the idea because:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nA country with high unemployment, say, would have less incentive to make its labour market more supple if jobless benefits were financed federally. Anyway, European countries are nowhere near ready to cede so much fiscal autonomy.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>QED! The design flaw will persist and the policy initiatives being considered will entrench them and make outcomes when the next negative shock hits even worse.<\/p>\n<p>All the rest of the proposals that the Economist Magazine considers relating to increasing international competitiveness (for example, to force Germany as a trade surplus nation to spend more domestically) will fail. But nations are already being bullied into cutting wages and conditions in a vein attempt to become more export-oriented.<\/p>\n<p>Please read my blogs &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=10547\" title=\"Fiscal austerity - the newest fallacy of composition\">Fiscal austerity &#8211; the newest fallacy of composition<\/a> &#8211; and <a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=11559\" title=\"Export-led growth strategies will fail\">Export-led growth strategies will fail<\/a> &#8211; for more discussion on why those policy options are deeply flawed.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>If I lived in Europe right now I would be consulting immigration rules and heading to Australia. Apart from the weather being better at least our government saw fit to introduce strong and early fiscal interventions to quell the worst of the crisis. We are far from being Shangri-La but by comparison some of the Euro nations are becoming hell on earth.<\/p>\n<p>All the policy initiative of the European Council will work to make the situation in Europe even worse and do nothing to address the fundamental design flaw in their monetary system which reflects the dictates of the prevailing neo-liberal logic.<\/p>\n<p>To review the key blogs I have written about the EMU and its failings &#8211; the following blogs may be of further interest to you:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=5377\">Euro zone&#8217;s self-imposed meltdown<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=6545\">A Greek tragedy &#8230;<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=7208\">Espa\u00f1a se est\u00e1 muriendo<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=7362\">Exiting the Euro?<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=7909\">Doomed from the start<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=8093\">Europe &#8211; bailout or exit?<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=8581\">Not the EMF &#8230; anything but the EMF!<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/?p=8963\">EMU posturing provides no durable solution<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>RBA puts rates up again<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Apart from the bank economists getting it wrong again (I joined them this time!) today&#8217;s decision by the RBA to lift interest rates even though by their own admission there is a benign inflation environment at present is mindless. I will address the logic tomorrow.<\/p>\n<p>That is enough for today!\t\t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>I was thinking about the recent European Council meeting today which was held in Brussels over the weekend. It is clear that the Eurozone bosses are choosing to ignore all the lessons that the current crisis has provided to them about the basic design flaws of their monetary system. They think the solution to their&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[55],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12176","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-eurozone","entry","no-media"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12176","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=12176"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12176\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=12176"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=12176"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/billmitchell.org\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=12176"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}